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This thesis focuses on the role of district officers in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in Bengal 
from 1850 to 1905. Existing historiography incorrectly portrays the ICS as a passive coherent 
institution. This has limited our understanding of the significant role of district administration 
in the governance of British India. This thesis demonstrates that an imagined and practised 
idealised district official influenced policy and was integral in the reciprocal production of 
the practices of colonial government. This thesis establishes that this model persona existed 
outside of the Punjab, and had a specific realisation in Bengal. This idealised district officer 
was envisioned as an autonomous man-on-the-spot who could act as a decision maker. 
However, this discretionary capacity conflicted with an increasingly codified, professional 
and bureaucratic ICS. These contradictions were not only between idea and reality but existed 
within the idealisation of the district officer. The tensions produced by the imagined and 
practised district officer shaped debates about governance, the rule of law, and bureaucracy. 
This thesis demonstrates that despite the expansion of bureaucratic control over the practices 
of local administration, the district officer continued to be an autonomous decision maker. 
Through examining key moments of construction and contestation this thesis charts the 
working life-cycle of the idealised district officer. Using a discursive methodology this thesis 
interrogates an underutilised source group, the ‘governing literature’ of British India. These 
manuals, guides and handbooks were instrumental in the crafting of an idealised role. This 
model district officer was integrated into the policies and practices of government. By 
following the idealised district officer as imagined in texts, as a candidate for the 
examinations, as a revenue official, as Magistrate and Judge, in his failures and in his final 
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A note on spelling: Due to the significant variation in the spelling of place names this thesis 
adopts the most consistent British Indian usage during the period under consideration. Indian 
terms have been treated as English nouns, and original spelling has been preserved in all 
quotations.  
 
Ameen / Amin – Indian court official employed to prosecute local enquiries  
Amlah / Omlah - The head Indian official of a judicial or revenue court  
Chaukidar – A village watchman 
Cooley – A labourer 
Cutcherry – A place of public business, an office or court 
Dacoit – An armed robber 
Jamma / juma - A statement / proposal of the public revenue, its amount, and how it has been 
assessed  
Jammabandi - Settlement of the amount of revenue assessed upon an estate, a village, or 
district, a village or district rent-roll, a register of the village holdings  
Khanapuri – The first stage of preparation of the draft record-of-right, a plot map  
Khasra / khusra – A field book, an account of the measurement of the lands of a village 
Khewats - A contribution sometimes levied on rent-free lands in order to compensate for any 
deficit in the revenue 
Lathi – A stick or bludgeon  
Mahalwar / Mauzawar – A division of villages for revenue assessment or demarcation, 
(mouza: village) 
Mofussil – Country, rural stations 
Mohurir – An Indian official responsible for stamps 
Munsif / moonsif – An Indian civil judge of the lowest rank 
Nabob – corrupt Nawab, a Mughal governor, applied to senior East India Company servants  
Pattas - A deed of lease, a document given by the Collector to the Zamindar, or by the 
receiver of revenue to the cultivator  
Patwari – A village accountant and land record officer  
Punkah – A pulley operated fan made of cloth or matting  
Thakbast / thakbust – The process of laying down boundaries in a survey or settlement 
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Qanungo / Kanungo – A Mughal revenue official, worked with patwari  
Ryot / raiyat - A tenant of the soil, an individual occupying land as a cultivator  
Serishtadar - The head ministerial officer of a Court organises cases and certifies paperwork  
Sudder – Chief seat of Government, often referring to revenue courts or revenue court 
officials before 1858 
Talukdar / talookdar – A landholder, often junior to the zemindar  
Vakeel – A legal representative  
Wallah - A person involved in some kind of activity, where they hail from or what they wear, 
e.g. Punkah Wallah  
Zemindar / zamindar – A landholder, often hereditary, responsible for the collection of 
Government revenues 
 
See, H.H. Wilson, Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms and of Useful Words Occurring 
in Official Documents in Relating to the Administration of British India (London, W.H. 
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So I was up in the saddle before sunrise and in the village, ten miles away, at early 
dawn, just in time to find the whole population turned out, with lathis already 
whistling ominously through the air, and two or three planters on horseback with a 
whole posse comitatus at their heels, spoiling for the fray. The moment I 
approached the contending forces collapsed, the lathis disappeared like magic, 
every sign of friction vanished, and the planters laughed and rode away. There 




In his memoir Henry Cotton used this event to represent himself as an idealised district 
officer. His mere presence was enough to disperse the crowd, he was the very persona of the 
Government, and he represented the rule of law. At the time of this incident, in 1869, Cotton 
was serving as Assistant-Magistrate, a junior civilian official, presiding over the subdivision 
of Chuadanga, in the district of Nuddea. He had discovered that a group of planters intended 
to forcibly sow indigo on village lands. As he anticipated conflict it was Cotton’s duty as the 
man-on-the-spot to ride to the scene and prevent trouble.
2
 Cotton was thoroughly aware of the 
role he had embraced. He recounted how on arrival in India he had been ‘directly encouraged 
to assume an attitude of a patronising and superior character’.3 Cotton had a complicated 
relationship with the idealised persona of the district official, initially embracing it and later 
rejecting it, but yet in his memories of India he still frequently cast himself in the role of the 
benevolent, autonomous, and paternalistic ruler.  
This thesis focuses on the role of district officers in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in the 
province of Bengal from 1850 to 1905. The district official, imagined and practised, is 
followed through his working life-cycle from recruitment to retirement. It was a role imagined 
and constructed by individuals like Cotton, but it was also developed and endorsed by the ICS 
and the British Government in India. In the 1909, edition of The Imperial Gazetteer the 
authors described the role of the head of the district: ‘he is the representative of the 
Government in the large area under his charge; in the eyes of the people he embodies the 
                                                 
1
 Sir Henry Cotton, Indian & home memories (London, 1910), 95.  
2
 The image of the district official quelling the riot with a glare has become a cultural trope. Several 
interviewees referred to the influence of Sanders of the River, in Ronald Hunt and John Harrison, The District 
Officer in India 1930 – 1947 (London, 1980), 2-25. Also see, Clive Dewey, Anglo-Indian attitudes: the mind of 
the Indian Civil Service (London, 1993), 5; and J. Bristow, Empire Boys: Adventures in a Man’s World 
(London, 1991).  
3
 Cotton, Indian & home memories, 66.  
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power of the state or “Sarkar”, and it is to him that they primarily look to redress their 
grievances and to promote their welfare’.4 Personally embodying rule and acting as the point 
of contact between the subjects and the colonial government were the fundamental functions 
of the district officer. Throughout the mid to late nineteenth century the district officer 
continued to be imagined as an idealised governor, knowledgeable, independent, moral, and 
benevolent. This idealisation of the role influenced the official mind and the policies of the 
Bengal government. However, as a practical role it could only ever be fraught with 
contradictions. These contradictions emerged from the conflict between the imagined district 
officer and the reality of government. More importantly, they existed within the very idea of 
the district officer.  
The idealised figure of the man-on-the-spot was frequently juxtaposed against the 
machine of government. In 1891, one satirical novel described the bureaucratic defeat of a 
young civil servant: ‘week follows week, year follows year, and at last the griffin awakes and 
faces the truth. The hollow mockery of his beloved office; the grinning sarcasm of red tape’.5 
By the late nineteenth century the ICS had developed into a ‘scientific administration’.6  Land 
revenue, police, jails, public works, schools, forestry, irrigation, settlements and surveys were 
all gradually devolved from the personal workload of the district officer into distinct 
departments under specially trained officials.
7
 Yet as Henry George Keene explained, the 
district officer was still frequently imagined as an independent governor and was ‘expected to 
exert an intelligent control over many elements of local administration’.8  
While not eradicating the autonomous district officer, the creeping impact of 
bureaucratisation did cause tensions and contradictions in the processes and practice of 
government.
9
 Conflict between the capacity and autonomy of the district officer influenced 
policy reforms regarding settlements and surveys, judicial independence, and official conduct. 
However, the district officer continued to be imagined as a decision maker. Maintaining and 
                                                 
4
 William Stevenson Meyer, Richard Burn, James Sutherland Cotton, and Herbert Hope Risley, (eds.) The 
Imperial Gazetteer of India (Oxford, 1909), v1, 49.  
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1897), 179. 
7
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 Kenne, A Servant of ‘John Company’, 232.  
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For a discussion of the role of the district officer in local governance see, Jan-Georg Deutsch, ‘Celebrating 
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even codifying this autonomy remained central to these policy debates. Therefore, this 
idealised role acted as a framework or foundation for the development of strategies of rule 
even within a more regulated conceptualisation of government.  
Rather than diminishing in importance the idealised benevolent and paternalistic district 
official remained significant throughout the challenging and more accountable atmosphere of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century. Through examining key moments of 
construction and contestation, this thesis will argue that a deeply contradictory idealised 
representation did not only influence several policies, but that this role was reciprocally 
shaped by governing practices.  
The period between 1850 and 1905 were the formative years of the ICS. It was during 
this time that the idealised district officer was developed and contested. This thesis takes the 
1850s as a starting point. It was a decade of change for the British Government in India, a 
collection of defining moments rather than a radical break. There is an enduring narrative 
surrounding ICS. It states that by the 1860s a rigid, organised and hierarchical bureaucracy 
emerged out of the mercantilist self-interested East India Company (EIC).
10
 This account still 
dominates histories of India, and, as Nicholas Dirks explains, its repetition enforces the belief 
that ‘nabobs were replaced by bureaucrats who were earnest, mostly middle class, and 
increasingly professional’.11 Central to this allegedly smooth and seamless transition was the 
advent of the competitive examination system in 1854.  
The competition system has been considered the driving force of the professionalization 
of the civil service in India. Transitioning from patronage to examinations did radically 
transform the method of selection, but as will be demonstrated in Chapter Two, it did not 
necessarily change the ethos of the service. The move to competitive examinations was one of 
several moments which enabled the emergence of an idealised district official. This thesis will 
argue that the competitive system did not only strengthen the autonomous model of the 
district official but contributed significantly to this idealised persona.  
Traditionally, the Indian Rebellion, and the subsequent transfer to Crown rule, has been 
credited with causing a break in the style of Government and changing the nature of the ICS.
12
 
                                                 
10
 Accounts of liberal modernity in Britain and Empire still overwhelmingly rely on this image of the ICS, see 
Simon Gunn and James Vernon, (eds.), The peculiarities of liberal modernity in imperial Britain (Berkeley, 
2011). 
11
 Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (London, 2006), 23.  
For a discussion of the Nabob see Tillman W. Netchman, Nabobs: empire and identity in eighteenth century 
Britain (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
12
 See, Thomas Metcalf, The aftermath of revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1964); and Francis G. Hutchins, 




Yet, there was evidently significant continuity between the service of the Company and the 
ICS under Crown rule. As Lewis Wurgaft has argued, ‘the reformist impulse of the 1830s and 
1840s was too overlaid with paternalistic and authoritarian assumptions to warrant such a 
simple division’.13 The Rebellion acted more as a catalyst than an intervention. By confirming 
existing anxieties it merely advanced concerns and enabled the implementation of long 
awaited reforms.
14
 These continuities are more evident in the province of Bengal, where the 
conditions already existed for the realisation of the district officer. While both the advent of 
the competition system and the Indian Rebellion had significant transformative effects neither 
should be overstated.  
 This thesis utilises the 1905 partition of Bengal as an endpoint. The creation of Eastern 
Bengal and Assam was represented as a solution to an overstretched administration.
15
 
Population growth and the subsequent demands on the Bengal Government necessitated a 
division of the region. Curzon argued that it would afford “the opportunity for increased 
contact between the administration and the people by easing the former’s burden”.16 
However, the partition was also motivated by a desire to curtail the political influence of 
Calcutta elites over the Bengali community. In 1904, H.H. Risley, Home Secretary to the 
Government of India, explained “one of our main objects is to split up, and thereby weaken a 
solid body of opponents to our rule”.17 The partition was made along physical, linguistic, and 
ethnological lines. The British created a majority Muslim province, consolidated control over 
the tea industry in the region, and attempted to establish a new centre of political opinion at 
Dacca. The partition resulted in significant changes in the organisation of the ICS. After 1905, 
the districts of Eastern Bengal, with which this thesis is primarily concerned, were 
administered according to the non-regulation province system, with Deputy Commissioners 
replacing Collector-Magistrates as heads of the districts. This transition was not the end of the 
idealised district officer, but the role once again shifted to cope with the reforms of the new 
century. This shift is outside the scope of this discussion, but is worth noting nonetheless. 
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 Lewis D. Wurgaft, The imperial imagination: magic and myth in Kipling's India (Middletown, 1986), 19.  
Also see E.M Collingham who argues that the Rebellion confirmed existing narratives and acted as a catalyst 
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(Cambridge, 2001), 113.  
Alternatively, Christopher Herbert convincingly demonstrates that the real impact of the Mutiny was felt at 
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By concentrating particularly on Bengal, this thesis offers an alternative focus to the 
dominant narratives surrounding the ICS, and re-orients the discussion of the district official 
away from the highly militarised regions such as the Punjab. The Punjab and North Western 
Provinces have incorrectly acted as a blueprint for histories of the ICS. By focusing on the 
legacy of the Lawrences, these accounts frequently fail to acknowledge that the governing 
practices of the Punjab School were rooted in a particular ideology of rule.
18
 As Kathryn 
Tidrick argues: ‘it is in the 1840s, in the Punjab, the last remaining corner of India to be 
brought under British control, that we find the first signs of a distinctive governing ethos 
which was to capture the imagination of the public and the imperial civil service alike’.19 The 
‘Soldier Sahibs’ of the Punjab were undeniably influential, and certainly had popular appeal, 




During the annexation of the region, the Governor General, Viscount Hardinge, 
insisted ‘British administration in the Punjab should be undertaken on a direct yet paternalistic 
basis’.21 This style of rule was primarily limited to the period during, and immediately after, 
annexation. Yet, the Government remained highly militarised throughout the nineteenth 
century.
22
 Despite attempts to bolster civilian Government, civil service reforms allowed 
military personnel to continue to dominate the administration.
23
 It was a source of tension in 
the ICS as army officers were often promoted over covenanted civil servants in non-
                                                 
18
 The Punjab school was popularised by Kaye, see, John William Kaye, Lives of Indian officers (London, 
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regulation provinces like the Punjab.
24
 Therefore the governance of the Punjab was shaped by 
the specificity of its staff and the environment.  
It is necessary to unpack the cultural legacy of the Punjab School and particularly its 
role in British imperial literature. As Catherine Coombs explains the Punjab was frequently 
imagined ‘as the setting which represented the best and most authentic image of British-
Indian life’.25 As chapter one will discuss, the cult of Victorian heroism and imperial 
masculinity indisputably drew on the legacies of the Lawrences.
26
 However, the focus on the 
Soldier Sahibs has neglected the contradictory and anxious atmosphere district officers 
functioned within.  By concentrating on Bengal, this thesis will demonstrate that the idealised 
district officer existed outside of the Punjab environment.  
This thesis argues that despite the very different governing practises of the ICS in the 
Punjab and Bengal, the idealised district officer in Bengal shared many of the characteristics 
of the Soldier Sahib.
27
 Autonomous masculinity, paternalism and an outdoor lifestyle were 
salient features of both model personas. As the place seen as being governed by the most 
bureaucratic form of rule, Bengal provides a more useful site for charting and analysing the 
idealised district officer. Dewey described Bengal as ‘the night watchman state’,28 and argued 
that district administration in Bengal was reduced to the status of caretaker, mechanically 
carrying out long established procedures. This view of the Bengal ICS has dominated our 
understanding and has influenced historical accounts of governing practices.
29
 However, this 
thesis argues that the model district official was not eclipsed by the rise of bureaucracy but 
                                                 
24
 Covenanted were members of the ICS who had signed the covenant, after 1853 this term denoted the senior 
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remained an influential persona, and was informed by and contributed to the development of 
bureaucratic government. While this thesis does not seek to make a comparison between 
Bengal and Punjab, it is the key contribution of this thesis that an idealised district officer 
developed in Bengal and yet shared common features with a ruling style more typical of the 
non-regulation provinces. Therefore, the crucial contradiction between heroic autonomy and 
bureaucratic regulation was more apparent in Bengal than the Punjab. 
Building on Jon Wilson’s work, this thesis argues that the idealised district officer 
developed alongside bureaucracy and codification.
30
 Wilson offers an account of colonial 
state formation based on an often anxious process of human interaction, revealing the 
complex personal motivations occurring in the decision-making process. By tracing the 
development of abstract principles and categories for governance, Wilson reflects on the 
disjuncture between policy and practice. The ‘strangers’ of Wilson’s account refashioned 
themselves into an idealised role, a prefabricated character which they could inhabit in order 
to make sense of the world and their place in it. The investment in an idealised district officer 
was motivated by the belief that the man-on-the-spot understood the locality and was better 
placed than arbitrary rules and inflexible policy.  
However, Peter Robb argues that in the later nineteenth century ‘the generalist 
government officer became unable to cope with the weight and complexity of business and 
information; there could no longer be the one fount of all state power and actions’.31 Robb 
argues that the gradual expansion of the colonial state necessitated the ordering of 
knowledge, codification and the creation of bureaucratic structures.
32
  It is undeniable that the 
structure of the administration of the Raj developed greater scope and complexity, but it is the 
dislocation between discretion, procedure, and practice which requires our attention. David 
Ludden states that by the late nineteenth century the character of the ICS was that of a 
professional regime: 
 
to qualify as an officer of the state would no longer demand detailed personal 
expertise in local administrative discourse and intricate political reality. Quite the 
contrary. Careers would henceforth be made by imbibing the ethos and discipline 
of an Anglo-Indian imperial bureaucracy.
33
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This impression of an impersonal bureaucracy, as expressed by Ludden and Robb, reflects the 
detailed and comprehensive histories of the ICS by B.B Misra.
34
 Misra insists that the ICS 
was the realisation of a Weberian rational bureaucracy. This argument credits the British 
Government in India with not only a coherent, but a teleological agenda. This 
historiographical ‘illusion of permanence’ has discouraged investigations into the 
complexities of the ICS.
35
 Such homogenizing tendencies are often based on the conclusions 
made in intellectual histories of India.
36
 In these accounts, the coherent and passive ICS acts 
as a medium for grand schemes of Government and political ideas. When the ICS is viewed 
through the lens of the Mills, Macaulay and Stephens, the significance of the district officer is 
obscured by the focus on intellectual agendas.
37
 Influenced by the work of the Cambridge 
school, this thesis seeks to challenge this vision of British Indian Government.
38
 John 
Gallagher argued that colonial power ‘was hobbled at every turn. It depended on local allies 
and local conditions that might buckle its policies. Often it did not know what it was doing.’39 
Acknowledging that the ICS existed in an insecure and unclear environment, amongst 
collaboration and resistance, enables us to better understand the importance attributed to the 
experience of the district officer. Therefore, by relying on metropolitan and high political 
discussions intellectual historians have neglected the fundamental influence of Indian 
experience on the ICS. This thesis challenges Eric Stokes claim that ‘the transformation of the 
“Englishman” from nabob to Sahib was also fundamentally an English and not an Indian 
transformation’.40 As this thesis will demonstrate, the idealised district officer was imagined 
and practised in Britain and India.  
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While this thesis does not intend to trace the impact of utilitarianism, liberalism or 
conservatism on district officers, it does recognise the influence of various political and 
intellectual trends on the official mind.
41
 The idealised district officer with his paternalistic 
tendencies was utilised by utilitarians, liberals and conservatives alike. Indeed, the persona of 
the district official could embody the prestige and pageantry of Conservative tradition and the 
moral civilsing impulse of Liberalism.
42
 This persona was pragmatic, fluid and continuously 
contested and reconstructed. It is the continuing commitment to the idealised district officer, 
and the complexities and anxieties that it produced, which this thesis will explore. Ultimately, 
the official mind continued to imagine and represent ‘a semi-mythical tradition of horse-back 
rule’, despite the impracticality of this role in a more bureaucratic British India.43  
This thesis explores the idealised district officer, imagined and practised, through his 
working life cycle. Using a discursive methodology this model persona is charted from 
representations in administrative texts, to the ICS examinations, and then explored in 
problematic governing practices. In order to examine this idealised district official, this thesis 
interrogates an underutilised source group, the ‘governing literature’ of British India.44 These 
manuals, guides and handbooks were instrumental in the crafting of an idealised role. 
Governing literature reciprocally influenced the district officer. It provided a platform for this 
persona, offered information and guidance to officials, and in return these texts were shaped 
by the experiences and governing practices of district administrators. These books collated 
and curated the persona of the idealised district officer. It is through them, that this thesis 
explores the defining characteristics, contradictions and anxieties which shaped the district 
officer and his governing experience.  
The idealised district official is traced through reforms, policies and debates, including 
the advent of the competition system, the role of the revenue official in settlements and 
surveys, and the judicial autonomy of the district officer in corporal punishment. In addition 
to governing literature, this thesis examines a range of Government and public sources, 
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including official documents, legislation, and published texts. Multiple sources regarding the 
governing practices of district administration have been analysed, including documents from 
the National Archives of India at New Delhi and the State Archives of West Bengal in 
Kolkata. However, the primary focus of this thesis is the idealised district officer as imagined 
and constructed by the official mind. Therefore, the discussion of the model persona in 
practise is limited to policy debates and discussions. It is outside the scope of this thesis to 
examine the everyday processes of government at the district level. While governing practices 
and bureaucratic systems are discussed, this thesis is interested in the influence and role of the 
idealised district officer according to the British Government in Bengal. By exploring the 
model persona of the district officer, this thesis offers a nuanced perspective on the British 
Indian official mind and the ICS. This introduction will now consider the historiography 
regarding the ICS and the Government of India, then will follow a discussion of the 
theoretical influences on this thesis, next the role of the district officer in the Province of 
Bengal is briefly described, and finally an outline of the chapters is provided. 
‘A historiography which neglects the ruling race’: The historiography of the ICS 
 
This thesis offers a new account of the district officer, and subsequently explores the 
significance of this idealised persona in the governance of Bengal.
45
 The history of the ICS 
has been confined principally to detailed accounts of the structure of the administration, 
biographical studies, and anecdotal narratives from former civil servants.
46
 This thesis seeks 
to move beyond these personal accounts and political administrative histories. As Bradford 
Spangenberg notes, the historiography of the ICS is often ‘permeated by an aura of romantic 
mythology’.47 While the district officer features prominently in this literature, he is frequently 
portrayed as a semi-mythical benevolent figure.
48
 According to H.M.L. Alexander, this 
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historiography tried to ‘capture and recreate was the spirit of the ICS’.49 These histories 
provided crucial perspectives on the official mind at the end of Empire but they also 
established a series of unhelpful tropes.  
In the 1970s and 80s there was an effort to recover the ICS from the image of a 
romanticised and altruistic service.
50
 By focusing on the problems with recruitment and the 
disillusion of the competition wallah generation in the late nineteenth century, Bradford 
Spangenberg successfully dismissed the myths of the ICS popularised by other histories.
51
 
The historiographical challenge to Raj nostalgia built upon Spangenberg’s work.52 These 
histories discuss the interwar period, specifically focusing on the recruitment issues and the 
path to decolonisation. In these revisionist discussions the image of the district officer was 
overhauled, and recast as the bench-mark of decline, and the indicator of impending crisis.  
As Simon Epstein argues, the diminishing powers and abilities of the district officer in 
the face of nationalism and war revealed his fundamental, and fragile, role as ‘the physical 
embodiment of Government’.53 Epstein et al. successfully argue that the idealised district 
officer was dismantled by the political pressures of the twentieth-century, rather than merely 
being eclipsed by the growth in government. Indeed, the endurance of the idealised district 
officer demonstrates the continued commitment of the Raj to this contradictory and 
problematic role. It was his inability to remain an autonomous arbiter which proved the 
undoing of the model district official, as the horseback paternalist proved to be incompatible 
with representative government. While these histories confirm that an idealised district 
official continued to exist in the official mind even in the interwar period, they do not explain 
the origins of this significant persona. This thesis addresses this absence in the historiography 
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of the ICS. It examines the characteristics and influence of the imagined district officer on the 
practices and policies in Bengal.  
There is a similar historiographical trajectory in accounts of African district 
administration. The administrative services of the African Empire provide the closest 
comparison to the district officer in India.
54
 Crucially Anthony Kirk-Green demonstrates that 
the district officer of the Colonial Administrative Services (CAS) was often based on the idea 
and practices of the ICS.
55
 The district officer in Africa ‘constituted an across-the-board and 
immediate identity, neither rank-specific nor territory-specific, simply the symbol of 
authority’.56 Recruitment focused on character, initiative and leadership, and as a result the 
African Empire was supposed to be staffed by a more practical rendering of the idealised 
district officer. Kirk-Greene’s nostalgic narrative focuses primarily on the men who ‘rejected 
the bustling vulgarity of bureaucratic administration and increasing political nationalism and 
saw themselves being nearer to the people and in the “real Africa” when they were out in the 
bush’.57 Christopher Prior’s account of imperial administration in Africa unpacks this image 
of the CAS as a monolithic body inspired by altruistic duty.
58
 Prior insists on a historiography 
which challenges existing tropes and assumptions: ‘to suggest that officials were merely latent 
vehicles for a particular policy, conception of Empire or pattern of behaviour, shaped by 
either the metropole or the region in which they worked, has effectively denied them 
agency’.59 It is perhaps a step too far to claim those at the centre of the colonial government 
have been denied agency, but Prior is correct to draw attention to the homogenizing 
tendencies in existing historiography. It is not that civil servants of Empire have been denied 
agency, it is that their agency has been rendered to the passive adoption and facilitation of 
policy and ideology.  This thesis similarly seeks to return the district officer to the centre of 
these discussions, and demonstrate that the ICS was not a vehicle for metropolitan ideologies, 
instead the idealised district officer often influenced policy. 
Analyses of the impact of representations of the ICS have been primarily limited to the 
twentieth-century and post-Independence discussion of Empire. H.M.L Alexander argued that 
the image of the ICS was influenced and affected by the public representation of its work, and 
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the preconceived notions of its abilities. He explained ‘civilians identified with this received 
image while at the same time contributing to its elaboration. Their self-image was thus a 
mixed collection of inherited and assimilated beliefs, and was also the result of a continuing 
process of image-building’.60 Alexander believes the civilian officials were mostly unaware of 
the process of image building, a claim that this thesis disputes.  
The experience of Independence produced a quantity of memoirs and oral interviews 
which reflected on experiences in the ICS.
61
 As Catherine Coombs explains, these documents 
and accounts offered an opportunity for retired district officials to ‘re-constitute a sense of the 
value of the role they had played as an administrative corps, and to reinforce their belief in 
the need of Indian people for paternalistic government’.62 Coombs successfully demonstrates 
that there was a conscious self-fashioning in the post-1947 account of the administration. 
Therefore, to argue that district officials were unaware of the process of image building is 
certainly not true for the men of the decolonisation decades. Furthermore, as Clive Dewey 
argues, these representations drew on the imagined ICS of the nineteenth century.  
The conscious and active process of building the image of a district officer in the ICS is 
discussed in Dewey’s Anglo Indian Attitudes. Dewey’s work is an intensely researched 
biographic study of two interwar civilians, Malcolm Darling and Frank Brayne. Central to 
Dewey’s narrative is the belief that the men of the ICS were cognisant of the image of the 
service and could fashion alternative or complementary ideal roles within existing 
parameters. While, this is a thorough account of the working lives of two civil servants, it 
does not satisfactorily demonstrate beyond two specific case studies that the men of the ICS 
‘were the prisoners of the values they absorbed in their youth’.63 This thesis seeks to develop 
this discussion, not through detailed biographical study, but through an exploration of the 
persona of idealised district official, his realisation in governing literature and his influence 
on policy and practise. In order to understand this influential role it is essential to situate it in 
the contradictory bureaucratic atmosphere of the British Raj. The idealised district officer 
was defined by the tensions between the imagined role and the practical work of government. 
It is these tensions, the policies and debates that they produced which this thesis will explore.  
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‘The whole machine of government’: Bureaucracy, governance and the ICS 
 
Despite the bureaucratic realities of the working life of the district officer The Imperial 
Gazetteer continued to confidently represent the district officer as a benevolent, paternalistic 
and autonomous official:  
 
A Collector of strong and sympathetic character with the gift of insight may gain 
the strongest hold over the affections and imagination of the peasantry and tales of 
his sagacity and good deeds will be told in remote villages many years after his 




This thesis argues that the Government of India remained committed to the autonomous 
district official, and that this idealised persona developed in conjunction with the expanding 
bureaucracy.
65
  However, this continued investment in an idealised personal and discretionary 
style of rule did result in conflicts and tensions within the government and policy decisions. 
These issues were negotiated through ideas of professionalism and expertise. Bernard 
Silberman argues that decision makers could ‘create structures for the perpetuation of 
decision making roles’.66 This was achieved in the ICS by forming a distinctive code of 
behaviour centred on the objective and expert knowledge of the idealised district officer. 
Hierarchy, discretion and rule-bound information management all combined to preserve the 
district officer as a decision maker and refashion him as a professional.  
The role of information management has been explored by Bernard Cohn. Cohn 
argued that through the process of information categorisation ‘the British overtly designed 
their own role as a contradictory ideal which they struggled to adhere to. They set themselves 
an ideal type against which they were never going to successfully measure.’67 For Cohn, this 
ideal type was conversely constructed in opposition to the definitions imposed on the 
colonised. Reducing the district officer to a persona merely constructed in contrast to the 
colonial subject neglects the tensions and anxieties within the British official mind. 
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Furthermore, Cohn’s account of the projects of knowledge production often ignored the 
anxieties and conflicts between these grander schemes of governance, and the daily practices 
of the district officer. It is these tensions which this thesis seeks to explore by examining an 
idealised governing role.  
This idealised governing role, the district officer, was shaped by mundane acts and 
techniques of governance. Therefore, we must understand how government was also 
influenced by this imagined and practised persona. It is the relationship between the acts of 
governing and the idealised governor which this thesis takes as a theoretical framework. As 
Foucault asserted, ‘a person who wishes to govern the state well must first learn how to 
govern himself’.68 There has been insufficient attention on the acts of Governmentality which 
aimed to regulate the officials of the State. Furthermore, discussions of Governmentality have 
frequently been limited to Europe, with the exception of Joyce’s discussion of India, and have 
therefore neglected the impact of Governmentality on the officials of the Empire.
69
  
Patrick Joyce, building on the work of Nikolas Rose, has drawn our attention to what he 
has termed ‘technologies’ of the State. Joyce has thus interpreted Foucault’s Governmentality 
as a scheme or apparatus of government action which achieves political authority through 
strategies, techniques and procedures.
70
 For Foucault and Rose, Governmentality can be 
defined as the ‘conduct of conduct’.71 Essentially, for Joyce, Governmentality is the 
production of the self-regulating subject who facilitates the power of the State.  
It is Joyce’s discussion of liberal Governmentality which has the most relevance for this 
thesis. Joyce is particularly concerned ‘with how the governors sought to work upon 
themselves, as well upon others, in the elaboration of an ethics of governance’.72 For Joyce 
liberal Governmentality was defined by the separation of the administrative from the political 
via technical expertise, ethical personae and codes of behaviour. He invites us to consider the 
‘techniques and technologies operating not only upon the governed but upon the bureaucratic 
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self’.73 Rose in particular calls for attention ‘to the mundane, little government techniques and 
tools, such as interviews, case records, diaries, brochures and manuals’.74 By examining 
mundane textual technologies, as well as practice and policy, this thesis interrogates the 
governance of British India through an imagined idealised district official.  
Regrettably, in his occasionally totalising account, the anxieties, tensions and local level 
issues are absent from Joyce’s work. Moments of contestation and failure frequently provide 
useful reflections on governing ethos and mundane practices. By utilising moments of 
construction and contestation this thesis explores the reciprocal impact of the idealised district 
officer on the governance of India. While Joyce acknowledges the ‘localist tendencies’ in 
British India, he concludes that a rational bureaucracy, a paper empire was able to know and 
capture action on the ground.
75
 Although Joyce’s arguments about the reiterative power of 
bureaucratic writing are useful, by viewing governance ‘at a distance’, through the lens of the 
paper machine of the India Office, Joyce naturally decides that records and writing dominated 
government practice. This leads him to the conclusion that ‘bureaucracy depends on the 
extinction of the individual personality of the bureaucrat and its replacement by what is 
designed to be regarded as the neutral personhood of the bureaucrat’.76 This was not the case 
for the district officer. The faceless bureaucrat, in the guise of the competition wallah, was a 
spectre in the official mind, as will be explored further. In fact, the British Government in 
India consistently rejected the neutral and mechanical bureaucrat and valued what Peter Cain 
has described as ‘a degree of flexibility in colonial management’.77 The idealised district 
official was a model official persona defined by character, human relationships, experience 
and personally cultivated knowledge. By using the mundane technologies of governance to 
explore the construction and contestation of the idealised district official this thesis offers a 
new intervention in histories of governance.  
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‘He belongs all the time to that little Island’: The district officer as coloniser 
 
In order to achieve this wider examination of the idealised district officer this thesis utilises an 
analytical framework which draws on New Imperial histories.
78
 This thesis situates itself 
within the New Imperial School as it seeks to recognise and problematize a persona informed 
by colonial, gendered and racial discourse.
79
 As Homi Bhaba explains, colonial discourse is a 
‘form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always “in place,” 
already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated’.80 While not entirely absent 
from New Imperial histories, the figure of the district officer has often remained in the 
background. This omission demonstrates how naturalised this persona has become, the district 
officer is uniquely emblematic of the British Empire, yet this idealised role has not been 
considered a useful site of analysis. However, as this thesis demonstrates, this complex figure 
was constantly re-negotiated and re-asserted in the official mind and in the policies of British 
Indian Government. The idealised district officer epitomises that which was always known 
but anxiously repeated.  
New Imperial histories have been criticised for failing to move beyond the imagery of 
discourse. Wilson explains that ‘what is missing is an interpretation of the historical process 
by which a particular form of discourse comes into being and then has an effect on the world 
around it’.81 By interrogating the discursive construction and contestation of an idealised 
persona this thesis seeks to move beyond the representation of an imagined idealised district 
officer. The analytical tools of the New Imperial scholars have been utilised to offer an 
alternative socio-cultural history of colonial government. This thesis considers the impact of 
categories of difference on the persona of the district official, and then examines the 
subsequent influence of this role on British governance in Bengal.  
Drawing on the work of Catherine Hall this thesis examines how a specific 
governmental role was shaped by the experiences of Empire and Home.
82
 According to Hall, 
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Empire was continually feeding into British society and culture, and colonial difference 
‘intersected with, and helped to reformulate, British domestic discourses of class, ethnic and 
gender difference’.83 The idealised district officer was a product of these discourses, as Hall 
explains ‘Englishmen were able to use the power of the colonial stage to disrupt the 
traditional class relations of their own country, and enjoy new forms of direct power over 
“subject peoples”’.84 As discussed in Chapter Two, the character of the idealised district 
officer was informed by debates regarding class, Britishness and masculinity. However, 
tension existed between the imagined ideal of an autonomous benevolent and masculine 
figure and the realities of bureaucratic labour. These contradictions informed the debate 
regarding the competition system. By examining the idealised district official this thesis 
demonstrates the impact and function of gendered and racial discourses in the realm of 
governance 
 The significance of these discourses in British India has been discussed by Mrinalini 
Sinha and E.M. Collingham, and this thesis builds on their conclusions.
85
 Sinha considers the 
centrality of ideas of masculinity to the project of rule. By using gender as a lens through 
which to observe British governance in India, Sinha reveals the significant role of racial, 
bodily and gendered discourses on the practices and policies of the Raj. The claims regarding 
legitimate rule frequently drew on a specific male British identity which Sinha calls the 
‘manly Englishman’. Indian and alternative white masculinities threatened the stability of 
these legitimising discourses. Therefore the ‘manly Englishman’, and his style of government, 
was increasingly defined in opposition to the Bengali elites. The idealised district officer, an 
expression of the ‘manly Englishman’ was similarly constructed through reciprocal 
contestations. Crucially, the idealised district officer adjusted according to the material 
conditions of Empire. This model persona evolved to reflect the racial, bodily and gendered 
discourses of the nineteenth century.  
However, as Collingham argues, this was an anxious and contradictory process. 
Collingham charts the bodily transformation of the: 
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nabob from the flamboyant, effeminate and wealthy East India Company servant, 
open to Indian influence and into whose self-identity India was incorporated, to 




This was a symbolic and physical journey during which the body of the sahib became an 
instrument of rule. It was a role defined not only by physical experience and representation 
but also by the acts of governance. Maintaining the symbolic power of the ruling body was 
crucial to the continuing stability of British rule. Collingham argues that bureaucratisation 
disciplined the colonising body, and reduced it to an impersonal administrator. However, as 
discussed in Chapter One, the idealised district officer continued to be characterised by 
outdoor paternalism. The body of the Competition Wallah, the disciplined bureaucrat, was 
considered inadequate for the task of governing. This thesis argues that the continuing 
commitment to the symbolic masculinity of the idealised district officer in governing 
literature was a deliberate articulation of imperial power. 
As Elizabeth Buettner has demonstrated, racial identity and Britishness, like 
masculinity, were defined not just through discursive constructs, but by the active 
maintenance of ‘whiteness’.87 Permanent impermanence was vital in the forging of the 
specifically British Indian racial identity and it also enabled family continuity in the staffing 
of the Raj.
88
 Buettner argues that acts of transience were part of ‘the integral role of family 
practices in the reproduction of imperial rule’.89 This thesis seeks to build on Buettner’s work 
by examining the cultural and social practices which crafted the persona of the idealised 
district officer. The investment in the model persona of a district official was incentivised by 
the inherent contradictions presented by the civilising and benevolent project of colonial rule 
in British India. By insisting upon the necessity and importance of a white, British, 
paternalistic official persona, the Government attempted to circumvent promises of tutelage 
and self-governance.
90
 Even into the twentieth-century district officials could ‘simply step 
into an established role, supported by the props of their official position, white skins; a 
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supposedly manly Anglo-Saxon physique’.91 This was the sahib’s mask of Orwell’s 
epiphany, and this thesis will explore its construction, contestation and influence in British 
Indian governance. In order to fully appreciate the influence of the idealised district officer in 
mid to late nineteenth-century British India, this thesis first examines the origins of the role. 
The model persona was a product of the policies, practices and environment of the Bengal 
Government. 
‘People accustomed to a despotic authority should look to one master’: The history of the 
district officer  
 
The details of the working life of the district officer in the nineteenth century have not 
received recent historiographical attention.
92
 Accounts of district administration have 
frequently focused on the expanding machine of Government.
93
 Increases in subordinate 
staff, departmentalisation and codification have all been credited with suppressing the role 
and power of the district officer. Instead, the increased size of the administration caused 
tensions and anxieties about the position of the autonomous decision-making district officer. 
However, the official mind continued to prioritise this idealised persona in policy and 
practice. Before tracing the life-cycle of the imagined and practised model district officer, 
this thesis will outline the history of his working role, and the context of Bengal district 
administration.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with the Lower Provinces of Bengal, the territory 
established as the Presidency of Bengal under the Government of Bengal in 1854.
94
 In 1867, 
the province of Bengal was 246,785 square miles with a population of 42,505,222. By 1905, 
after the partitioning and separation of Assam and Eastern Bengal, the province measured 
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151,185 square miles with a population of 74,744,866.
95
 In 1905 Bengal had 48 districts and 
134 subdivisions, the average area of a district was 3,300 square miles, and the average 
population was 1.5 million.
96
 On average there were 216 members of the ICS stationed in 
Bengal, 35 were Judges, 52 were executive district officers, and 106 were junior civilians.
97
  
Henry Beveridge explained that the districts were mostly the result of artificial 
divisions by the British, but the district officials were ‘apt to forget this, and that they 
endeavour to account for certain phenomena in a district as if it was an entity which had been 
separated off for as a long a time as an English shire or parish’.98 Districts were often 
compared to British counties or regions in order to express the comparative size of the 
administrative area, Wales and Yorkshire were considered standard measurements.
99
 Each 
district was organised into one of nine divisions, these divisions were the responsibility of a 
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Figure 1 – Map of the districts of West Bengal and Bangladesh101 
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Figure 2 – Map of India 1857102 
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Figure 3 – Map of India 1894103 
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Table 2 – Districts of Bengal 1886104 
 
Name  Districts Sub-divisions 
Burdwan 6 17 
Presidency 6 23 
Rajshahye 7 14 
Dacca 4 16 
Chittagong 4 9 
Patna 7  23 
Bhagulpore  5 17 
Orissa 3 7 
Chota Nagpur  4 6 
Total 46 132 
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The head of each district was the Collector-Magistrate. This role underwent a complex 
development from the Early Company period. Thirty-six Collectorships were established in 
1786, along with the Board of Revenue to act as supervisor. The judicial powers of the 
Collector were withdrawn by Regulation II of 1793.
105
 This resulted in the development of the 
judicial branch of the service which will be discussed further below. During the early 
nineteenth century the junior and subordinate establishment of the Collector was gradually 
enlarged.
106
 Commissioners of Revenue and Circuit were established in 1829 and were 
designed to be accessible to the people, expected to frequently visit their districts and 
supervise the work of the Collector-Magistrates. The creation of Deputy-Magistrates (Act XV 
of 1843) and Subdivisions (1845) reflected the increasing workload of the district 
Government.
107
 By the mid-nineteenth century local district administration was already 
characterised by increased complexity and rational organisation. This culminated in the 
reunification of the roles of Collector and Magistrate in 1859. The gradual progression of 
legislation demonstrates that the model of an idealised district official could only have 
emerged towards the end of the mid-nineteenth century in Bengal, and therefore, tracing its 
origins to the Punjab is fundamentally misleading.  
The consolidation of district administration in the role of the Collector-Magistrate was 
further achieved by the shift to codification in the 1860s.
108
 The Criminal Procedure Code 
defined the criminal judicial work of the Magistracy. The Magistracy was divided into three 
classes with the first class being the most senior.
109
 The Judge of the Court of Sessions was 
the senior judicial officer at the district level, empowered to try criminal cases and award the 
death penalty, subject to confirmation by the High Court. Criminal justice was conducted in 
the Courts of the District Magistrate, aided by Assistant and Deputy-Magistrates. Civil justice 
was tried in the subordinate district courts and the court of the district munsifs. Therefore, 
while the judiciary was accountable to the High Court at Calcutta, the Magistracy remained 
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entwined with the executive district administration. The separation of the executive and the 
judicial services remained problematic throughout the period under consideration.  
In 1873, George Campbell, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, proposed a new system of 
parallel promotion. The scheme aimed to secure parallel but separated career paths for the 
judicial and executive branches. Historically, district officers had frequently switched 
between executive and judicial roles. As Henry Cotton explained, the purpose of Campbell’s 
scheme was ‘to secure more permanent, more efficient, and more experienced officers for the 
charge of districts and other important executive duties.’110 In 1875 the parallel promotion 
system was confirmed, civil servants had to choose whether to pursue the executive or judicial 
branch between the tenth and twelfth year of service. Once the decision was made the district 
officer could not revert to either branch without the express permission of the Government.
111
  
In 1881 the decision deadline was reduced to the ninth year of service. Members of the 
High Court Judiciary argued ‘the work of the Courts has become so specialised that it can 
only be mastered by an officer who is able to devote himself to it from an early period of his 
service to the exclusion of all other studies’.112 The role of the judge was suited to early 
specialisation due to the technical and detailed study required. However, there were 
considerable difficulties attracting civilians to the judicial branch as promotion was slow and 
infrequent.
113
 Furthermore, it was argued that by fixing the decision so early in the career of a 
civil servant, the judiciary would be increasingly staffed by men without sufficient experience 
of executive or revenue business.
114
   
Therefore the separation of judicial and executive district administration was revisited 
again in the 1890s. Charles Elliot, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, believed the judiciary 
viewed the executive with increasing suspicion and hostility.  
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The same man acts a Judge in the hot weather, hearing appeals from a Magistrate 
who is his senior, but in the cold weather he loses his acting appointment, and 
becomes a Joint-Magistrate serving under the orders of the very Magistrate whom 
he may have censured or instructed in his official position. This cannot be good 
for the temper and discipline of the officers concerned.
115
     
 
It was eventually decided that civil servants would make the decision after they had served as 
a third class district magistrate. This was considered an appropriate level of experience as the 
judicial officer would have sufficient exposure to executive and revenue administration before 
pursuing the bench. However, Elliot’s concerns about overlapping roles continued to be 
problematic, especially with the increasing Indianisation of the service in the later nineteenth 
century.  
During the period considered by this thesis Indian covenanted civil servants were a 
minority and even fewer achieved and held senior district official positions.
116
 Uncovenanted 
and subordinate services were almost entirely staffed by Indians. As this thesis discusses, 
district officers overwhelmingly relied on the Deputy Collectors and Indian Magistrates. 
Indeed, the uncovenanted and subordinate officials bore the majority of the workload of 
district government. Despite recruitment challenges, there was considerable reluctance to 
involve Indians in the administration of Government. By 1870 only five Indians had been 
admitted into the covenanted service. Between 1861 and 1905, 356 Indian candidates sat the 
examination, and only 68 were successful.
117
  
The Indianisation of the civil service has been excellently and comprehensively 
examined by Sukanya Banerjee and Malti Sharma.
118
 However, as this thesis focuses on the 
idealised district officer it is not within the scope of the study to consider the role and impact 
of Indian officials, except when they interacted with the imagined and practised district 
official. The persona of the district officer was imagined and usually practised by white 
British men.  Therefore, the decision to examine the governance of India from the perspective 
of the British official mind has resulted in a restricted discussion of the significant 
                                                 
115
 No 2328A, From H.J.S Cotton Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal To Secretary of Govt of India, 
home department, Calcutta, 31st March 1894, IOR/L/PJ/6/418, File 6601 April 1896, Time at which Bengal 
Civilians between the Executive and Judicial branches of the administration in Bengal, p. 4. 
116
 Romesh Chunder Dutt was the first Indian to achieve executive rank in 1883, J.N. Gupta, The life of R. C. 
Dutt (1911). 
117
 Between 1861 and 1891 there were 1296 appointments offered, only 24 of these went to Indians, or 1.9%.  
BL, IOR/L/PJ/6/1053, File 4647 19th December 1910 - 6th January 1911, Successful Indian Candidates 1886 – 
1910 and BL, IOR/L/PJ/6/315, File 293 11th February 1892, Native Candidates. 
118
 Sharma, Indianization of the civil services in British India; and Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming imperial 
citizens: Indians in the late-Victorian Empire, (Durham, 2010). 
Also see, Compton, ‘Indians and the Indian Civil Service’, 99-113. 
40 
 
contributions of Indian civil servants, subordinate officials and district collaborators. This is 
not a deliberate exclusion, or in any sense a denial of the presence and fundamental role of the 
Indian Government officials, but merely the product of the perspectives examined and the 
policies and practices discussed.  
This thesis recognises that the governing work of British India was frequently 
achieved through the labour of Indians.
119
 In the 1870s the Government of India made a 
commitment to reduce recruitment to the covenanted services and expand the subordinate 
Indian administration. In 1858 executive district staff in Bengal totalled 113 covenanted and 
100 uncovenanted, (see table 3).
120
 By 1886 the covenanted staff had slightly increased to 198 
while the uncovenanted had reached 738, (see table 4). This expansion of the subordinate 
services was primarily in response to the departmentalisation of local government.  
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Table 3 – Bengal ICS 1858121 
 
Covenanted  1858  
Bengal Secretariat  2 








Covenanted Total 113 
Uncovenanted 100 
Deputy Collectors and Magistrates 100 
Grand Total 213 
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Table 4 – Bengal ICS 1886122 
 
Covenanted 1886  
Bengal Secretariat  11 





Deputy Commissioners 8 
Joint-Magistrates 33 
Assistant Magistrates 87 
Director of Agriculture  1 
Commissioner of Police Calcutta 1 
Inspector General of Police 1 
Inspector General of Registration 1 
Inspector General of Jails 1 
Deputy Inspectors General of Police 2 
Covenanted Total 198 
Uncovenanted   
Deputy Magistrates and Collectors 294 
Assistant Commissioners 6 
Sub-Deputy Collectors 84 
Uncovenanted Total 384 
Registration Department  34 
Inspectors 2 
Registrar, Calcutta 1 
Special Sub-Registrars  31 
Jails  12 
Superintendent of Jails  9 
Assistant of Jails 3 
Police 110 
District Superintendents 50 
Assistant Superintendents  60 










From the mid-nineteenth century the ICS was characterised by bureaucratic expansion. 
Departmentalisation resulted in the creation of separate administrative units for public works, 
medicine, education, forestry and many other spheres of government action. These new 
departments were staffed by specialists, and were usually independent from the civil service 
and district officers.
123
 Misra called this transition ‘bureaucracy despotism’. He argued that 
the British Government in India developed a bureaucratic regime 
 
which at every level of the hierarchy tightened the chain of subordination from 
local officers through Provincial Governments to the Government of India. 
Administratively, the objection of rationalization was to promote speed and 




This image of a rigid bureaucracy, a steel frame, has informed the historical impression of the 
ICS and eclipsed the influential role of the idealised district official. Robb supports Misra’s 
conclusions and argues that “the district officer’s actual tasks were increasingly hemmed in by 
the jobs performed by other agencies”.125 However, as this thesis will demonstrate, despite the 
bureaucratic realities of the administration, the official mind remained committed to an 
idealised district officer characterised by autonomy and personal rule. As Curzon warned in 
1899, ‘the real tyranny that is to be feared in India is not the tyranny of executive authority, 
but that of the pen’.126 The commitment to the idealised persona of the district official, and the 
dislike of the machine of government, was reflected in the civil service reforms of the later 
nineteenth century.  
In 1870, Mayo, Governor General of India, argued that local governments should have 
more power over these administrative departments, including jails, police, education, medical 
services, printing, roads, public improvements and civil buildings. Although the local 
government did not have power of appointment or control over finances, the administrative 
responsibility was returned to ‘local interest, supervision and care’.127  However, with this 
greater responsibility came expenditure which could not always be met by local government 
budgets. Therefore, in 1882, the income from excise, licenses, income tax, stamps and 
registration were divided between local and central government.
128
  However, contrary to 
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Misra and Robb’s claims, this did not simplify or reduce the workload of the district officer. 
In 1886, the Report of the Salaries Commission concluded that ‘no Commissioner of a 
Division and no Collector of a heavy district in Bengal is at present able to devote any one of 
the larger questions connected with his charge the care and attention which it deserves’.129 
Rather than being diminished by the expansion of the bureaucracy, district officers were 
reimagined as an elite atop a larger district government, and this was reflected by the reform 
of the ICS after the Aitchison Commission.  
The Public Service Commission chaired by Aitchison in 1886 was concerned with a 
range of key issues affecting the civil services in India, including Indianisation, age of 
candidates for the competition system and the Statutory Service. In 1879, Lytton had 
established the Statutory Service, it endeavoured to open up a reserved portion of covenanted 
civil service positions to Indians by directly recruiting from the uncovenanted civilians.
130
 
However, it was considered a failure as few Indians could take advantage of the scheme and 
the recruits were treated with hostility by covenanted and uncovenanted services. The 
Aitchison commission concluded that the solution was to divide the ICS into three services, 
and this was enacted in 1892.
131
  
First was the Imperial service, this was the covenanted ICS, entry by competition and 
mainly staffed by white British men. As well as access through the competition system, 
Indian candidates could be selected to fill a series of reserved posts in the Imperial service. A 
third of all district, civil and sessions judgeships and a sixth of all Magistrates and Collectors 
were promoted from the Provincial services. Secondly, the Provincial service, or Bengal Civil 
Service, was primarily composed of the uncovenanted roles of responsibility, including 
Deputy Collector and Deputy Magistrate. The Bengal Civil Service, unlike other Provincial 
services in India, was recruited through competition. Finally, the Subordinate service, this was 
directly appointed and included the Sub-Deputy Collectors, Sub-Deputy Magistrates, and 
other village level officials. This division of labour reflected the commitment to a small 
imperial elite. As this thesis demonstrates, the official mind preferred to continue to imagine 
the idealised district officer as an autonomous responsible decision maker.  
By 1905, the Collector-Magistrate was the head of a complex local machine of 
Government. In the later nineteenth century, the idealised model of the district officer was 
informed by the contradictions of bureaucratic work, and refashioned into an executive 
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authority. However, the idealised district officer was consistently represented as a district 
officer with knowledge of the people and locality. It was a persona simultaneously shaped by 
anxiety and confidence in the imperial project. The district officer was the personal 
representative of a modern civilised government. Yet, the role, and its idealisation, rested on 
the belief that India required a specific kind of rule, a form of Oriental despotism, which the 
people were accustomed too. This was reiterated by Sir George Campbell during his term as 
Lieutenant-Governor, ‘“the natives”, he remarked, “cannot understand the existence of a 
“hakim” without authority. “Hakim ka hukm” is the keystone of their political life”’.132 The 
idealised district officer epitomised the confidence of the British in the legitimacy of their 
rule, but his absence could undermine the stability of the Raj.  This model persona managed 
to embrace multiple agendas and it was utilised to represent a plethora of ideologies, but its 
enduring characteristics were autonomy, knowledge and experience. By following the 
idealised district officer as imagined in texts, as a candidate for the examinations, as the 
revenue official, as Magistrate and Judge, in his failures and in his final days this thesis 
asserts that this model persona had a significant influence on the governance of Bengal.  
Chapter Outline  
 
Chapter One commences the life-cycle of the district officer by exploring the most formative 
texts in the construction, contestation and reimagining of this role. This chapter uses an 
underutilised source group which this thesis has designated governing literature. These texts 
varied from manuals, handbooks, guides, legal compendiums, textbooks, novels and 
biographies. This chapter introduces the genre and charts the dominant characters and tropes 
in the representation. Despite varying in content, style and authorship they were united by the 
shared purpose of informing and instructing the official in India. These books claimed to 
make the system of government intelligible. Manuals, handbooks and guides simultaneously 
critiqued as they represented. They drew upon an established set of anxieties, tensions and 
codes of conduct. These texts reveal the consistent centrality of the British civilian to 
discussions of British India and the complex role the district officer occupied in the British 
Imperial imagination.  
The various roles of the District Official are discussed through the medium of these 
texts and they form the structure of the thesis chapters. Governing literature aided candidates 
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through the examinations. Private and Government texts were constantly supplied to the civil 
servant with instructions regarding policy, procedure and regulations. Ultimately it was in 
retirement that the district official did his duty and contributed his experience to the field. 
These sources enable us to begin unpacking the representation of the district official in order 
to explore the discursive function of such a representation in the practices of governance.  
Chapter Two focuses on the advent of the competition system in the early 1850s. The 
debates surrounding the competitive examinations provide a lens through which to explore 
the importance of the idealised district official to competing visions of British rule in India. 
The competitive examination system was constantly revisited and redesigned. The concerns 
over how to select, train and produce an ideal civil servant engaged political and public 
discourse throughout the period. The contested figure of the district official emerges 
prominently in the reactions to the system and the exams themselves. This chapter enables us 
to observe how this imagined model of a civil servant was impressed upon the young men 
entering the service. By charting their selection, examination and training, this thesis 
demonstrates how candidates internalised the contradictory qualities later expressed in policy 
and procedure at the district level.  
Chapter Three discusses the role of district officer as a revenue official in the 
capacity as Collector. The enduring figure of the Collector during the nineteenth century and 
the romance surrounding his work was tangible in the practices and procedures of the revenue 
branch of the service. Through an examination of the settlement and survey processes this 
chapter examines how the Collector emerged as a local expert and transitioned from initially 
crucial, to unskilled and unprofessional and back to a fundamental cog in the machine of 
revenue Governance. Through an examination of the manuals and legislation surrounding the 
work of the survey and settlement function in Bengal it is clear that the Collector frequently 
occupied a problematic position relative to the allegedly scientific department. This was 
especially evident in the process of boundary marking and field mapping. Debates over the 
practice of survey and settlement throughout the period revealed the awkward and significant 
impact of the district official in the revenue business of Empire.  
Chapter Four explores the judicial branch of the ICS at the district level through the 
roles of Judge and Magistrate. The place of the local officer in the rule and codification of 
law has received scant attention. This chapter reveals that the Magistrate endured as a figure 
of discretion in the day to day Government of British India. Contradictory to the codifying 
impulses of the Raj, this chapter reveals the dominance of the district judicial officials in 
shaping policy. The debates and controversies surrounding the Whipping Act throughout the 
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nineteenth century illustrated how tensions around codification, autonomy, and discretion 
intersected with debates about crime, law and punishment. The Whipping Act was upheld 
and extended based on the commitment to the voice of local experience forwarded by the 
district administration. The Whipping Act facilitated the rule of law through colonial violence 
and located its action in the persona of the district official.  
Chapter Five examines the men who did not live up to the idealised role ascribed to 
them. Using the legislation surrounding misconduct this chapter demonstrates how the 
spectre of the incompetent, corrupt or indebted civil servant plagued the official mind. The 
limited and discreet consequences for these civil servants often illustrated lapses in 
confidence and faltering commitment to the imagined model of government. These moments 
of crisis explained and justified the increasing resort to rigorously codifying and observing 
the activity at the district level. Yet, despite these tensions and anxieties, the district officer as 
man-on-the-spot remained central to the schema of bureaucratic regulation. Furthermore, by 
examining those who contradicted the representation of a model district official this thesis 
reflects on the function of the persona in modes of governance.  
This thesis concludes with the finale of the life-cycle of the district officer in British 
India. By summarising the process of retirement it brings new reflections on the district 
official and his role in strategies of government. The insistence on quiet unostentatious 
retreats from Empire, awkwardly but tellingly conclude the tense and contradictory role of 
the district official and his persona. The pensioners of the ICS were the most prolific writers 
of governing literature. This returns us to the beginning of the thesis and confirms that the 
district official was a re-negotiated and re-imagined figure.
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Chapter One ‘A character to support – a name to gain’: Governing Literature and the District 
Officer  
 
In the preface of H.A.D. Phillips’ Manual of Revenue and Collectorate Law he urged: 
 
It is the object of this manual to oil the wheels of the official machine, and thereby, 
to lighten such burden. At the same time the compiler hopes and desires, that the 
use of the Manual will improve the administration by the substitution of certainty 
for uncertainty, of definite data for haphazard decision, by rendering smoother the 
thorny paths of law and practice and generally by posting up the sign boards of 
applicable case law, so that “he that runs may read”.1 
 
A prolific writer of administrative texts, H.A.D. Phillips published several editions of his 
manuals and authored a range of books about the governance of India.
2
 The Manual of 
Revenue and Collectorate Law was advertised as containing ‘important rulings and 
annotations’, and included in the 1888 India Office Library catalogue.3 Phillips served as an 
Assistant-Collector and Magistrate in Bengal from 1874 to 1886, and eventually became 
Under-Secretary to the Bengal Government. As an author Phillips was evidently inspired and 
informed by his own experiences of district administration. His opening image presents us 
with a Collector simultaneously desirous of independence and guidance. Phillips and his 
manuals were exemplary of a particular genre of governing literature. For Phillips governing 
literature was an aid in the process of negotiating the increasing complexities of law, practice 
and procedure.  
Governing literature claimed to provide definitive advice on conduct, law and policy 
for the aspiring or serving Indian Civil Servant. These books often marked the beginning of 
the ICS life-cycle by shaping expectations during the examinations, probation and journey to 
India. Guides, manuals and handbooks also offered existing district officers information 
about new legislation. Governing literature assisted district officials at each stage of their 
career, guiding them through unfamiliar procedures or practices, and reinforcing the 
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idealisation of their role. These works purported to make the system of government 
intelligible. Governing literature was constantly present and ready to offer guidance 
throughout the working life of a district official. However, governing literature did not 
merely act as a set of knowledge, or the means of creating and producing knowledge.
4
 
These underutilised texts contained a pervasive representation of an idealised district 
official. This model persona was influential both in the official imagination and in the 
practice of policy. Governing literature described and supported a style of government which 
ruled through the decisions of the individual district officer. The juxtaposition faced by the 
district officer between autonomy and bureaucracy constantly reoccurred in these texts. It is a 
tension which has remained unexplored in histories of British Indian Government. By tracing 
this model district official in administrative guides, manuals and novels, this chapter 
demonstrates the influence and importance of this idealised persona. Therefore, it is 
important to understand and value these publications not only for the representations that they 
contained but also the function they performed. First this chapter will explore the existing 
historiography surrounding literature and writing in British India. This will be followed by an 
examination of governing literature and its market. Then this chapter will explore the 
characteristics of the idealised district officer as presented in these texts and the limits placed 
on this persona by bureaucratic systems. 
‘The myth of the heroic individual’: Historiography 
 
Governing literature has been neglected in existing discussions of literary history in British 
India. Historiography regarding writing on British India has been primarily concerned with 
fiction, biography and travel guides.
5
 Considered as purely administrative or legislative texts, 
governing literature has been excluded from wider discussions of representation in British 
India. While travel writing, literature, biographies and histories shared similar styles, content 
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and audiences they did not explicitly target the ICS or intend to influence the practice of 
government. In order to fully assess the significance of governing literature it should be 
examined in the literary context of nineteenth-century British India.  
Anglo-Indian fiction was popular in Britain and India. Allen Greenberger argues that 
the literature of the Raj shaped perceptions of India and the British experience, ‘it was these 
images, that people coming out to India held, which influenced the way in which they saw 
India’.6 British Indian literature significantly influenced the development of heroic male 
imperial figures.
7
 The imperial heroes of Anglo-Indian fiction have been credited with 
informing the development of the idealised district officer.
8
 However, these representations 
were grounded on a sample of exceptional experiences, and were essentially aspirational.  
Fictional tales of imperial heroes frequently drew on the existing biographies and 
accounts of British Indian military and political figures. Histories and biographies were 
significant for the benchmark representations of British Indian heroes and statesmen they 
contained. The Lawrences, Thomas Munro and John Malcolm all became the subjects of 
numerous biographies, and J.W. Kaye’s books typified the hagiographic treatment of these 
imperial administrators.
9
 These books were undoubtedly included in many of the personal 
libraries of aspiring and serving Indian Civil Servants, and often appeared on exam 
recommended reading lists.
10
 However, as these books did not explicitly craft or explore a 
governing role they cannot be considered governing literature. 
The heroics of the Lawrences, Malcolm and Munro were worked into ideological 
models of British governance in India which, in the words of Sir John Marsham, were 
systems of ‘administration the like of which has never been seen in India, and which looks 
more like a picture of imagination than a tangible reality’.11 Therefore, these representations 
                                                 
6
 Greenberger, The British Image of India, 2.  
Ghose discusses the ‘female gaze’ in women’s writing, Ghose, Women travellers in colonial India. 
7
 Greenberger, The British Image of India, Wurgaft, The imperial imagination and Tidrick, Empire and the 
English character. 
8
 Bivona, British Imperial Literature; and Viswanathan, Masks of conquest. 
Deane offers an alternative account of a more complex imperial masculinity, Deane, Masculinity and the new 
imperialism. Also see Bristow, Empire boys; Tidrick, Empire and the English character; and Dawson, Soldier 
heroes. 
9
 John William Kaye, Lives of Indian Officers, illustrative of the history of the civil and military services of 
India (London, 1867); John William Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe ... from 
unpublished Letters and journals (London, 1858); John William Kaye, History of the Sepoy war (London, 
1864); and John William Kaye, The administration of the East India Company: a history of Indian progress 
(London, 1853). 
10
 Edward Eastwick, A handbook for India; being an account of the three presidencies and of the Overland 
route, intended as a guide for travellers, officers and civilians, with vocabularies and dialogues of the spoken 
languages of India With travelling map and plans of towns (London, 1859), xxi – xxiii. 
11
 Y.B Mathur, British Administration of the Punjab (1849 - 75) (Nai Sarak, 1973), 167. 
51 
 
drew upon styles of governance which were admitted at the time to be unique, specific and 
idealised. Although the lives of the Lawrences, Munro and Malcolm were praised, these were 
examples quite far removed from the working life of a Bengal Collector in the 1870s. This 
thesis seeks to challenge the existing narrative which locates the idealised district officer in 
the Punjab, and demonstrate that while this model persona shares common features with the 
soldier sahibs he was also a product of Bengal government.  
The Indian Rebellion also played a significant role in the mythologised narratives of 
imperial heroism. Personal accounts of the Rebellion and ‘Mutiny literature’ were very 
popular amongst the Victorian reading public.
12
 Many of the guides and memoirs written 
during or after the Rebellion featured either direct personal accounts or collated stories from 
the locality. As Gautam Chakravarty has argued, ‘Mutiny literature’ fused historiography and 
fiction to establish a cultural narrative which endured in British consciousness into the 
twentieth-century.
13
 Indeed, tales of heroic district officers defending their homes would have 
contributed to the idealisation of the role. As Chakravarty further suggests, the cultural 
response to the Rebellion worked in tandem with the administration to resurrect British India 
from the moment of crisis. The literary representations of heroic imperialism certainly shared 
many of the characteristics of the idealised district officer and undeniably contributed to the 
male imperial imagination, but they were often limited to the realm of fantasy. 
While it should be considered a distinct genre, governing literature did borrow 
stylistically from biographies, histories and travel guides. Introductions and prefaces were 
often used for informative scene setting. Descriptions of the local area, people and customs 
helped position the author as a knowledgeable and experienced commentator. These travel 
guide imitations were even satirised, Prichard comforted his audience: ‘you need not be 
afraid, reader, of my taking up your time with a long disquisition upon the ancient history of 
this part of India’.14 As consumers of travel writing members of the ICS would be familiar 
with this style of introduction, and as Mary Louise Pratt has explained travel writing enabled 
the coloniser to represent his or her authority over landscape and people.
15
 The role of 
authoritative commentator was enthusiastically embraced by district officials.
16
 Governing 
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literature was intrinsically critical and provided a platform from which district officials could 
project and shape their own idealised persona. However, while governing literature shared 
many of the characteristics of the travel writing genre, these texts explicitly crafted a 
colonising and governing role. The reader of governing literature was being invited to control 
and rule, not merely consume the landscape.  
The role of authoritative commentator assumed by authors of governing literature 
establishes these texts as part of the culture of self-writing of the Victorian period.
17
 Joyce 
argues ‘technologies of the self in the nineteenth century involved “making self visible to the 
self”’.18 Governing literature was a technology of governance and helped make the idealised 
district officer visible. As Michael Mascuch explains, autobiography and life-writing are a 
means through which individuals can engage with and reproduce shared socio-cultural 
experiences. Mascuch argues that autobiography is a cultural practice, ‘a performance, a 
public display of self-identity, even when composed secretly for an audience of one’.19 
Furthermore, the reading of biographical narratives allowed a person perspective on lives 
normally inaccessible. Through reading life-writing individuals can experience the 
contingency of their own self-identity.
20
  
This study includes memoirs and life writing, but wishes to expand Mascuch’s 
analysis to the administrative texts and manuals of nineteenth-century British India. 
Governing literature encouraged readers to engage with an idealised role, practice it, and 
reflect on the experiences through their own contributions to the genre. The memoirs 
discussed in this thesis were specifically crafted as instructional or exemplary of the idealised 
district official life. Rather than simply reflecting or remembering they were part of the 
construction, contestation and management of the idealised persona. This thesis does not 
engage with biographical studies or try to recreate the daily lives of district officers, instead it 
examines those works which endeavoured to guide, instruct and inform.  Governing literature 
must be treated as distinct within the wider literary history of British India. Rather than 
merely celebrating, describing or representing British Indian life, these books actively 
critiqued and reciprocally constructed a governing persona. Furthermore, these texts existed 
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within a specific market. It is by exploring the production and nature of governing literature, 
that this chapter reveals the unique role they played in the governance of Bengal.  
‘Small compass or accessible form’: The market 
 
The belief that manuals, guides, handbooks and even novels were appropriate tools for 
managing and instructing officials in the conduct of government was established from the 
1840s.
21 
In the mid-nineteenth century, there was a shift in attitudes towards the role and 
work of the civilian official in British India.
22
 At this time there was a consolidation of the 
various duties and responsibilities of the district officer.
23
 District administration was also 
shaped by the introduction of the competitive examinations system in 1853, explored fully in 
Chapter Two. The metropolitan debates produced by the advent of the competition system 
demanded a renewed focus on the type of man who should rule India, and it further 
encouraged a reassessment of the working life of the district official. Governing literature 
was a response to this moment, and thus a new textual genre emerged in Britain and India.
24
 
This chapter draws upon a range of 60 texts written between 1839 and 1912. Although 
this thesis focuses on the Bengal Presidency it has also considered governing literature aimed 
at other regions and British India more generally.
25
 This decision to include texts written 
about British India and other provinces rather than blurring differences demonstrates the 
common features of the idealised district officer. While this role had a specific realisation in 
Bengal, it is important to recognise that it drew on other styles of governance. Furthermore, 
the presence of the idealised district officer in texts about the government of British India 
demonstrates the influence of this imagined role on the official mind.  
The British and Indian book market was saturated with works directed at the serving 
and experienced civilian official.
26
 These books promised to formulate and guide the district 
official through changes in practice and procedure. Relying on the familiar tropes of the 
district officer, good character, moral conduct, innate governing ability, and experience of the 
locality, these texts provided a framework for understanding new projects of rule. The books 
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under discussion include guides, manuals, service rules, handbooks, legal compendiums, 
memoirs and novels. These works specifically targeted a civilian official readership. While 
some governing literature also anticipated an audience including the Indian Army or non-
official persons, the texts discussed here predominantly focused on the civil servant. By 
reconstructing the market for these texts this chapter reveals a specific and conscious genre 
which aimed itself at a distinct buyer. The consumer of these texts was not the aspirational 
man casting himself as an imaginary hero of Empire, but a working official requiring 
information on how to best act in his role as district officer.  
Governing literature relied on unofficial privately written texts until the later 
nineteenth century.
27
 This genre developed out of the existing market for private guidebooks 
and travel manuals. Many travel books were primarily aimed at the Indian Civil Servant and 
were often advertised alongside other more administrative and official texts. Travel and 
lifestyle guides were designed to give the aspiring civilian advice on how to prepare for an 
Indian vocation both logistically, mentally and morally. The most popular official travel 
guides were Bradshaw’s and Murray’s.28 The Times recommended Eastwick’s ‘The 
Handbook of India not only to those who may visit the country as travellers but to the 
members of the Indian services’.29 These handbooks and guides specialised in practical and 
logistical information, for example Eastwick costed out a civilian’s outfit at £54.7.3.30 These 
texts asserted their authority over which provisions, modes of travel and routes were the best, 
cheapest or most appropriate. J.H Stocqueler mocked what he considered unnecessary 
recommendations ‘some guide-books recommend that water, soda-water, brandy, Lucifer 
matches, raspberry vinegar jam, and a score of similar superfluities be carried’.31 The most 
salient information contained in this group of books, after suggesting routes and outfits, was 
the setting up of a household. While the majority of domestic manuals were aimed at women, 
it was considered necessary in governing literature to advise the young men of the ICS how 
to establish and maintain a home.
32
  The conduct of the home was considered a reflection of 
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how a civilian official would conduct the district, further discussed in Chapter Five. The 
domestic and personal lives of the ICS were also frequently represented and critiqued in 
Anglo-Indian fiction.   
There was a specific genre of governing literature novels within the broader Anglo-
Indian fiction of the period on British India, (see figure 6). The novels were usually brief, and 
were often a series of short stories or vignettes rather than a full narrative. Authors often used 
prefaces to hint that the content came from experience, or that the story was even auto-
biographical.33  This style emphasised the instructional and allegedly realistic tone of the 
fiction. These stories were usually overtly positive about the British administration and 
presented the reader with a pantheon of British heroes doing their duty. There were also 
several satirical novels which were well received, and evidently considered entertaining, 
Adventures of Thomas Brown, a Griffin (1891) was praised thus; ‘to those whose appetite for 
fun needs no coaxing, we can recommend the above unpretentious little volume’.34 The 
commentators frequently focused on the charming and diverting nature of governing 
literature fiction.
35
 By playing out repeated scenarios, with familiar characters, these novels 
asserted their instructional value and realistic representations. Governing literature novels 
functioned as a critical standard and solidified the characteristics, qualities and duties 
outlined in the manuals and guides into imagined individuals. These books further endorsed 
the literary freedom confidently and critically exercised in British India.
36
 
This literary freedom empowered privately authored manuals and guides to offer advice 
over and above which bungalow, suit or train to choose. These texts became vital instruments 
in the process of governance, because they detailed and maintained the rules, regulations and 
instructions necessary for the activities of colonial rule. The majority of these works focused 
on the necessity of regulating, guiding and instructing the civilian who might otherwise fall 
foul of misinformation and thereby expose himself or jeopardise his authority.  
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As Edmund Hull claimed, the authority of these texts extended beyond the details of 
everyday life. Hull’s guide (1871) promised not only accurate but necessary information and 
he explicitly demarcated his work from the aesthetic guides of the period:  
 
‘there are numberless details in matters of everyday life, with regard to which 
judicious advice, explanation or warning, would impart to him confidence and 
protection . . . while the ordinary handbooks, though interesting as guides to 
places, and diffuse in descriptions of locality do not pretend to take the place with 
regard to everyday life, which is the object of the present work’.37 
 
This emphasis on accurate information reflected a tone found generally in governing 
literature. Authors used the preface or introduction of the text to set out their opinions and 
expectations, (see figure 7). The presence of ‘facts’, reports or official information was often 
cited as evidence for the validity of the claims in the text.
38
 Personal experience was also 
used to justify and legitimise the books.
39
 Despite the saturation of the market, authors 
insisted that they offered something unique or more useful than existing manuals.
40
 The 
female author of Indian Outfit and Establishments (1882) admits to the saturation yet 
enduring popularity of the market ‘though there are books already published on the subject of 
housekeeping in India, still, as numerous questions are constantly appearing in various papers 
asking for information respecting Indian life’.41 Different authors offered a variety of 
allegedly unique solutions in order to provide accuracy and utility. 
 A portable text that could be kept on the person and consulted during the decision-
making process was a common solution. Excluding the legal compendiums, governing 
literature was often intended to be consulted on the spot. Captain Henry Kerr’s A Few words 
of advice to Cadets (1839) was praised by the Asiatic Journal as a ‘little volume, which will 
scarcely encumber the pocket’.42 J.H Stocqueler’s The Handbook of British India (1854) was 
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similarly praised, ‘this publication embraces, in a condensed form, complete and accurate 
information’.43 Baden-Powell complained that manuals were frequently either too narrative in 
approach or consisted of nothing but unfathomable rules and codes. He argued therefore they 
were ‘not sufficient for the purpose; the latter are costly and more or less inaccessible’.44 In 
Baden-Powell’s opinion there was a balance to be struck between guiding the official and 
providing details on legislation.  
The concept of accessibility referred not only to the size of the books, but also to the 
role of the text as practical decision assisting tool. Legal manuals were often cumbersome, 
impractical and expensive.
45
 This legal literature principally offered an accurate copy of 
legislation, but it was not unknown for authors to offer commentaries on practice and 
procedure. They were usually more static texts, residing in court rooms for consultation on 
points of law, rather than portable handbooks which offered guidance as well as regulations. 
There was a consistent demand for governing literature, and with each shift in practice and 
policy a new guide or handbook was required to assist the district officer. Therefore it was 
not only a popular but a profitable genre.  
The cost of governing literature varied usually Government or official texts were 
cheaper as they were issued directly to district libraries.
46
 The exception appears to have been 
texts like The Civil Auditor's Manual for the Madras Presidency (1857), which was an 
extortionate thirty shillings.
47
 Governing literature was advertised and reviewed in British and 
Indian newspapers and magazines.
48
 Adverts for guides, handbooks and manuals were often 
located alongside advice on which portmanteaux to purchase, how many bottles of 
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Schweppes soda water were required for the sea voyage, or where to obtain brandy in 
Calcutta.
49
 These adverts were commonly an opportunity for publishers to encourage the 
purchase of similar volumes.
 
 
Several publishers specialised in governing literature. W.H. Allen & Co claimed to be 
the booksellers of the East India Company, and three of the texts discussed in this thesis were 
published by W.H. Allen. Other large publishers of the period also supplied governing 
literature, including John Murray, Kegan & Paul, Clarendon, Seely and Macmillan. The 
confidence of larger publishing houses in the viability of these books attests to their 
popularity and established place in the British Indian book market. Thirty-three of the texts 
were published in India, with seven being printed on Government presses. Government 
presses do not appear to have been in operation until the 1880s. Instead Calcutta publishers 
like Thacker & Spink facilitated the production of governing literature.
50
 Governing literature 
was aimed at newly qualified and serving civil servants. The texts produced in India would be 
used by existing district officers in order to clarify new legislation or explain a new role.  
Calcutta had a flourishing book culture as well as many journals and magazines.
51
 The 
Calcutta Review frequently contained detailed commentaries on newly published works. 
George Campbell’s Modern India (1852) was subjected to a lengthy article in which the 
editors of The Calcutta Review stated: 
 
When an Indian professional author challenges attention, by voluminous work on 
India, we naturally inquire what are his credentials Where did he gain his 
information in what departments has he served is he one of the “crack collectors” 
and “capital district officers”, or has he delighted to pore over old Sanscrit 




As demonstrated by the editors of The Calcutta Review, authorship and perceived expertise 
did impact reception. The majority of the authors in this study were connected to the British 
Government in India. Several of the authors detailed their current roles on title pages or in 
signatures at the end of introductions and prefaces, see figures 4, 5 and 6.
53
 These statements 
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of professional qualifications were a mechanism used to demonstrate knowledge and 
expertise.  
The most prominent civilian officials in the sample include George Campbell, former 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir Henry Stuart Cunningham, Judge of the High Court at 
Calcutta, Whitley Stokes member of the Indian Legislative Council and Baden Henry Baden-
Powell, conservator of forests in Lahore and half-brother to the hero of Mafeking.
54
 Other 
authors had notable Oriental careers, like Edward Eastwick who served in the East India 
Company army at Bombay, was an MP and a Haileybury professor. Some were critics of 
Empire like Robert Montgomery Martin who founded the East India Association and spoke 
out against sati and slavery. Five authors were of Indian extraction, four identified themselves 
as uncovenanted civilians, including Mahadev Govind Ranade, the nationalist and founding 
member of the Congress. The contributions of Montgomery Martin and Ranade demonstrate 
that this was not a genre limited to the praise of Empire. Governing literature was inherently 
critical, even those authors who supported the Raj offered opinions on how best to govern 
India. The writers of governing literature confidently acted in a position of critical authority. 
These texts embodied the autonomous and experienced attitude of the idealised district 
officer.  
However, this critical capacity was not limited to those who had experienced the ICS or 
even lived in India. Some were merely armchair scholars like Edward Rupert Humphreys, 
Headmaster at Cheltenham Grammar and prolific writer of schoolbook histories and political 
commentaries. Many authors remained anonymous, but they frequently used revealing 
pseudonyms like ‘An Anglo Indian’, ‘A Civilian’ or ‘A Servant’. Only one of the authors is 
probably a woman.
55
 The authorship of these texts provides crucial perspective on the 
attitudes towards governance expressed in the manuals, guides and handbooks. Yet despite 
the varied backgrounds of the authors they consistently relied on the idealised district officer 
as a medium through which to communicate different political perspectives and alternative 
administrative agendas. By the late nineteenth century, the prevalence of these books, and the 
idealised district officer they contained, compelled the British Indian government to author 
official governing literature.  
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Figure 4 – Title page, Captains R. Smyth and 
H.L. Thuillier, A MANUAL OF SURVEYING for 
India detailing the mode of operations on the 
Revenue Surveys in Bengal and the North-





Figure 5 – Title page, J.H. Stocqueler, 
The Hand-Book of British India : A Guide 
to The Stranger, the Traveller, the Resident, 
And all who may have business with or 




Figure 6 – Title page, Thomas 
Iltudus Prichard, The Chronicles of 
Budgepore, or Sketches of Life in 




Figure 7 – Preface, James Henry Young, The Revenue Handbook Containing 
a short sketch of the laws and regulations in force connected with the 
collection of the government revenues in Bengal & North West Provinces, 
(Calcutta 1855), i. 
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‘A handbook of India has become an especial want’: The Genre as an instrument of 
government 
 
The increasing adaptation and utilisation of administrative texts by the British Government in 
India demonstrated the significant role they played in the governing process. Until the 1880s 
the private and unofficial market dominated the production of Indian Civil Service rules, 
legal manuals, and revenue handbooks. The Government of British India was content to 
sanction unofficial or privately authored texts. This approval was initially facilitated by 
providing access to governing literature through Government and official libraries in Britain 
and India.
56
 The India Office libraries held collections considered relevant to civil servants 
and the administration generally, and could be consulted by staff of the India Office, trainee 
and existing members of the ICS. 
In 1878 the British Indian Government formalised rules for the approval of privately 
authored manuals or guides: ‘officers in the service of Government, who may desire to solicit 
Government patronage, other than that of the Local Government, for literary or other works, 
shall apply to the Government of India’.57 This recognised the existing practice of private 
books being used by the ICS. Throughout the period authors frequently stated that the British 
Government had approved, used or endorsed their texts.
58
 H.A.D. Phillips confidently 
declared:  
 
many Magistrates and Judges congratulated the compiler on the arrangement and 
completeness of the annotations, two secretaries to Government endorsed the 
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book with their imprimatur of approval, and the Civil Service Commissioners in 




By 1883, a remuneration procedure was established for officers who had provided books for 
public or official use.
60
 This process reveals that the British Government in India adopted and 
endorsed private books alongside their own internally produced governing literature. Private 
and unofficial governing literature continued to have a role in the Government of British 
India.   
However, by the late nineteenth century there was an increasing demand for a concise, 
coherent and definitive official governing literature. In the early 1870s, as part of his call for 
unified and simplified codification, James Fitzjames Stephen raised the issue of the 
cumbersome expensive law libraries maintained by district officers. Stephen drew attention to 
the confusion created by conflicting or absent governing literature: ‘No one understood the 
Regulations; they were practically known either by rule of thumb, or by compendiums and 
digests, which were published from time to time under the authority of Government’.61 This 
was reaffirmed by the Report of the Salaries Commission, 1886, which strongly 
recommended a digest of important Government orders: ‘a digest of this kind promotes the 
despatch of business, prevents orders being forgotten, maintains proper continuity of 
procedure in the Government Secretariat offices’.62 While private books could supplement 
general and specific information regarding policy and procedure, the absence of a consistent 
and comprehensive official text was problematic.  
The Government of Bengal had already acknowledged this issue and attempted to 
address it by providing a Government rulebook. In 1866, the Bengal Government had 
distributed the Rules for the Guidance of Officers engaged in the Administration of the 
Revenue Department in the Lower Provinces of Bengal to all of the district officers. R.B. 
Chapman, Secretary to the Board, stated ‘the advantage of collecting into one well arranged 
Manual all the orders issued by the highest Revenue authority on one subject is obvious’.63 
The district officers were instructed not only to study the manual carefully but make notes 
and corrections in it when new regulations or orders were passed. This text endeavoured to 
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facilitate uniformity in Government by distilling the most important information into a 
coherent book. The revenue rule book of 1866 was a significant step towards the 
homogeneity of local Bengal administration. It also aided in the construction of the imagined 
and practised idealised district officer.  
The Government manuals of the nineteenth century had a clear purpose, they regulated 
through enforcing adherence to procedure. The Rules for the Guidance of Officers engaged in 
the Administration of the Revenue of 1866 asserted:  
 
Experience will only show, practically, whether the arrangements of the book is as 
convenient as the Board has endeavoured to make it. If it prove to be so a 
Revenue Officer showing ignorance of any important order in the Revenue 




However, this regulating culture of the Government manual took twenty years to be fully 
established. In 1888 the Board of Revenue issued A Manual of the Powers, Duties, Practices 
and Procedure of Revenue Officers.
65
 This manual established the official practices involved 
in maintaining governing literature. As the standardised collection of policy and procedure, 
the manual had to reflect each new rule. C.E. Buckland, officiating secretary to the Board, 
ordered it was ‘to be distinctly understood that this Manual is issued under the authority of 
the Board, and that it is incumbent on all Revenue officers to be guided by the rules contained 
in it. Errors and omissions should be brought to the notice of the Board’.66 The 1888 manual 
included procedures for inspecting the manual itself, including checking that the correction 
slips and new orders had been pasted in appropriately.
67
 Therefore, not only did district 
officers have to engage with this manual as a compendium of rules, they were also 
accountable for the accuracy of its contents. District officers were simultaneously curators of 
Government texts and subject to the guidance contained within.  
The end of the nineteenth century saw an outpouring of Government issued manuals 
as well as procedures for inspecting, storing and correcting them.
68
 The first edition of A 
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manual of rules and regulations applicable to members of the covenanted civil service of 
India was issued in 1885.
69
 This text was an explicit collected codification of the rules 
governing the work of the district officer. It consolidated the boundaries and limitations of 
the district official. Therefore, these books acted as a promise of accountability and efficient 
accurate work. In 1901, the Bengal Government compiled The district officers' handy 
reference book. This text was a Government issued index of all approved governing 
literature. According to F.A. Slacke, the book was a response to: ‘the great difficulty 
experienced by District Officers in readily obtaining a clue to the previous orders on any 
subject … The necessity has long been felt of a handy work of reference where such orders 
could easily be traced’.70 In addition to various texts on specific districts, history, politics, 
language and law the reference book listed 55 authorised Government manuals and 
handbooks. Government manuals were often short technical volumes covering mundane 
regulations and everyday administration.
71
 The necessity of an official reference book 
reflected the fundamental role played by governing literature in the everyday practices of 
government. Indeed, governing literature had the capacity not only to document but to 
enforce adherence to administrative systems.  
A new genre of governing literature emerged out of the official rulebooks and revenue 
guides. Government inspection manuals tested the newly codified bureaucratic practices and 
demanded careful observation of rules and procedures. However, these inspection manuals 
were soon accused of being unfit for purpose. Criticising the Board issued manual of 1880 
the Commission stated ‘the use of this manual was never insisted on, and the book itself was 
so defective that in many districts it has never been introduced at all’.72 They further 
condemned the inspection manual for being too prescriptive and failing to ask the important 
and relevant questions, prioritising much ‘tithing of mint, anise, and cummin, and neglecting 
the weightier matters of the law’. 73 Instead of testing the validity of decisions and the 
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Yet, the inspection manuals endured and several were published from the 1880s.
75
 
Taking the form of lists of questions for each department the inspection manuals remained 
unwieldy and overly rigorous. The rules focused on the bureaucratic minutiae; for example, 
the keeping of paperwork: ‘2. Are the registers clean and neat, or dirty and blotted? Is the 
writing in them fairly good? Are there many alterations and erasures, and when there are any, 
are they neatly made or smudged, and is each initialled by a superior officer?’76 The ideal 
autonomous decision-making Collector was strikingly absent from these texts. These 
inspection manuals appeared to reduce the work of district Government to bureaucratic 
procedures and practices.  
However, despite being highly prescriptive about routine matters, the preface of the 
1891 manual declared somewhat incongruously:  
 
the object of an Inspection Manual is to test the work in all branches of a 
Collectorate. It is meant to assist officers in inspection, but not to prescribe a 





Even the most bureaucratic of governing technologies left the smallest space for the 
judgement of the Collector and Commissioner. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the style 
of official management did leave the senior district official scope for personal influence in the 
workings of his office and the supervision of his subordinates. The British Government in 
India continued to issue conduct rules, revenue guides and judicial texts which imitated the 
style of private books. Yet, the inspection manual endured as a rigorous means of holding 
district officers accountable to their decisions. This highly bureaucratised form of governing 
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literature was a method of codifying and containing the work of the district. This was the 
contradiction of the idealised district officer, imagined and practised. He was envisioned as 
an autonomous man-on-the-spot ready to ride to the scene of the crime, but later he would be 
quizzed about the cleanliness of his notebooks.  
Governing literature was an instrument of Government primarily because it 
documented legislation, process and procedure. Yet this regulatory framework existed around 
a specific focal point. These texts regulated as they represented. Whether instructing, 
criticising or praising the Raj these texts relied on an idealised version of the district official 
through which they could articulate competing ideas of power and schemes of government. In 
order to chart and explore the symbolic power and characteristics of the district officer as 
represented in these texts, this chapter first interrogates and reflects on George Campbell’s 
Modern India. 
 ‘A kind of king’: The Idealised District Officer 
 
The Calcutta Review concluded that Campbell’s Modern India was written by a man “who 
has conversed with Punches, instructed village accountants, watched the progress of 
agriculture, and even attempted it as an amateur, adjusted boundary disputes”.78 It was a book 
authored by an experienced district officer, a student of the Punjab School, and it advocated 
the importance of executive power of the Collector-Magistrate.  
 
The collector is not merely to be the agent of Government, to reconcile boundary 
disputes, to warn dilatory cultivators that their shares will be taken from them, and 
given to men who can and will work, but he is to stand over his village with 





While Campbell’s idealised district official drew on his Punjab experience, it was a model he 
thought was appropriate for all of British India. As early as 1852, Campbell believed the 
government exerted too much control over the executive district officers.
80
 Modern India 
gives an account of independent men being frustrated by a demanding bureaucracy: ‘the 
executive officers have no power to expand the smallest sum on their own authority, all 
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charges must be explained and sanctioned”.81 Campbell argued that this over centralisation of 
decisions was the result of frequent changes in the district civil service, and the ICS had 
resorted to depending on an administrative systems rather than local experience.
82
 According 




During his term as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (1871-1874), Campbell attempted to 
implement this vision of an idealised district officer.
84
 Campbell was committed to the idea of 
an autonomous, empowered, and experienced executive district official. On commencing his 
new role, Campbell concluded that in Bengal the Collector-Magistrate had become “more of 
a drudge and less of a master than is desirable in a country where personal authority must 
always go for much”.85 By giving local government more financial control and reducing the 
routine workload of the district official, Campbell attempted to scale down the Bengal 
bureaucracy. Campbell confidently asserted that the idealised district officer was suitable for 
Bengal and not just the Punjab, and his reforms reinvigorated the governing commitment to 
this model persona.  
Modern India has now been recognised as an early expression of Campbell’s 
significant political views on British India. Yet, at the time it was authored by a relatively 
unknown civil servant. This text echoed the typical rhetoric of the guides, manuals and novels 
examined in this study. These volumes were ideologically invested in the British civilian 
officials, and the representations they contained encouraged a symbolic role for the aspiring 
and serving civilian official in British India. This thesis argues that there was a tension in the 
portrayals of an idealised district officer between the dependency on the Britishness of the 
civilian official and the limits the administrative machine could place on this essential 
character. The contradictions and tropes emergent in these texts frequently found a focal 
figure in the role of the Collector-Magistrate. The contradiction of the idealised district 
officer was rooted in the relationship between his imagined and practised autonomy.
86
 This 
thesis will now explore this tension by outlining the characteristics of the idealised district 
officer and the limits placed on his paternal benevolence by the bureaucratic system.  
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 The Collector-Magistrate was frequently envisioned as the perfect colonial official, 
and portrayed as the lynchpin of the Empire.
87
 In these representations the Collector 
cultivated the relationship between ruler and ruled by acting as an individual representative of 
Britain.  This relied on a specific British character, a framework of conduct defined by innate 
governing abilities, racial superiority, and agency based on affirmative action. In his practical 
and critical account of British India, Montgomery Martin argued: ‘individual character has a 
powerful influence in India, for good or for evil; since the ordinary class of natives naturally 
judge the British Government by the Conduct of the Englishman who is their immediate 
ruler.’88 Martin was not alone in imagining a distinctly English idealised district official. A 
specific form of imperial Britishness, or indeed Englishness, was defined in these textual 
representations, and it depended on moral standards, rationality and the innate skills of 
governance.
89
 As Antoinette Burton suggests, ‘a sense of national and racial superiority based 
on Britain’s imperial status was an organising principle of Victorian culture’.90  
A discourse of racialised dominance informed the paternalistic role of the idealised 
district officer.
91
 The persona of the idealised district official was the imagined and practised, 
realisation of the governing superiority of white male Britishness.92 British superiority, and its 
role in the work of district officials, was emphasised throughout the genre: 
 
he will find the average native predisposed to respect him. His colour and 
nationality alike create this predisposition, and prestige of belonging to the 
dominant race, at once gives him a position which he may pardonably regard as 
flattering, but which he should be careful to take advantage of in an intelligent and 
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These representations created an expectation of racial distance and conduct amongst both 
Indian subjects and fellow officials.
94
 The aspiring civilian was encouraged to develop or at 
least monitor those characteristics and behaviours deemed innately racially superior. Even 
within the Government-issued manuals the racial element of rule was emphasised. Madras 
civilians were provided with explicit instructions regarding ‘the manner of European 
superiors towards Natives. It would be quite out of place, in this paper, to speak of the 
necessity of kindness and of an absence of all violence’.95 Racial authority was viewed as 
fundamental to their source of power and additionally it formed the basis for the key qualities 
in symbolic representations.   
The portrayal of the district officer often escalated into grandiose depictions of power: 
‘English men who have thus ruled provinces and districts, equal in size to small European 
kingdoms, have been venerated by the Natives almost as deities in the shape of men’.96  The 
frequency of references to godlike or monarchical power indicates the pervasive nature of the 
imagined role of the district officer.
97
 This language of representation inflated the power of 
the colonial official as a remedy to the structural weight of the administration. The idealised 
Collector was envisioned as an autonomous decision maker, either independent of or in 
opposition to the central Government. This idealisation of the role often focused on the early 
career and the work of the Assistant-Collector. Specifically these representations celebrated 
the freedom of the junior position, the alleged lack of interference by provincial Government 
and the unimpeded contact with the colonised:  
 
in the course of the first year, I traversed in every direction the regions under my 
control, dwelling among the people, studying their feelings and their habits. The 
tent become my home, and the horse my only means of transport. Simple was the 




This author emphasised the simplicity of the lifestyle, indicating the contrast of later years 
and more senior positions. The model district official was an on the spot decision maker, and 
therefore moved independently amongst the people. This interaction with the subjects and 
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space of the district was achieved during tours of the locality in the cold season. This imagery 
and the practice of the tour created an association between youth, freedom of movement and 
distance from the bureaucracy.  
The executive branch was considered a more pleasant life with a more comfortable 
working environment in comparison with the work of the Judiciary. For the Collector, even 
the return to the more administrative environment of the district station and the office during 
the hot season, was still characterised by independence. The outdoors life was heavily 
romanticised by governing literature and relied on recurring motifs. For example, one 
repeated image was the figure of the Collector conducting business from under a tree or tent: 
‘the deep shade of the mangoe and mowha at midday where my tents are now pitched, and 
where justice is now to be administered, where decision has to struggle against habitual 
procrastination.’99 However, this idealised image of an outdoorsman relied on preconceptions 
around physicality and masculinity.  
The idealised district officer’s masculinity was complex, relying simultaneously on 
physical acts of governance and paternalistic benevolence.
100
 District administration required 
physical exertion, the capacity for movement, especially on tour or during a crisis was a 
defining characteristic of the ideal district officer.
101
 Being able to ride a horse was a crucial 
qualification for district life: ‘no officer shall be considered to have qualified who does not 
satisfactorily prove that he is at home on horseback and can cover a fairly rough bit of 
country without difficulty’.102 In George Campbell’s vision of the district officer the horse 
was even central to the performance of petitioning and justice. He described an imagined 
scene of an elderly woman ‘seizing his bridle, casting herself under the horses feet, and 
clamoursly demanding either instant death or a restitution of her rights’.103 The horse in this 
representation echoes the feudal images of authority referred to earlier. A horse also provided 
the district officer with the means of independent action. The necessity of riding to the spot to 
settle a dispute or investigate a crime aided in distancing the work of the district officer from 
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the bureaucracy of the office. Effective horsemanship, and therefore productive work, 
depended on good physical health.  
Robust masculinity was a fundamental characteristic of the ideal British civilian, and 
acted as a contrast to the degenerated or bookish administrator, and the effeminacy or 
barbarism of the Indian.
104
 The ideal man for the ICS was said to have ‘a bodily frame 
invigorated by athletic exercise’.105 Physical health, mobility, endurance and strength were 
necessary for the proper functioning of an ideal civilian with the camp life and riding over 
rough country. This is further evidenced in the practical advice concerning clothing, bathing 
and disease prevention in the guides and manuals. Compromised health was intrinsically 
linked to other forms of incompetence and degeneracy.
106
 The Indian Civil Servant of 
middling age was renowned for having a ‘bad liver’.107 According to Hull the symptoms of 
such degeneracy included sallow skin, a liver diseased red face, and a slouching gait.
108
 As 
ever, the authors of guides and manuals saw it as their role to actively prevent such failings. 
For example, Johnson recommended drinking Schweppes soda water, and wearing mosquito 
drawers in bed.
109
 The best remedy appeared to be the maintenance of British morality and 
gentlemanly vigour.  
The district officer was characterised by the typical muscular Christianity of the 
Victorian era.
110
 Although as Regenia Gagnier has argued ‘as the century progressed the 
Christianity seemed to melt away from the athletic project, leaving only the muscle’.111 The 
dominance of frontier masculinity over the exotic and feminine India, as typified by Kipling, 
has a limited presence in governing literature.
112
  There was also little indication of the sexual 
adventuring, as described by Ronald Hyam.
113
 Only Captain Kerr vaguely hinted at the 
‘disgraceful’ nature of mixed-race liaisons. Kerr described an Indian connection as one 
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‘which has no one feeling, in the just instance, congenial to it, but a disgusting sensuality. 
Avoid it as you would the plague spot’.114 This confirms that by the mid-nineteenth century 
such practices were clandestine, and the masculinity of the district official was grounded in a 
more Victorian sensibility. As Leslie Stephens’ quipped, India was ‘certainly the most 
masculine middle-aged busy society’.115 This was a distinctly middle-class and administrative 
masculinity drawing on paternalism. 
The masculine authority of British India was paternal, and the district officers were the 
‘ma-baps’ of the people.116 The symbolic power of the civilian official created a dichotomy 
which endowed the British Collector with traditional, even feudal, authority and 
simultaneously refashioned the Indian people as weak, childlike, incompetent and awestruck. 
In his administrative account Bowmanjee Cursetjee Cowasjee stated ‘happily we are under a 
Government which we can faithfully confide in and look up to, like little children to a 
parent’.117 Cowasjee’s tone is difficult to penetrate, the text could either be a genuine tribute 
to British rule or a parody intended to criticise. Although it is difficult to determine 
Cowasjee’s motives his work demonstrates the pervasive nature of the racialised language of 
benevolence.  
Indian Civil Servants were encouraged to see themselves as bearers of enlightened 
civilisation: ‘The Saxon stranger, who has come from many a hundred leagues, the youth of a 
few summers, is listened to attentively by old men, brought up in these very valleys, occupied 
all their lives in these subjects.’118 The idealised district officer had a crucial role in the moral 
influence of Government in British India. As Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann have 
argued ‘the most powerful tool of self-legitimation was the colonizer’s claim to improve the 
country and to bring the fruits of progress and modernity to the subject peoples’.119 The 
idealised persona of the district official had an active role in the promotion of progress and 
civilisation both in the official mind and in practise.  
For the British Government in India the Collector was considered vital to moral 
improvement, as it was he who had the means and resources most at his disposal: through his 
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instrumentality the cause of education, and therefore, of Christian enlightenment, may be 
advanced – his charities, judiciously dispensed, will save myriads from starvation.120 The 
wellbeing of the people was dependent on the knowledge and experience of the Collector. 
The moral uplift and civilisation of British India was contingent on his work. It was through 
his personal connection with the people that the Collector could both utilise and be an 
instrument of the British Government. However, as Campbell argued, bureaucracy was a 
barrier to the civilising mission. Bureaucratic systems were removing the idealised district 
official from the people and extinguishing the autonomous characteristics required to deliver 
benevolent improvement. This thesis now examines the concerns about bureaucracy in 
Bengal, and the problematic idealised officer in practise.   
‘A mere machine of record’: Bureaucracy and the Indian Civil Service  
 
Bureaucracy was an anxious issue in the guides manuals and novels.
121
 In 1857, E.R. 
Humphreys made a plea regarding the conduct of British rule: ‘the civil servants of India 
should not be mute machines for collecting taxes and distributing justice; they ought to be 
moral rulers of India’.122 As expressed by Humphreys, there was a desire for a modern 
administration centred on professionalism and efficiency, but this was contrasted against the 
fear of extinguishing the autonomous actions and innate governing ability of the idealised 
British district official.
123
 This warning found its focal point in the debates surrounding the 
new Indian Civil Servants recruited through the competition system. The advent of the 
competitive exams, and the discussions it provoked throughout the nineteenth century will be 
the subject of the next chapter, but it is important to understand how the figure of the 
competition wallah acted in opposition to the idealised district official.  
There was evident suspicion of the competition wallah who was often characterised as a 
type of functioning automaton devoid of the capacity to interact with and understand the 
nation under his tutelage.
124
 In The Chronicles of Budgepore, Prichard lampooned the 
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competition wallah through the character of Fitzmisl: ‘the old school of civilians affected to 
look down upon him, criticised unfavourably his seat on horseback, and the cut of his 
shooting coat, it was clear to me that they were a little afraid of him.’125 Unlike the idealised 
district officer the competition wallah lacked the moral manly character which encouraged 
respect from the colonised. In such representations the competition wallah always failed to be 
adequately masculine, but yet he was a threat despite his refusal to leave the office and 
engage with the work of the district.  
The principal menace posed by this imagined competition wallah was his predilection 
for reorganisation and his desire to interpose new bureaucratic processes.
126
 His style of 
governance was not based on innate characteristics, and he favoured instead the centralising 
impulses of the India Office. The competition wallah was ready to report anything he 
perceived as maladministration: ‘wherever he looked at the machinery about him he saw 
things out of gear and working badly, and his mind was forthwith haunted with devises to 
improve them. He saw material, money, time wasted; wheel catching against wheel’.127 These 
concerns about increased bureaucratisation and mechanisation were based in the belief that 
India was best governed by personal and autonomous action. As early as 1844, J.H. 
Stocqueler cautioned against the ‘mass of gubernatorial machinery’, claiming ‘that it moves 
at all, is rather owing to the boldness of the local governors’.128 Bureaucracy was placing a 
limit on the man-on-the-spot.  
The principal anxiety was that the Government was becoming or had become a 
machine, and district officers would be reduced to automatic parts rather than individual 
decision makers.
129
 Usually the central Government or the India Office was identified as the 
source of mechanisation. As discussed above, George Campbell was an opponent of the 
centralising impulse of the British Government in India.
130
 Campbell believed that district 
officers should continue to exercise a degree of power independent of the India Office:  
 
Although the executive officers of Indian districts exercise large powers the 
Government is intensely centralised. They are responsible for every particular of 
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their proceedings, and are supervised to an amazing extend. For all acts beyond 





Campbell believed this rigid accountability and excessive monitoring frustrated the proper 
exercise of government. Instead of the efficient autonomy of the idealised persona, district 
officers were being burdened with unnecessary routine matters. George Birwood shared 
Campbell’s concerns, and criticised the impersonal Government in the metropole. Birwood 
accused the India Office of being ‘a mere machine of record – a dead-letter office’.132 Both 
men believed that the increasing reliance on reports and documentation did not capture the 
subtleties of the decision-making process.  
The Report of the Salaries Commission of 1886 investigated the impact of the machine 
of government on the district official, and was strongly influenced by Campbell’s vision.133 
By assessing the increase in the workload and responsibilities of the Collector between the 
1840s and the 1880s, the report highlighted the greater complexity of the role. The 
Commissioners argued this was as a result of bureaucratic procedures. It was concluded that 
the Collector was subject to too many checks and reports, and that his capacity for 
independence was limited by constant referral to the Board of Revenue and the Bengal 
Government for routine matters. The Report listed over 146 different reports which the 
Collector had to file. This was to be remedied by re-establishing the power and decision-
making capacity of the Collector in the district, and the aim of the Commissioners was to 
relieve ‘Collectors from a great deal of anxiety and from composing elaborate letters in 
justification of their demand for funds for a variety of petty, but unavoidable, 
disbursements’.134 There was a fundamental conflict between policy which privileged the 
decisions of the Collector at the district decision-making level, and the procedures which 
required his attention to the minutiae of everyday routine.  
The Commissioners wished to exchange what they saw as unnecessary checks and 
overly rigorous surveillance, for a style of inspection which reflected the more personal 
relations between the Collector, the district and its people. The Report reflected Campbell 
and Birwood’s concerns that by relying on fixed procedures, rules and documents the district 
officer would lose the experience and ability to respond in moments of crisis or change. 
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Furthermore, weighed down by the bureaucratic machine, the district official could no longer 
have a beneficial influence on Indian society. By insisting upon the empowerment of the 
district officer, the Report of the Salaries Commission acted as a renewed commitment to the 
idealised Collector. However, the conflict between the bureaucratic realities of government 
and the idealised autonomous decision maker were not resolved by this Commission. In 
practise, the district officer continued to be subjected to unrealistic expectations which drew 
on the idealised persona, and contradictory rules which undermined his autonomy. This was 
revealed in the policies and procedures around famine. 
Darren C. Zook has argued that the spectres of famine and poverty were used by the 
British to bolster their own legitimacy.
135
 Instead of being recognised as symptomatic of an 
exploitative revenue system, these issues were further evidence of the inability of India’s 
susceptibility to disaster and need for guidance and care. Therefore, the benevolent role of the 
idealised district officer directly informed famine administration. Famine prevention and 
management relied on the district officer’s familiarity with his district and its inhabitants. The 
famine manual (1905) stipulated that ‘it is upon the District Officer that Government relies to 
give first warning as to impending famine, to estimate its probable extent, and to suggest the 
measures which must be taken in order to combat it’.136 District officers were expected to 
possess an intimate knowledge of the locality, either through personal experience or 
documentation. This was highly unlikely due to the transitory nature of the district civil 
service. Regardless of the realities of experience, it was presumed that district officials would 
be able to recognise abnormalities in seasonal rainfall, understand average crop production in 
each region, and have a detailed record of the various states of poverty in the district. 
Once famine had been confirmed, the administration no longer required autonomous 
action. Instead, the manual provided minute detail on how to set up, regulate and monitor 
relief works.
137
 These instructions were to be followed to the letter, and even dictated the 
precise depth and measurements of an emergency water tank. However, the district officer 
was able to exercise limited independent decision-making in the allocation of charitable 
relief. It was his duty to assess whether the relief works were too severe or constituted real 
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 In this managerial capacity he remained the arbiter of moral 
improvement and represented the idealised district official.  
The famine manual encapsulated the tensions between the innate abilities of the 
idealised district officer and the rigorous demands of the administration. In its closing 
remarks the manual once again relied upon the experienced and benevolent idealised district 
officer: ‘future famines will likewise, no doubt, reveal defects in the present regulations; and 
it will rest, in the first instance, with the officers in charge of the operations to grapple with 
the new problems as they arise’.139 Policies regarding famine prevention and management 
reflected the contradictions of the idealised district officer in practice.  He had to be an 
obedient instrument to the mechanisms of paternalism, and yet also appear to be the sole 
symbolic arbiter of benevolent government. The district officer was expected to critique and 
improve policies and practices of governance, and in the process reciprocally shape his own 
role. Governing literature, and especially memoirs, provided opportunities to vocalise these 
contradictions and tensions within the role of the district official.
140
   
Robert Carstairs used governing literature to express a long term commitment to the 
improving potential of the British Empire. In the closing remarks of his memoir (1912) he 
hoped that his ‘plans will yet be thought worthy of a trial; and that they will bring some little 
benefit to the people among whom I lived many years.’141 Carstairs’ memoir reads as a 
declaration of his feelings of defeat in the face of the bureaucratic machine of Government. 
He recounted in details his efforts to adopt projects of improvement. He proposed irrigation 
plans to clear canals and ensure water tanks were clean.
142
 After successfully widening a 
canal he sent the details of his scheme to the Provincial Government, but ‘the clerks breathed 
on this plant that I had been tending for a year with so much love and pride, and it withered 
away’.143 Several chapters of Carstairs’ memoir repeated this motif by casting himself as the 
man-on-the-spot struggling against the static unyielding Government. His A Plea for the 
Better Local Government of Bengal (1904) acted as a manifesto of his schemes of 
improvement.
144
 The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review praised the text for its 
‘suggestions which are the outgrowth of ripe experience, the experience of a man who loved 
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his work, who cherished the people among whom he lived’.145 Carstairs lived and practised 
the persona of the fatherly caring and experienced district officer and it was because of this 
that his critiques and frustrations, although honestly and frankly expressed, were accepted 
into the projects of improvement adopted by British India.  
Similarly to Carstairs, George Graham used his memoir (1870) to criticise the 
contradictory agenda of the official mind. As district officer Graham appeared to resent what 
he saw as arbitrary ideas drawn up by clever Secretaries. Early in his career he was ordered 
by a Collector to oversee a cotton growing initiative. Graham explained the realities of 
executing these schemes as a district officer: ‘I shall have to use what is called my “moral 
influence” to induce them to plant it and look after it, and then I shall have to send a report on 
the result to Government’.146 Through his critique of benevolent projects Graham identified 
the limitations of the idealised district officer in practice: ‘the fact is, I had dealt with the 
matter from the paternal government and moral influence point of view, and found it very 
difficult to make my somewhat irregular proceedings fit into the cut-and dried red tape form 
required.’147 Graham was frustrated by the expectation that he should simultaneously fit the 
role of paternal and uplifting district officer while following the prescriptive bureaucratic 
procedures. 
Graham and Carstairs had been influenced by the idealisation of their role and used 
their contribution to governing literature to highlight the contradictory requirements of the 
role in practise. Their frustrations were primarily directed at the centralised bodies of 
Government, the Board of Revenue or the Bengal Secretariat. Both men resented the 
centralising impulse, accountability and bureaucratic influence emanating from the local 
Government administration. These were the same administrative systems that Campbell had 
argued against in 1852, and later attempted to curtail as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. It is 
this conflict between the idealisation of the role and the limits policy and practise placed on it 
that this thesis explores.  
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In Pictures of Anglo-Indian Life, a fictionalised memoir, the anonymous author described the 
scene of a district officer leaving his locality: 
 
My subjects flock to see me – to have the last word of parting. They touch my feet 
sorrowfully: they tell me they have scarcely felt my rule, so gentle have their fetters 





The idealised district officer in this representation was the benevolent paternalistic figure so 
frequently found in governing literature. He knew his people, they loved him, but in parting 
he remained stoic, distant and superior. Governing literature helped Indian Civil Servants 
embrace a symbolically powerful persona. It was an idealised role they could consume before 
the commencement of their career. The saturation and diversity of the market demonstrated 
the popularity and success of these works. The variety in authorship, style, publisher and cost 
attested to the complexity and broad appeal of the books. While intersecting with ‘Mutiny 
literature’, biographies, histories and travel guides, the genre remained distinct and specific. 
The success of the private and unofficial books resulted in the British Indian Government 
adopting governing literature. These texts collated regulations and acted as systems of 
accountability. Memoirs and guides functioned as critical platforms from which serving or 
retired officials could voice discontent or provide alternative advice. Furthermore, they 
produced and managed a governing role which was integrated into the procedures and 
practices of rule. This role was reciprocally reproduced through the experience of policy and 
practice during the working life-cycle of the district official. Governing literature was an 
integral part of the mundane technologies of governance. 
 However, the idealised district officer as represented in governing literature 
frequently occupied an anxious and contradictory position between bureaucracy and 
autonomy. Thus far this chapter has explored how these fundamental tensions defined the 
imagined and represented world of the district officer. Now this chapter turns to the impact of 
these representations in the procedures and practices of the ICS. The struggle between the 
idealised district officer and the realities of the administration Bengal spilled out into 
competing projects of rule and varying functions of Government. It is by observing the 
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construction and contestation of this role in different phases of the working life of the district 
officer that this chapter demonstrates the function of such a representation. It was in 
anticipation of the examinations, the process of candidacy and the commencement of training 
that this persona was established in the official minds of a generation.  
84 
 
Chapter Two ‘Highly polished and costly instruments’: The Competition System 
  
In a letter concerning the proposed changes to the mode of admission to the Indian Civil 
Service, Sir Edward Colebrook Bart stated: 
 
our endeavours must be to secure efficiency of administration in India itself, that 
the value of this complex machine must depend on its securing to that country the 
services of a body of men in the highest state of efficiency, morals and intellect.1  
 
The value of India and the men who ruled it was evidenced by the debates surrounding the 
competitive examination system. These discussions were not limited to reflections on the 
nature of colonial rule, but concerned bureaucracy, power, Britishness, character, and the 
state of education. This chapter will explore these debates as expressed in published letters, 
pamphlets, critiques, and exam guides. The competition system was the subject of multiple 
conflicting and shifting agendas in metropolitan and British Indian public discourse. Initially 
shaped by the Commission headed by Thomas Babington Macaulay, the examinations 
underwent multiple reforms. While the competition system continued to be regulated by the 
Civil Service Commissioners, the opinion of the district officers and the Indian Government 
remained as a key influence.  
Arguments focused on the nature of the candidates and the design of the exams. As 
Colebrook Bart indicated, there were concerns about how to select, test and train the right 
sort of governing subject. These discussions were influenced by the ideal of the model district 
officer. Furthermore, the competition system, and the debates surrounding it, contributed to 
the moulding of this idealised persona. The consistent goal in the official mind was to 
produce an ideal civil servant, and to avoid the contemptable figure of the competition 
wallah. The competition wallah was the antithesis of the model district official. This figure 
was characterised by impractical intellect, effeminacy and moral weakness. The challenge 
was to design a system which would capture the vigorous, active and moral young men of 
Britain and yet somehow weed out the bookish, weak and ineffective types. However, the 
system chosen evolved into one of the most complicated and contested examination processes 
of the nineteenth century. This chapter first considers the existing historiography regarding 
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the competition system and education in nineteenth-century Britain. After outlining the 
advent of the competition system, this chapter discusses the design, style and content of the 
examinations. By analysing the overlapping and contingent issues of education, character, 
class and nationality this chapter demonstrates that the examinations and the imagined ICS 
candidate were influenced by the idealised district officer. Finally, this chapter explores the 
role of the probationary period in shaping the model district official.  
 
‘The best qualified among all persons’: Historiography 
 
Existing historiography has provided a comprehensive narrative of the beginnings of the 
competitive system.
2
 R.J Moore has described how Charles Trevelyan, Benjamin Jowett and 
T.B. Macaulay subtly utilised the 1853 charter renewal to ensure a proper meritorious 
process, and stripped the Company and Haileybury of the power of appointment.
3
 
Furthermore, Compton demonstrates that the vision of a gentlemanly administrator 
‘epitomised the strength and weakness of the British governing idea’.4 Compton’s analysis of 
the contradictory and irresolvable principles of the competition system and the influence of a 
symbolic role on the examinations provides a useful starting point for this chapter. However, 
beyond the reforming moment in 1853, the process of recruitment, examination and training 
has not been considered in recent historiography.  
Discussions regarding recruitment problems have been mainly confined to the early 
twentieth-century. Potter and Beaglehole conclude that the recruitment issue was the result of 
the deterioration of a previously successful system.
5
 Yet, Spangenberg argues by the late 
nineteenth century ‘recruitment for the ICS very early fell into a negative syndrome from 
which, for the various reasons outlined, it could never lift itself’.6 According to Spangenberg 
the middle-class tone of the service irreparably damaged it in the eyes of the Viceroyalty and 
other metropolitan aristocratic groups. Limited attention has been given to the roots of this 
decline or the idealised persona which was so essential to the system of competition. As this 
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chapter demonstrates, the background and class of the recruits continued to be a serious 
concern throughout the period. 
The issues of class and background, highlighted by Spangenberg, have been obscured 
by the continuing belief that the competitive exams were a natural consequence of the 
reformed British education system. This interpretation has limited our understanding of the 
relationship between the ICS schools, universities and bureaucracy.
7
 In his discussion of 
institutional liberal Governmentality and bureaucracy, Joyce explains that public schools 
were ‘machines for making governors, for it needs to be realised that the teaching of how to 
govern oneself and so how to govern others was not incidental but central to elite education’.8 
In 1864, the Clarendon Commission was tasked with investigating the educational standards 
in the nine leading public schools.
9
 It concluded that the Clarendon man was defined by ‘their 
capacity to govern others, and control themselves, their aptitude for combining freedom with 
order, their love of healthy sports and exercise’,10 and indeed this reads like the model 
candidate for the ICS.
11
 The public school ethos helped produce a governing culture, as the 
individual was sacrificed to an idealised persona of the athletic, honourable and masculine 
Victorian.
12
 As Regenia Gagnier argues, ‘they learned in school to be boys without women, 
then to be masters of other boys, and then to be guardians of state and empire’.13 However, as 
Buettner explains, ‘less famous and less expensive schools are a more promising starting-
point for examining imperial family histories than the institutions that have dominated 
educational historians’ attention to date’.14 Therefore, while many of the men of the ICS were 
products of the public school system, these experiences should not be homogenized or limited 
to elite institutions.
15
 Furthermore, as Buettner has demonstrated, the ICS had a reciprocal 
relationship with public schools. This chapter argues that the idealised district officer and the 
competition system must be considered products of, and influences on, British education and 
governing culture. 
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This chapter demonstrates that the district official informed the competitive exams, and 
influenced an imagined ideal candidate. However, the tensions between the district officer’s 
autonomy and the increasing role of bureaucratic government were reflected in the 
examinations. These concerns were focused on the education and background of potential 
candidates. In order to better understand the contradictions and anxieties at the heart of the 
competition system debate, this chapter first examines the socio-political climate from which 
it emerged.  
‘How to manufacture a man’: Reforming admission to the Indian Civil Service  
 
This thesis argues that while the advent of the competition system cannot be separated from 
the reforming atmosphere of the mid-nineteenth century, it was devised primarily as a means 
of more efficiently securing and producing the idealised district official.
16
 In the 1850s 
patronage, corruption and inefficiency began to sit uncomfortably with shifting attitudes in 
the British governing administration.
17
 The public perception of Company governance ran 
contrary to the emerging popular liberalism which was to define British politics in the later 
nineteenth century.
18
 Even those defending the Company were aware of its public image, and 
one such defender argued in the Morning Chronicle ‘declamation is easy for those who have 
learned nothing of the India to-day and have forgotten nothing of the India of Burke’.19 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the British Government was increasingly defined by 
liberalism and the culture of ‘disinterested’ government.20 After the Northcote-Trevelyan 
report highlighted the abuse of the patronage system, and portrayed the British civil service 
as rife with idle and incompetent individuals, the proposed remedy was to recruit using 
meritorious exams.
21
 However, this was contingent upon the cultivation of a more 
professional gentlemanly identity. Phillip Harling argues that cross-party reformers shared a 
commitment ‘to make officers of the state more accountable to a notion of public service’.22 
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The civil service was to be staffed by gentlemanly administrators, characterised by 
accountability and expertise. David Vincent explains that after Crimea the persona of the 
gentlemanly administrator enabled the civil service to retain the preferred characteristics of 
discretion, authority, intellect, while dismissing the less savoury notions of nepotistic 
patronage, inefficiency and indulgence.
23
 Professionalism was reworked into a duty or 
service, defined by discreet reserve, discipline and self-restraint.24 The work of the 
gentlemanly administrator was distanced from the middle class professions and the financial 
taints of careerism were obviated by a conscious commitment to moral accountability. 
Through the role of the gentlemanly administrator, hard work, professional conduct and 
moral virtue became entwined in Victorian ideals of good character and duty. Character was 
an active quality, a dynamic principle to be understood and developed by individuals. 
Furthermore, it was social behaviour, devised and structured by a predominantly middle and 
upper class culture. More practically imagined it was a code of conduct and a set of moral 
standards enclosed within certain behaviour patterns. Character was intimately linked to duty, 
service, and, therefore, work. Lauren Goodlad argues that the notion of character shifted 
during the nineteenth century from an evangelical vision of limitless self-improvement to a 
more stratified class based gentlemanly attribute.
25
 Work, and especially Government service, 
became an expression of the liberal values of moral worth and personal effort. Collini argues 
that the ‘examinations were important for the professions because they served as agents for 
ideas of individual responsibility and public duty’.26 Examinations depended on the 
characteristics of individualism, self-reliance and manly effort which underpinned the new 
identity of the gentlemanly administrator.  
However, as Dewey argues, the ICS was deemed more worthy of reform than the Home 
civil service because ‘the Indian civil servant exercised a power for good or evil which no 
English civil servant – perhaps no functionary in the world possessed’.27 This perception of 
significant influence informed the idealisation of the district officer. Patronage was abolished 
in the ICS a year before Northcote and Trevelyan’s report. Macaulay first proposed 
competitive entry by means of examination during the renewal of the EIC charter in 1833. 
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The competition system was the realisation of a long held ambition, and therefore, should be 
considered a distinct element of the mid-century reforming moment. For the British Home 
civil service, the gentlemanly administrator was slow to emerge, and the meritorious exams 
did not eliminate patronage or gross inefficiency until late into the nineteenth century.
28
  
Traditionally civilian officials of the EIC had been recruited by patronage and 
nomination.
29
 During the charter renewal in 1813, it was agreed that to qualify for a career in 
India, nominees had to reside at Haileybury for four terms.
30
 Opened in 1806, the training 
college was infamous for poor discipline and questionable levels of education. Despite these 
shortcomings, Haileybury was regarded with nostalgic affection by its alumni. John Beams 
reminisced ‘Haileybury was a happy place, though rather a farce as far as learning was 
concerned’.31 The legacy of Haileybury was its continued perception as an institution which 
had gathered the best kind of men together. Henry George Keene supported this conclusion, 
and although he confessed it was not the most academic of institutions, this was irrelevant as 
the young men ‘belonged to the old Anglo-Indian families, and had often been born in the 
country, where their names were well known’.32  
This ideal of young men with an inheritance connected with the East continued to 
plague the recruitment process.33  Cohn argues ‘it is likely that from 1840 to 1860 fifty or so 
interconnected extended families contributed the vast majority of the civil servants who 
governed India. And these civil servants certainly had crucial administrative roles until the 
1870s’.34 Kipling claimed ‘if there were a single loaf in all of India, it would be divided 
among the Plowdens, the Trevors, the Beadons, and the Rivett Carnacs’.35 Patronage was 
supposed to ensure this continuation of innate governing abilities. However, Macaulay 
believed that more than family ties were required to govern India. In his first efforts to 
introduce competitive examinations during the 1833 charter renewal Macaulay successfully 
proposed that nominations should be limited to four men per Company Director. These four 
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candidates would be required to sit an exam and only one would be admitted to Haileybury to 
complete his training. This entrance exam was more stringent than existing examinations at 
Haileybury, but was primarily based on the typical education of young men with a strong 
focus on the classics, basic mathematics, English history and composition. The pass rate was 
around 75 percent.
36
 It was not until the charter renewal of 1853 that patronage was 
completely abolished.
37
 As a result in 1854 a Commission was established to investigate the 
best possible means of recruiting civil servants.  
The Commission and the subsequent report have become synonymous with Macaulay. 
The report favoured the shared ambitions of Benjamin Jowett and Macaulay to recruit 
university men. Macaulay believed that the civil servants of the EIC should possess ‘the most 
liberal, the most finished education that his native country affords’.38 Macaulay has been 
credited with wedding the ICS to the universities, but as this chapter argues, the subsequent 
relationship was complex. Despite some concerns about targeting university students, 
Macaulay believed that undergraduates could be tempted away from the celibate life of a 
university don by an Indian vocation. The Commission concluded that the examination had to 
appeal to the general liberal education of a gentleman.  
The Commissioners did not wish to attract ‘a mere smatterer’,39 essentially they wanted 
to avoid candidates who had knowledge ‘of wide surface and of small depth’.40 Critics argued 
that without the personal guarantee and recommendation provided by nomination, the system 
could select morally corrupt persons. According to William Baptist Scoones, there was ‘no 
further evidence of fitness to undertake the delicate task of governing a proud susceptible and 
keen sighted race of men, than is implied by a certificate of good moral character, and the 
somewhat whimsical approbation of an irregularly constituted stuff of Examiners.’41 
However, Macaulay and the Commissioners believed there was a link between intelligence, 
the application of studious habits, good character and moral standing. In defence of the 
process, the report confidently stated:  
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early superiority in science and literature generally indicates the existence of some 
qualities which are securities against vice – industry, self-denial, a taste for 
pleasures not sensual, a laudable desire of honourable distinction, a still more 




Macaulay certainly believed that a diligent student preparing for the competitive exams at 
Oxford or Cambridge was a better behaved and more morally worthy individual than a 
Haileyburian. However as the nineteenth century progressed the idea of what a liberal 
education, or even a good education, constituted became the source of considerable anxiety. 
In fact, Macaulay and Jowett had rather grandiose expectations of the new system. They were 
confident that it would change the nature of public schooling, and that the allure of such 
honourable, attractive and independent positions would produce a dramatic effect on the 
ambitions of young men.
 43 
 Macaulay’s competitive examination scheme was shaped by his 
commitment to the idealised district officer. The model district officer, as produced by the 
competition system, was integral to Macaulay’s vision for a renewed British India: 
 
you might read the character of the collector … in the eyes and in the garb of the 
population – in the appearance of the fields and of the houses. When there was an 
incompetent collector, the peasantry were brokenhearted … But let a good 
collector replace the bad one, and the whole scene is altered.44 
 
Macaulay’s imagined idealised district officer reflected the representations of the Collector in 
governing literature. Therefore, the debates surrounding the competition system focused on 
how best to capture, and train, suitable candidates who could become district officers. 
 ‘Conscientious plodders’: The design and style of the examinations  
 
As the examination papers themselves have received limited attention, exploring their content 
and style offers a new contribution to our understanding of the competition system, and the 
impact of public debate on it.
45
 Furthermore, investigating the exams themselves reveals the 
importance of an idealised district official to the Civil Service Commissioners and the British 
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Government in India. The contradictory nature of the imagined and practiced idealised 
district officer was reflected in the debates surrounding the competitive exams. By examining 
the value of subjects in the marking scheme, this chapter reveals contemporary perceptions 
about types of intelligence, and the relationship between mental culture and the work of 
Empire.  
Applicants submitted their intention to take the examination along with an indication as 
to which subjects they would sit. The examination was technically open to any natural born 
subject of Her Majesty.
46
 Therefore, while it was not prohibited, it was difficult for any 
Indian born candidate to participate. The steadfast refusal to hold the exams anywhere but 
London, the privileging of typically English education and eventually the compulsory 
residence in a university during probation made it expensive and challenging for any Indians 
wishing to enter into the covenanted civil service.
47
  
The first exams were held in 1855 and the last Haileybury nominees went to India in 
1856.
48 
Haileybury was closed in 1858 and the Civil Service Commission was established in 
order to keep the ICS out of the politicians’ hands.49 Each year the examination regulations 
announced how many places were available and divided them by province. The annual 
regulations were necessary due to the frequent changes in the exam procedure, and the 
constant shifting of the minimum and maximum ages. In 1857 there were 60 candidates for 
12 places, by 1870 there were 327 candidates for 43 places.50 Due to the considerable 
number of applicants an examination fee of £5 was introduced in 1871.
51
 This fee supposedly 
ensured that only those truly committed to an Indian career would sit the exam. The exams 
could be up to three hours long and were often accompanied by a viva-voce. Scientific papers 
also usually involved a practical or laboratory examination.
52 
The results were always 
published alongside an examiners report. This tradition was soon criticised. It was argued that 
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the best tutors could be easily identified by observing the names of the successful pupils, and 
this compromised the fairness of the system.
53 
 
While the style of the examinations remained fairly consistent throughout the period, 
the content varied significantly
. 
In order to have a broad appeal the examination offered a 
large variety of subjects, supposedly based on a gentlemanly English liberal education. In 
reality, as Dewey argues ‘the broad spread in papers was in part the product of a reluctance to 
exclude any type of intelligence’.54 This range of topics reflected the concern that exams 
would be unable to capture the discretionary abilities so valued in the idealised district 
officer. The nature and measuring of intelligence was central to the discussion and informed 
the subjects of examination. Many commentators disagreed with Macaulay’s ultimate aim 
and thought that a university education was surplus to requirements. It was argued that ‘the 
work demanded from the bulk of the Civil Service is that not of originating a policy, but of 
following a prescribed course through the practical details of daily business’.55 What was 
needed was methodical labour and not genius.
56
  
Contemporaries were concerned that the exams rewarded the recitation of facts and 
quickly learnt arguments, and not the studious application required of a potential district 
officer.
57 An anonymous pamphleteer claimed the real issue with the candidates was ‘the 
feebleness of true intellectual interests, the craving amongst young Competition Civilians not 
for knowledge but for marks’.58 These anxieties were focused on the cramming system.59 
Cramming was a style of intensive tuition, often undertaken in a residential setting, and 
occasionally included boarding with the crammer and fellow tutees. The tutor would take on 
a small number of candidates or probationers over a period of a few months or even up to a 
year. E. Stack claimed that in 1865, 32 percent of candidates went to crammers, for an 
average of 5 to 6 months, whereas by 1874, 84 percent of candidates were attending 
crammers for an average period of between 12 and 18 months.
60
 These tutors specialised in 
intensive preparation, and supposedly favoured those subjects with the highest marks for the 
minimum effort. They utilised past papers and manuals to coach their students towards likely 
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questions. Critics argued that cramming undermined the entire purpose of the examination 
system. Crammed students would be ill-prepared for the working life of a district official. 
Therefore, the system was adjusted to favour subjects which were thought to require 
consistent and long term study, rather than those which could be rapidly absorbed, (see tables 
5 and 6). 
The initial solution was to adjust the marking system. A minimum demonstration of 
competent knowledge was required, (see table 6), and marks were only counted after a 
candidate had obtained an agreed minimum mark.
61
 This was in order to prevent the 
candidate spreading minimal knowledge over many subjects instead of demonstrating solid 
learning in a few fields of study. Throughout the period candidates had roughly twenty eight 
different papers to choose from. There was technically no limit on how many papers could be 
taken. This allowed considerable variations of knowledge and topic combinations. In an 
evaluation of the competition system exams Alfred Tupp concluded that ‘a moderate 
knowledge of even four subjects will not secure a man a place, he must know at least one of 
them very well indeed’.62 As Macaulay had wanted, the range of papers did not exclude 
avenues of learning, but this did lead to concerns about the potential disparities in knowledge 















                                                 
61
 Between 1868-1878 the subjects and marks were fixed, but there were several changes in the subsequent 
decades, see Misra, The Bureaucracy in India, 158-174. 
62
 Alfred Cotterell Tupp, The Indian Civil Service and the Competition System (London, 1876), 48.  
95 
 































                                                 
63
 Ewald, The Guide to the Indian Civil Service, 16 – 17.  
Examination  Marks  
English Composition  300 
English History, including a period selected 
by the candidate 
300 
English Literature, including books selected 
by the candidate 
300 
Greek 600 




Maths, pure and mixed 1,000 
Natural Sciences  500 (each) 
Electricity and magnetism 300 
Experimental laws of heat and light 300 




Political Economy 300 
Sanskrit 500 
Arabic  500 





Vernacular languages  400 (each) 
History and geography of India 350 
Political Economy 350 
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Knowledge   
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Lit, Lang, and History (inc 




























Electricity and magnetism 
Geology and mineralology 
Zoology 
Botany 
500 (each) ¼  
Moral Sciences, logic, mental 
and moral philosophy 
500 ¼ 
Sanskrit  375 1/6 
Arabic 375 1/6 
Total 7,125  
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Initially, the topics reflected a liberal English education with a heavy focus on classics, 
English, mathematics and moral sciences. History, geography and modern languages were 
considered the cram subjects, as they lent themselves to rapid attainment compared to the 
long durée required of mathematics and classics.
65
 Initially the traditional subjects were more 
successful. For example, in 1859 the highest placed candidate of the entire cohort was first in 
Maths, the second highest candidate was first in English, and the candidate placed third 
overall came first in Classics.66 As well as requiring minimum attainment, the exams 
weighted the total potential marks according to the perceived value of each subject, see tables 
5 and 6. Sanskrit and Arabic were only worth 375 marks each. They were considered a token 
gesture to any Indian born candidates and allegedly represented the equivalent classical 
languages of the Indian subcontinent. Purely linguistic in focus, the Sanskrit and Arabic 
papers did not include the history or literature of the European language exams. This biased 
weighting of marks also neglected the useful preparation Sanskrit and Arabic offered for 
other vernacular languages later on in the probationary exams.
67
 As a framework to test 
studious habits the British Government remained confident in its commitment to the liberal 
gentlemanly education, but the competition system was ill at ease when being compared to 
the state of general education.  
The ICS examinations were simultaneously praised for improving education and 
criticised for ignoring developments in academia and school curricula. English literature, 
composition and good grammar were all given primacy in the exams, thereby encouraging 
the study of these subjects. While it appears obvious that a civil servant would need to 
demonstrate a good grasp of written English, English literature was not traditionally part of 
the British public education system. Rev. Robert Demaus congratulated the examiners and 
believed the ICS literature paper would result in an English master in every public school.
68
 
This was the kind of far reaching educational influence Macaulay had craved. Yet, when in 
1891, after fears that it had become a cram subject, Italian was removed from the syllabus. 
This decision was criticised as educators argued that modern languages were part of the 
public school curriculum, but the Commissioners responded: ‘the primary object of the 
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scheme under consideration is not to prescribe an educational curriculum but to obtain an 
adequate supply of highly educated candidates’.69  
The sciences remained a contentious issue throughout the nineteenth century. From the 
advent of the system the examiners for the science papers complained that the scheme 
unfairly targeted scientific specialist subjects.70 The balance of marks for the sciences did not 
appear to appreciate well applied knowledge but instead favoured a brief survey of various 
topics. H.H. Risley recalled that the ‘sciences were frequently taken up by men who had no 
previous knowledge or taste for them, and who “got up” the subjects from popular manuals, 
supplemented by special lectures’.71 The natural science, botany and electricity papers were 
criticised for being less rigorous and easy to pass. A.C. Bainbridge asserted that the practical 
tests were rife with cheating, and the examiner was usually unaware:  
 
He can only have a limited number of machines or specimens, upon his table. The 
first candidate who leaves his room can often name them all to some of his 
friends. These latter can refresh their memories by a reference to their text books 




Despite these critiques, by 1891 Oxford and Cambridge successfully lobbied to have the 
scientific tripos recognised as valid qualifications for an ICS candidate.
73
  
As Dewey argues, towards the end of the century a shift occurred towards those 
subjects which were not only believed to be the best demonstration of intellect, capacity and 
moral character, but also those which were of the most use in India itself.74 In 1860, the 
classics, British and European language, literature and history accounted for two thirds of the 
total possible marks. By 1900, philosophy and the moral sciences constituted half of the total 
possible mark. The literature element had been severely reduced, and three new social 
science papers had been added, including political economy and economic history, and 
political science. These moral and social science papers featured the history of jurisprudence, 
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and most importantly required a solid grasp of English politico-legal institutions, and English 
law.75 Despite the fluctuations in the content and style of the exams, by the end of the period 
there was a conscious favouring of the social sciences, these simultaneously blended the 
commitment to autonomy and independent decision-making, and the new technical 
professional skills of the modern era.  
The debates about the inclusion or exclusion of different subjects revealed a 
relationship between types of knowledge and the correct kind of civil servant. The potential 
for a candidate qualifying despite having insufficient or inappropriate knowledge was cause 
for serious alarm. J.S. Wylhe complained: ‘where then is the guarantee for the peoples’ 
satisfaction in the fact of their new master having one day in London showed some 
proficiency in stringing together Greek Iambics or flooring abstruse problems in pure 
mathematics’.76 There was an enduring conflict between those who believed that the exams 
should cultivate a specialist, independent and intellectual civil servant, and those who thought 
that little more than a check for hard work and basic intelligence was required.
77
 While it was 
generally agreed what the qualities of the idealised officer were in practice, the process of 
capturing, testing and shaping these characteristics remained problematic. These tensions 
were reflected in the exam questions, and the papers revealed the centrality of an idealised 
district officer in the official mind of the competition system. 
 ‘A frightful ordeal to pass through’: Taking the exams  
 
The examinations were influenced by the imagined and practiced district official. However, 
by attempting to test for the qualities and characteristics of this contested figure, the 
competitive exams aided in the construction of this idealised persona. Questions were 
oriented around the perceived skillset of the district officer, and they also required candidates 
to engage with the imagined administrative role.  
In the 1855 exam one of the passages for translation explicitly described the character 
of the idealised district official: ‘wisdom to discern the real interest of the community; 
goodness to endeavour always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to carry 
this knowledge and intention into action’.78 Composition questions frequently referenced the 
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governing race, the capacity to govern or the exercise of power.
79
 These essays encouraged 
candidates to articulate languages of power and envision their connection to an idealised role. 
In the most consistently popular papers, those of English literature, history and composition, 
the questions were clearly aimed at testing the communication skills and decision-making 
capacity of the potential civil servants. These questions encouraged candidates to demonstrate 
their ability to efficiently and effectively communicate detail: ‘write a letter asking for 
information of a locality you are unfamiliar with to a friend’.80 This question reflected the 
nature of the work expected of the early career of the district officer, writing, reviewing, 
memorising, regurgitating and presenting of reports.
81
 While the weighting of the marks in 
the English composition paper was frequently criticised, the essay style questions remained 
consistent. They were considered the most appropriate means of assessing the potential civil 
servant. Yet, simultaneously they were also the questions best adapted to the cramming 
method of study.  
The English history papers similarly encouraged the fashioning of an idealised 
gentlemanly administrator. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the history questions focused on a 
Whig grand narrative of British progress: ‘What changes in the Law, as affecting the freedom 
of conscience and the liberties of the subject, happened between the reign of Charles I and 
Queen Anne’.82 These questions lent themselves to discussions of the natural British 
governing capacity, and encouraged the candidates to see their own role in the system of 
Government and its heritage. The exams were often criticised for having little ‘Oriental’ 
learning. However, the history papers frequently referenced the EIC. Prominent figures like 
Warren Hastings or Robert Clive featured: ‘Write an account of the Hastings administration 
from Francis’ departure in 1780. For what special transactions was he subsequently 
impeached?’.83 Candidates were encouraged to reflect on or historicize Indian history. 
Questions tended to be on themes of success: ‘Estimate the merits and the deficits of the 
government of India by the East India Company’.84 These questions encouraged students to 
evaluate and contextualise British rule in India. As the century progressed, contemporary 
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history occasionally featured, and the Company was increasingly distanced through 
evaluative questions. Through the history papers the candidates were encouraged to see their 
role in the grand narrative of the Raj. 
The moral and political science papers asked
 
candidates to define, explain and 
occasionally challenge theories and concepts: ‘Show that the Ricardo theory of rent and the 
Malthusian theory of population rest substantially on the same foundation’.85 The political 
and philosophical variability within these papers, while reflecting contemporary trends, also 
encouraged the idea of independent reasoning which was so essential to the idealised district 
officer. Dewey has observed that later in the nineteenth century that a ‘reaction against 
utilitarianism co-existed in the book-lists with utilitarianism itself, as if the continued 
presence of utilitarian works was necessary to throw the reaction into high relief’.86 As 
Dewey explains, the moral science and political philosophy papers were not entirely aimed at 
drilling into potential district officials the best arguments and theories to govern India by. 
These questions encouraged a critical approach. They also required candidates to interrogate 
their own decision-making processes: ‘Is the argument from common sense an appeal to the 
judgement of the vulgar or is it at once scientific and philosophical? In what circumstances 
may it be appealed to, and under what conditions may it be employed’.87 Alongside 
philosophical debates, the methods of decision-making were tested. These questions asked 
candidates to consider the process of using common sense, or examine the moral justification 
of an argument. The increasing prominence of the moral, political and social science papers 
spoke to the continued commitment to an autonomous district officer. Candidates were 
required to interrogate their own decision-making processes and moral compass, often in an 
imagined environment. They were further expected to apply these skills and demonstrate 
legal understanding: ‘What are the uses of the institution of private property? What are the 
theoretical limitations to it? Why should we not expect to find it in the earliest stages of 
human society?’88 
For all the criticism of the sciences, the papers were equally revealing about the official 
mind. New scientific developments were reflected in the competition exams, with papers on 
electricity and magnetism featuring from the 1870s. Burgeoning theories of evolution and 
racial science were often intermingled with zoology and biology papers: ‘How do you 
distinguish structurally, man from the anthropoid ape? How far do certain lower races of 
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mankind approximate in character to those animals’.89 These subjects encouraged candidates 
towards a scientific skillset and their inclusion aided in the construction of the district 
officer’s expertise. Ethnography and anthropology were increasingly viewed as useful and 
relevant for trainee civilian officials. The competitive exams helped develop the idealised 
district officer into a qualified rational scientific bureaucrat. 
As Wilson has argued, the exams were testing more than intellectual ability. The 
competitive system was ‘an instrument for ensuring British and Indian officers acted as 
functionaries within a disciplined colonial machine. It was to be used to instil rational forms 
of mental order’.90 By analysing the examinations this chapter has revealed that the nature of 
this mental order was the subject of debate. The examination questions, style and content 
reveal that the type of intellect, work and persona the system tried to produce was based on 
competing interpretations of the idealised district official. However, this process was also 
shaped by the nature of the potential candidates. Contingent and overlapping factors of 
education, background, character, class, Britishness and age informed the anxieties regarding 
prospective candidates. A dichotomy emerged between an ideal imagined candidate, drawing 
on the persona of the district officer, and the competition wallah, who reflected the concerns 
regarding bureaucracy. The tension between these two figures reflected and informed the 
debates regarding the competition system. One of the principle concerns regarding candidates 
for the ICS concerned the nature of their preparatory education, be it crammer, public school 
or university. This was a source of considerable debate, and had an impact on the 
development of the competitive system.    
‘Men of good general education in several walks of life’: Education and schooling 
 
The competition exams were intended to reflect a typical British public school education, but 
as the system developed, public school educations were insufficient preparation.
91
 According 
to historians of the public schools the education provided was fairly limited.
92
 Primarily, 
learning was orientated around the classics, translating without context, and a basic 
introduction of mathematics, some French and later a minimal inclusion of the natural 
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 Public school applications peaked between the early 1870s and early 1890s due to 
the age range being significantly lower during this time.
94
  
The disparity between the promise that the examinations would reflect a classic liberal 
education, and the reality of the work required, presented an obstacle to public school and 
university candidates. As a result, the ICS became unpopular with educational institutions. 
A.H. Haggard, a subdivisional officer in Buxar, argued in 1875 ‘the Universities and 
Headmasters of public schools began to view with disfavour the working of a system which 
set them at nought, worked independent of them and from which they got no credit’.95 This 
unpopularity of the competition system amongst schools and universities was aggravated by 
the lower age limit, which meant that the boys were taken out of the final years in order to 
prepare for the ICS. Furthermore, institutional commonality which was so vital to the public 
schools was disassembled by the competition system. As Dewey asserts, the nature of the 
exam was ‘enough to force candidates to have recourse to crammers; nowhere within the 
ordinary education system could they obtain appropriate tuition to supplement their early 
specialisation’.96 
The most famous crammer was Walter Wren: he proclaimed ‘it is well known that I 
was becoming a monopolist, that my pupils beat all rivals whether from Public Schools or the 
Universities, and that therefore the Public Schools begged Salisbury, Secretary of State, to 
make certain changes in their fancied interests’.97 In a unique pamphlet Wren wrote to the 
Secretary of State for India defending his work and claimed that the crammers served a 
necessary function. Wren argued the demands of the preparation for the competition exams 
were being inadequately met by the public schools. Mr Cumine, an Assistant-Collector, had 
studied with Wren, and explained ‘so much impetus is given to cramming by means of 
manuals, for the next years’ examination. But this is clearly due to the carelessness of the 
individual crammer, and not to any defect in the system’.98  
There were a plethora of examination manuals covering the different subjects. These 
books offered strategy and advice, and frequently claiming specific expertise. They often 
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included sample examination papers or composition exercises.
99
 Examination guides asserted 
their role in a similar fashion to general governing literature, as one author argued: ‘most of 
the information published is as confusing and unintelligible to the public as the blue-books 
sold by the government printers’.100 These texts claimed to guide the candidate through the 
process by assisting in the navigation of the examination procedure and offering advice on 
which subjects to take, and which combination would enable the student to pass. Although 
the majority of the books focused purely on the logistics of the examination, many utilised 
language reminiscent of the ideal district officer as an incentive to pursue the vocation. 
Alexander Ewald confidently stated of the ICS ‘it’s pecuniary prizes and the positions of high 
social influence which it offers, is the most splendid career that any country can offer to its 
young men of talent’.101 For many of the candidates these manuals were the first exposure to 
the governing literature which would manage the conduct of their future careers. 
The popularity of examination guides began to cause anxieties. District officers 
distanced themselves from the texts in order to assert their independent success. Mr 
Winchester, an Assistant-Collector, stated that he read all his ‘books fairly, and never touched 
a manual, or handbook, or epitome’.102 Winchester’s rejection of handbooks and insistence 
on his ‘fair’ reading hints at a connection between the manual reading candidate and the 
competition wallah. A competition wallah dependent on a manual would lack discretionary 
capacity as he would only be capable of functioning when dictated to.  However, there were 
those who had a more realistic attitude towards the use of governing literature. Bainbridge 
argued ‘when deciding a case in court a Magistrate will never trust his slippery memory as to 
the exact wording of any important passage. His books are before him and he at once refers to 
the text’.103 Examination guides were part of governing culture in British India and this early 
exposure to such texts instilled a relationship with such works and the representations they 
contained. Although the quality of the education could be questioned it was undeniable that 
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crammed students did very well at the exams. Wren boasted that he had produced great 
statesmen and, of 175 candidates successful under the ‘new system’ 89 were Wren’s 
pupils.
104
 Critics of the cramming problem often laid the blame at the lowered age range 
which had removed students from universities, and it is to this debate that this chapter now 
turns. 
In 1875 the Secretary of State for India, Salisbury, launched an inquiry into the 
competitive system. He collated the opinions of 101 serving civilian officials, Sailsbury had 
two questions, firstly what should be the age range for recruitment, and secondly, whether 
residence in a shared institution was an appropriate arrangement. The majority of the civilian 
officials believed that residence at either a new Haileybury or a University would be a 
solution to the crammer issue. The calls for the reinstitution of Haileybury or some other East 
India College were dominated by nostalgia.
105
 Haileybury was romanticised amongst the ICS, 
especially in memoirs.
106
 Henry Cotton commented that in his early career, the service was 
still dominated by Haileyburians.
107
 Although Haileybury was considered the perfect 
environment for mutual association, it had ‘none of those high associations which cling round 
the old universities and form so large a part of the education they give’.108 Macaulay had 
always wanted to recruit university men, but integrating this into his competition system 
proved problematic. One solution proposed was to conduct a short course of study at a 
university, Oxford and Cambridge being obvious favourites. The advantages of the 
academics, the learning environment and the cultivation of cultured manners were prevailing 
incentives. 
University education underwent significant changes during the period under discussion. 
Keith Vernon argues that Oxford and Cambridge were shaped by the interference of the 
British Government.
109
 In the 1850s, a Royal Commission concluded Oxford and Cambridge 
were failing in their duty to educate the nation, and subsequently new honours courses were 
introduced.
110
 Initially, these new degrees were restricted to more traditional subjects like 
history and theology, but by the end of the nineteenth century even Oxford and Cambridge 
had branched out into modern languages, oriental studies and English literature. There was an 
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enduring commitment to the classics as the most appropriate university degree. As Vernon 
explains ‘classical learning was the hallmark of the gentleman and imparted the civility, 
humanity and broad views of the great civilisations’.111 Despite the belief that a university 
degree, especially one including the classics, was a superior demonstration of reasoned 
intellect, most undergraduates depended on private tuition.
112
 Oxford and Cambridge were 
required to adapt to the changing demands of the professional classes, especially as the 
universities in London and elsewhere were willing to offer alternative courses. The viability 
of an ICS staffed by graduates depended on the gradual shift in education offered by Oxford 
and Cambridge.  
Before the lowering of the maximum age to 19 there were quite a few university men 
among the candidates.
113
 Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, and University College London were 
the most popular institutions. Usually candidates would sit a few terms of a degree course, 
occasionally they could take one of the law or history tripos, and then they would pursue the 
ICS exam. There was always a concern that clever men would then choose to complete a 
degree instead of continuing into the service. However, many, including Rev. H. Latham 
believed ICS appointments did ‘not attract persons of first rate ability from universities’.114 
The principal problem was that most universities were unwilling or unable to accommodate 
the ICS candidates.  
In 1872, only Balliol at Oxford, and Trinity Hall at Cambridge actively welcomed and 
accommodated students intending to take the competitive exam. Balliol’s acceptance of 
candidates was primarily as a result of the involvement of Jowett who had proclaimed that he 
could not ‘conceive a greater boon which could be conferred on the Universities than a share 
in the Indian appointments’.115 An India College at either Oxford or Cambridge, modelled on 
Haileybury, but more appropriate for graduates or undergraduates, was proposed, but it never 
materialised. This was principally because students were underachieving in their 
undergraduate degrees in order to devote their attention to the preparation for the ICS exam. 
The university issue further highlighted the tension between the Macaulay’s desire for a 
gentlemanly administrator and the demands of the system by the later nineteenth century. 
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Another problem was a lack of expertise within the traditional university system. J. 
Muir complained that Scottish university students were disadvantaged as a result of the heavy 
concentration on English literature and History which was not catered for at Edinburgh.
116
 
However, the Irish universities did not share this lack of relevant intellectual culture. 
Competition reform benefited young Irish men. Between 1855 and 63, 24 percent of the 
recruited civilians were Irish university educated. Scottish civilians dropped from 13 percent 
under nomination to 10 percent, and likewise English recruitment decreased from 54 percent 
to 51 percent.
117
 Scott Cook argues that this was because Trinity College Dublin, like the 
University of London, adapted itself to cater for the exams by establishing chairs in Arabic 
and Sanskrit, and Queen’s University Belfast followed suit.118 The result of Salisbury’s report 
was that university residence during probation was made compulsory in 1878. This did not 
obviate the crammer issue for the first exams. It was concluded that a university residence 
would appropriately socialise and prepare the probationers even if they were crammed 
students. The education and universities debate was focused on trying to harness the idealised 
ICS candidate, and avoid the problematic character of the competition wallah.  
 
‘A beggar on horseback’: The ideal Indian Civil Service candidate and the competition 
wallah 
 
The debates around the style and content of the exams and the nature of the preparation were 
the product of conflicting ideas about the ingredients, imagined and real, for the ideal civil 
servant.
119
 The design of the system was contingent upon the individual, both imagined and 
real, who would be input into the process. The tensions emergent from discussions of 
character, intelligence, age, class, gender, and physicality demonstrate the centrality of an 
idealised persona for the ICS. The belief in the role of the competition system in selecting the 
correct attributes and appropriately moulding the civil servant demonstrates that the model 
district officer was already being constantly contested and reconstructed in the beginning 
stages of his life. The ideal district officer was described thus by Sir Colebrook Bart:  
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the type of officer the people like is someone who will listen to their long tales of 
grievance patiently, treat their notabilities with courtesy and in his administrative 




A test for these qualities of patience, courtesy, vigorous action and judgement were, for 
many, glaringly absent from the competition system. In response to the exams, there was an 
ongoing discussion about what set of attributes and characteristics were most likely to 
produce a good district officer. The allegedly meritorious examination system took no 
account of background, nationality, or moral compass. The figure of the competition wallah 
loomed disconcertingly during these debates.  
According to Baptist Scoones the competition men were viewed as ‘undergrown, 
transparent creatures, who have been subjected to a “nefarious system of education and have 
been allowed to suffer premature growth in an exotic nursery”’.121 Competition wallahs were 
often referred to as in some way ‘forced’ or ‘stunted’.122 These criticisms were reminiscent of 
hot house flowers, exotic and unnaturally grown. Critics of the system argued that the process 
did not allow the natural growth of manly habits and this was aggravated by the lowering of 
maximum application age to 19.
123
 A major concern was that these premature competition 
wallahs would be more vulnerable to the contaminating influences of the East, both in their 
bodily weakness and underdeveloped character. L.H.. Griffin complained that the 
competition wallahs were unpopular due to their arrogance, caused by premature success. He 
claimed ‘they neither ride, nor shoot nor dance, nor play cricket, and prefer the 
companionship of their books to the attractions of India society’.124 One presiding opinion 
was that the earlier batches of competition men were superior to the more recent recruits, 
unsurprisingly this was a view shared by the remaining Haileyburians and the early 
generations of competitioners.
125
 The competition wallah was intellectually insufficient, 
physically inadequate, morally compromised and lacking in the core qualities of a governing 
official.
126
 There were those ready to defend the Indian Civil Servants produced by the 
                                                 
120
 Bart, A letter to Thos. Baring Esq, 50.  
121
 Scoones, On the method of selecting candidates for the civil service of India, 14.  
122
 BL, IOR/L/PJ/3/1117, Proceedings of the Madras Government, 7th August 1875, public department Sir W. 
Gull. 
123
 A Haileybury man, An Indian Civilian’s Career, what it is, and what it might be, with some remarks on 
English mal-administration in India (Brighton, 1867), 3.  
124
 L.H. Griffin, Kapurthala 9th August, 1875. Ibid. 
125
 Mr Ravenscroft, acting chief secretary to government, Haileybury, Mr Oliphant acting revenue 
commissioner, Haileybury, Mr Ashburner, Revenue Commissioner, Haileybury, Mr Justice Kendall, 
Haileybury, Ibid. 
126
 Mr Peddler, acting secretary to government, Ibid. 
109 
 
competition system, Mr Crosthwaite claimed ‘a great deal of the cry against the competition 
men is due to old prejudices’,127 and Charles Turner argued that the competitioners were the 
equivalent to barristers or university tutors.
128
 The competition wallah served as the antithesis 
to the ideal district officer. He was condemned by his failure to demonstrate or acquire the 
crucial traits which made up the model Indian Civil Servant. Furthermore, the examination 
system failed to allow the competition wallah to prove he did possess such attributes. These 
tensions reflected the wider debates about how best to govern India and how to select and test 
the governors. Measuring and demonstrating the possession of the qualities of the ideal 
district officer became central to the discussion surrounding the competition system. 
The competition wallah was presumed to have an insufficient Christian moral compass. 
Goodlad explains in addition to gentlemanly conduct and active individuality, character 
depended on resistance or the lack of indulgence. One district officer, A. Hobhouse, defined 
morality as ‘the virtues of sobriety and chastity’.129 The competition men were often accused 
of being immoral. Governor of Madras complained ‘there are men amongst our junior 
Civilians who give way to sensual temptations’.130 The increasing number of middle class 
applicants made many doubt the rigour of the exam and the value of the conduct certificate. 
L.H. Griffin complained:  
 
What do the commissioners know of the character of a candidate, vouched for by 
the tutor or a clergyman, a friend of the family, who are naturally and necessarily 
ignorant of the pursuits and the companions which the youth may prefer in 
London? I really do not see how anything short of an appearance in the police 




Many considered the competition system an insufficient test for ascertaining the 
characteristics of a future ruler of men. It failed to identify those governing qualities that had 
been inherent in older generations and were so necessary for the proper conduct of district 
Government. However, Buettner has demonstrated that imperial careering was a family 
business.
132
 Jacob Thiessen explains ‘these men's connection with India might be less 
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hereditary than the Anglo-Indians’ had been, but it was no less careerist’.133 Therefore, many 
of the candidates would have had connections to India, but the system did not acknowledge 
them.  
The character problem in the ICS was attributed to the increasing number of career men 
in the service. Macaulay had been somewhat disparaging about the growing class of 
professional men, ‘for the duties, even of a very young servant of the Company, are more 
important than those which ordinarily fall to the lot of a professional man’.134 Harold Perkins 
argues that there was a division between Victorian perceptions of the gentleman, defined by 
governing qualities, and the business professional who did not possess these qualities but was 
more familiar with scientific or technologically oriented means of earning money.
135
 W. 
Hudleston complained ‘members of the service now regard themselves in many, I think I may 
say the majority of instances as the paid servants of a government, rather than as being the 
members of a governing service’.136 The competition men were seen as prioritising 
emoluments, pensions and leave rather than devotion to the project of rule. Naturally, critics 
of the ‘careerist’ competitioners blamed their lower middle class backgrounds.  
Concerns regarding the competition system found a focal point in the competition 
wallah. The elevated status accorded to the civil servant in India, and especially the Collector, 
resulted in anxieties regarding the class and moral standards of those who might access this 
coveted position through the open exam system. Montgomery Martin claimed that the mid 
nineteenth century recruits often came from trade backgrounds, ‘they have sprung from every 
class of English society; sons of druggists, ironmongers, tailors, upholsterers, drapers, 
undertakers, farmers, stewards, millers, butchers, printers’.137 In reality, between 1860 and 
1874 the overwhelming majority of candidates were sons of clergymen, (see table 7).
138
 Only 
27 men were the sons of food provisioners or shop owners.
139
 John Tosh argues ‘vicarage 
sons were particularly sensitive to the demerits of domestic patriarchy because their fathers 
were present in the home for so much of the time. It may be for this reason they are 
disproportionately represented in the ranks of officialdom’.140 Tosh believes the exposure to 
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the domestic patriarch created the desire for the flight to the Empire. The lifestyle offered by 
the ICS probably appealed over the genteel poverty of the Church. Therefore, at least until 
the 1870s the candidates were from an appropriate background, the Church was not the most 
profitable vocation but it was certainly respectable. 
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Table 7: Social backgrounds of Indian Civil Servants 1860 – 74141  
 
Job of father Civilians 1860 - 
74 
Landed / peerage 67 
Officers, Army, Navy, Indian 
Army 
65 
Clergymen  184 
Civil Service / Diplomat  57 
Legal 49 
Medical 65 
Merchant / Banking 48 
Architecture / Engineering 11 
Education 27 
Secretarial / Librarian / Agent 20 
Farmer / agriculture 28 
Shop / food provision, e.g 
Tailor or Baker 
27 
Organist 1 
Clerk  2 
Steward / Gamekeeper  2 
Station Master  1 
Not Specified  14 
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Table 8: Birthplace of Indian Civil Servants 1860 – 74142  
 
Birthplace 1855 - 74 
England 350 
Scotland  189 
Ireland  156 
Guernsey  3 
Europe (France 3, Belgium 1, 
Germany 3, Austria 1, Russia 
1, Gibraltar 1) 
10 
St Helena & Ascension  2 
India and Ceylon 6, (7 native 
candidates) 
Canada 11 
China and Mauritius  4 
West Indies 2 
U.S & Brazil 2 
Tunisia 3 
Polynesia  2 
At Sea  1 
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Yet, the impression remained that the service was being stocked by the lower sorts of 
tradespersons and this caused considerable anxiety. Wylhe claimed that it wounded ‘the 
people’s pride to see their thousands governed by a man who scarcely possess muster among 
his own race’.143 By opening up the competition system to men from all classes the inherent 
sense of ‘authority’, which was so crucial to the legitimate function of the British 
Government in India, might be compromised. The idea of the model district officer was 
dependent on an innate racial authority, and many clearly felt that the son of a grocer was 
incompatible with this vision of governing power. However, it was also argued that the 
subject race would be unaware of the differences of class. Tupp believed that as long as a 
man spoke the language fluently and became well acquainted with the culture, the locals 
would believe he belonged to that ‘“large class of Englishmen which is distinguished from all 
the rest”; although according to our standard he might be very widely separated from it’.144 
A.H. Haggard supported Tupp, and while he thought the competition exams were 
prohibitively expensive, he concluded that ‘in two years it is difficult in India to say which is 
the son of the banker and which of the gamekeeper’.145 Tupp and Haggard’s claims did 
depend on the individual capacity to integrate and conduct oneself correctly as a district 
officer, and many believed that the lower middle classes would not be capable of this. By the 
end of the nineteenth century it was increasingly difficult to recruit from the more desirable 
upper echelons of society, and the ICS had to settle for lower middle class candidates.
146
 
In addition to these fears that the natural governing elite were being displaced by lower 
class persons, were the anxieties caused by the Britishness of the candidates.
147
 In 1858 The 
Saturday Review complained ‘what, after all, is at present the result of recruiting the Indian 
Civil Service by competition . . . Simply this. We are substituting Irishmen for Scotchmen . . . 
Englishmen may be allowed to ask whether the empire gains by the exchange’.148 There was a 
prevailing opinion that in the context of the ICS, British should essentially equal English.
149
 
There was an obvious awkwardness around an Irish civil servant. A metropolitan colonial 
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subject ruling other colonial races was a sensitive contradiction. In 1903 Vincent A. Smith 
delivered a lecture at Trinity College Dublin on the merits of the ICS as a profession. Smith 
recommended the career to spirited young Irishmen, he explained: 
  
it pays much better than most professions, but because it offers to an able and 
ambitious young man an honourable and manly career, giving full scope for the 
exercise of the strongest character and the highest intellectual power, and holding 




Cook argues that the ICS was a way for the Irish to take advantage of the British connection, 
but ultimately by the later nineteenth century the English-Britishness issue was irrelevant to a 
sprawling bureaucracy.
151
 Yet, it was a discussion that still had a place in 1875, in the 
Salisbury report civil servants had varying expression of confidence in Scottish and Irish 
students. W.H. Smith argued ‘the Scotch universities do not, as far as I know them fulfill the 
desired conditions’.152 Whereas Robert Smeaton, officiating under-secretary for the North 
Western Provinces, was under the impression that all the Scottish men in the service were 
graduates. Furthermore, Sir Phillip Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay, believed that the 
graduates of the Scottish, Irish and London universities should be encouraged as much as 
Oxbridge men.
153
 Between 1855 and 1874 the English dominated with 350 ICS men being 
born in England (and presumably Wales too, as it was not listed as a separate birthplace), 
Scotland followed with 189 men and Ireland close behind with 156.
154
 There remained an 
overwhelming concern that Irish, Scottish, or Welsh competition men might not possess the 
innate ability to uphold the standards of the governing race, as the system did ‘nothing to 
prevent the transplantation of a raw youth straight from some rural parsonage in Wales to the 
mastery over masses of subject race full of craft and passion’.155 George Campbell believed it 
would practically insult Indians, short of destabilising society, to be governed by anyone not 
recognisable as a member of the imperial racial elite.
156
 The idealised district officer was 
                                                 
150
 Smith, The Indian Civil Service as a Profession, 25.  
151
 Cook, ‘The Irish Raj’.  
152
 BL, IOR/L/PJ/3/1117, W.H Smith, additional paper alongside, Mr Turner, officiating Chief Justice of NWP, 
Naini Tal, 23rd August 1875, written by secretary A. Colvin, 2, Bainbridge, and  C.H. Aitchson 21st May 1875, 
1. 
Buettner discusses the practice of Scottish identity in British India, see Buettner, ‘Haggis in the Raj: Private and 
Public Celebrations of Scottishness in Late Imperial India’, Scottish Historical Review, LXXXI, 2 212 (October 
2002), 212-39.   
153
 Sir Phillip Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay, Bombay Department, 27th August, Ibid. 
154
 See Table 8.  
155
 Wylhe, A letter to the Hon’ble Sir C. Trevelyan, 7.  
156
 Bengal (India), Report of the Salaries Commission, 17 
116 
 
imagined as an Englishman, but in practice his nationality and his masculinity were more 
complex.  
Masculinity and racial superiority were intimately linked and, as the period progressed, 
concerns around the ‘white maleness’ of the district officer came to the fore.157 This official 
administrative masculinity has not been sufficiently explored by historiography. Mrinalini 
Sinha has identified parallels in the descriptions of competition wallahs and Indian born civil 
servants. Indian born candidates for the competitive service often came from middle class 
backgrounds and lacked aristocratic authority. Sinha explains Indian competitioners also 
failed to ‘display qualities of “physical and intellectual manhood”’.158 According to Sinha the 
Salisbury Commission resulted in the exclusion of Indian covenanted servants by attributing 
fixed and naturalised characteristics to different ‘native types’.159 These exclusions were 
based on a fixed superior white male British persona.  
This white British male district officer persona was a complex and contradictory 
gendered role. C.A. Galton explained ‘Competition Wallahs have been reproached with 
effeminacy, as well as with deficiency, in the characteristics of a gentleman’.160 Effeminacy, 
or at least lacking in masculine attributes, was inextricably tied to lower middle class 
backgrounds.
161
 Masculinity, as defined by sporting activity, formed part of the assertion of 
control and bodily discipline required of an ideal district officer. In a letter to Trevelyan, 
Wylhe insisted that masculinity was fundamental to the relationship between the British and 
the Indian population ‘the play of his power commands their respect. They like him to have 
manly amusements which they can comprehend’.162 The issue faced by the British 
Government in India was how to test the physicality and masculinity of its civilian officials. 
Candidates for the civil service were expected to pass a medical examination. Sir William 
Gull had conducted these assessments from 1868. In total he had examined 289 candidates 
and explained that he usually only failed men on the basis of some mechanical fault, for 
example a heart valve malfunction.
163
  
Francis Galton, sometimes known as the Father of Eugenics, was a stringent critic of 
the medical examination, and argued for it to be part of the marked scheme of the 
competition system. Galton drew attention to the recent concerns regarding the constitutional 
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robustness of candidates. He suggested that ‘physical efficiency’ should be marked out of 
500, and he proposed tests for measuring strength, breathing capacity, agility or promptness, 
keenness of eyesight and hearing.
164 
When the India Office expressed concerns that that such 
a test might unfairly exclude Indian candidates, Galton asserted that Indians were most fit for 
the climate and would therefore pass. Arthur Godley, Under Secretary of State for India 
supported Galton and believed the testing would take into account the background of the 
candidate: 
 
Of course vigorous is a term which would be detrimental relatively to race, the 
same physical strength is not to be expected in natives of many races in India as is 
to be expected in Europeans Englishmen  and indeed men of the North of England 
have probably as a race greater physical strength than men of the South.
165 
 
Goldey’s choice of the word Englishmen over Europeans, and preference for Northerners 
highlights contemporary ideas of race, nationality and masculinity. Although European was 
often used interchangeably to mean British, Godley’s specific usage of English indicates that 
the idealised district officer was considered an Englishman, and not merely white and 
European. The Secretary of State, Viscount Cross, approved the additions suggested by 
Galton but under the proviso that physicality would be strictly marked based on a medical 
examination and measurements.
166
 While the British Government was unwilling to conduct a 
full racial bodily assessment of the candidates, the decision to extend the scope of the medical 
exam reflected the anxieties around physical fitness and capacity to rule.  
The second reform to the competition system based on physicality was the introduction 
of the compulsory riding examination. As already discussed, horsemanship was a crucial part 
of the ideal district officers identity. A civilian official willing ‘to mount his horse at 12 
o’clock at night, and ride thirty or forty miles, and without the intervention or aid of native 
subordinates personally hold an investigation, possesses an advantage over a brother civilian 
who may be unable to do so’.167 Wylhe asserted that being unable to ride a horse disqualified 
a man from becoming a Magistrate in India.
168
 The riding test was introduced in 1884 but no 
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marks were assigned, the candidates simply had to demonstrate competency.
169
 According to 
the rules of 1895 the test was conducted by a military officer acting for the Commissioners: 
‘the chief tests will be in Saddling and Bridling; Mounting and Dismounting; Trotting; 
Trotting without stirrups; Trotting without reins or stirrups; Cantering; Jumping the bar at a 
moderate height; Jumping a moderate hedge hurdle’.170 The test was considered necessary as 
increasingly candidates were coming from homes that did not keep horses.
171
 In 1899 seven 
candidates failed the riding exam.
172
 The resulting perception was that the system was 
drawing on a pool of men which was increasingly lacking in the required skill set. 
Furthermore, concerns around physicality and masculinity were aggravated by the lowering 
of the maximum age. Anxieties about the prematurity, mentally, morally and physically, of 
the candidates reflected general concerns about the constant raising and lowering of the 
minimum and maximum age for the applicants.
173
  
The age debate was intimately connected to the education problem, as the Civil Service 
Commissioners could not decide whether a schoolboy or a graduate made a better ideal 
candidate. Macaulay’s original vision for a service staffed by graduates was eventually 
condemned by those who claimed that they were too old for the demands of the work. Critics 
argued that they were ‘unsuccessful at the onset of their career, are very apt to dislike the 
country and the work; they adopt themselves less easily to the people; and they feel sorely the 
drudgery and difficulties inseparable from the first few years of a civilian’s career’.174 The 
original maximum age was 23, but in 1859 this was lowered to 22, five years later it was 
lowered again to 21 and by 1878 it was taken from 21 to 19. Briefly under Ripon the 
maximum age was increased back to 22, supposedly to allow Indians to integrate in to the 
service. As the age limit decreased, fitting in even a few terms at a university seemed 
impractical, and this contributed to the decreased popularity of the service.
175
 Therefore, 
‘gradually, the civil service commissioners and the India Office became reconciled to the 
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abandonment of the Macaulay committee goal – recruitment of the cream of the universities – 
and accepted as a substitute recruitment of the cream of the public schools’.176  
These changes to the maximum age limit were undeniably influenced by the concerns 
surrounding education, but they also indicated shifting attitudes about the age at which a man 
had matured into a colonising subject. Younger men were considered better suited to the 
nature of the work, and they could acquire the languages quickly.
177
 By commencing an ICS 
career at a younger age it was possible to achieve the position of Collector earlier and, 
therefore, in theory, district administration would be conducted by a more physically healthy 
group. This also offered the possibility of an early retirement with the potential for other 
work at home in middle age, an increasingly appealing prospect as a result of the diminishing 
returns on the pension. 
The age debate was also influenced by practical considerations, younger men would be 
less likely to regret their decision because they would have had limited exposure to other 
opportunities, but simultaneously this lack of life experience could leave them ill-equipped. 
As J.S. Mackintosh argued ‘the younger he is the less likely is he to think himself above the 
work of counting stamps and money and inspecting drains’.178 The Salisbury report echoed 
the uncertainty of the Civil Service Commissioners, of the district officers asked, 5 made no 
reference to age, 27 recommend a reduction, 36 argued for the retention of the existing limits 
and 36 would have raised it.
179
 The debate regarding the age of potential candidates reflected 
a service simultaneously characterised by the autonomous district officer and a rule bound 
regime. No one seemed able to conclude if the older or younger man would make a better 
decision maker or be more liable to turn into a bureaucrat. Therefore, the probationary period 
became fundamental to either train the younger man in the ways of a gentlemanly 
administrator or to force the older man into the agreed model. The probationary period served 
as the means of polishing away the failings of the candidates and rendering them more 
suitable for their role as the ruling race.  
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A ‘vessel into which knowledge regarding things Indian is to be poured’: The Probation  
 
The disjuncture between the design of the competitive exams and the practical role of the 
district officer necessitated a probationary period and further examinations in India.
180
  This 
process has received insufficient attention.
181
 Prior has examined the role of similar training 
in the African Colonial Administrative Service. He concludes that training was minimal, and 
‘beyond enduring enthusiasm for empire, little guidance was given as to both how officials 
were to act, and how far they were able to use race in understanding those whom they had to 
govern’.182 The ICS probation attempted to equip the newly qualified candidates with 
information about the languages and laws of India, but it was also lacking in practical 
preparation, as the majority of the training was conducted on the job.   
In 1858 further ‘specialist’ exams, primarily focused on languages and law, were added 
to the competition process. By 1859 the new probationary period was increased to a year and 
a more comprehensive ‘probationary’ exam was devised. Probationers were permitted a £100 
allowance. After 1864 the language exams were relocated from Presidency towns to England, 
(an additional £200 allowance was granted).
183
 The examinations were sat every six months, 
initially they could be resat, but this was refused after 1863 due to a belief that it encouraged 
laxity.184 Candidates had to pay back their allowance if they failed the probationary exams, 
and they, along with two guarantors, signed a £1,000 bond, making it a significant financial 
commitment.
185
 One anonymous commentator argued that the expense accrued by residence 
in London was not sufficiently rewarded by the future career.
186
 The London based probation 
was criticised as it exposed young men to the diverting pursuits of the capital. Sir Louis 
Mallet, the Undersecretary of State for India, wrote to the Civil Service Commissioners 
arguing the probation was ‘gained at the expense of all moral securities, the candidate being 
practically left to conduct their own studies in a great city without supervision of any kind’.187 
Conversely, H. Gillion, Joint-Magistrate of Jessore, argued that the probation should have ‘as 
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much freedom as is consistent with the attainment of the main end in view’.188 Many 
considered the grandmotherly fussing over the location of the probation as inconsistent with 
the independent role to be assumed in India. Alternatively, it was argued that a solitary 
existence was an equally inappropriate preparation, and that some kind of institutional 
association would benefit the future civilian officials.  
The importance of esprit des corps in the governance of India also dominated these 
discussions. It was believed that a group with mutual confidence would make a better unit as 
a civil service.
189
 There was some logic in the desire for a group residence or association. 
Especially with the reduced age limits it was important for a candidate to be ‘brought into 
contact and comparison with a large number of young men, which will give him a juster 
estimate of his own powers, than if he were brought up more privately’.190 A shared 
institution would facilitate the polishing required. The probation also played an important 
role in shaping the personality of the candidate because it gave him the crucial opportunity to 
spend time with his family and society more generally. H.G. Fanshawe argued that candidates 
were too long isolated at school and the exam process, he stated ‘no society of men can 
improve a man of 20 or 21 years of age in manner, except as far as “diffidence” is concerned; 
such influences beyond men and must be sought in women’.191 This view was expressed by 
several district officers and they recommended travel and mixing in literary or other 
intellectual society during the probation.
192
 C.H.T. Crosthwaite opposed an India College 
because he argued that the society in it would be too small and that unlike a university it 
would not ‘be of much advantage to those whose angles require to be taken and polished 
down’.193 Out of the 101 civilians asked, 75 were for an association of some kind, 47 
distinctly argued for a university, 14 were favourable towards a university and 14 wanted a 
special college.
194
 This was the reason for the introduction of the compulsory residence at a 
university during the probation.  
The university residence had also been the ultimate aim of some at Oxbridge. Reverend 
George Phear Vice Chancellor of Cambridge petitioned the Secretary of State for India in 
1874 and believed that Indian officials should have all the educational advantages of a 
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 By 1902, most of the major universities had scholarships, prizes and 
courses for ICS candidates and probationers. Christ Church had four Sanskrit scholarships 
worth £50. Cambridge offered prizes at Trinity, Pembroke, Gonville and Caius, St John’s, 
Emmanuel and Claire. University College Dublin emphasised a specialisation in Law and the 
University of London had a dedicated Indian school costing 25 guineas.
196
 In 1903, Oxford 
provided three hours of law lectures a week, plus the choice of forty history lectures, and four 
hours per week for the vernacular language of the allocated province. Probationers were 
given a £300 allowance for residing at a university approved of by the Secretary of State, and, 
in recognition of the original purpose of the scheme any particularly successful students 




Probationers were assigned provinces based on how well they did at the first 
examination and could express various preferences which were taken into account alongside 
their results.
198
 The North Western Provinces (NWP) and the Punjab were generally favoured 
due to the preconceptions about the active lifestyle and good climate. In 1894, several 
probationers listed their reasons for preferring particular provinces. Michael H. Whittley 
wished to be stationed near Agra as his mother would soon be living there.
199
 Thomas Callan 
Hodson wanted to go to the Upper Provinces of Bengal as he had friends in the locality and 
believed it ‘would be as conducive to the public interests as to my own, were I to be sent to a 
province where the feeling of isolation would thus be lessened’.200 W. Done Bushell had a 
specific interest in the Upper Provinces of Bengal. He explained that he ‘personally should 
much prefer to deal with manly races’.201 Alan W. Pim was similarly interested in the people 
of the NWP, as was L.S. Stevenson who was under the impression they were more 
Anglicised.
202
 It was evident that for these three men the influence of gendered racial 
discourse was shaping their preconceptions of the role and their particular ambitions 
regarding their positions as district officers. However, the dominant motivation appeared to 
be the presence of family or friends in the province. Once the province had been decided 
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upon, and confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioners, the probationer could begin his 
language studies.  
The languages for the Lower Provinces in Bengal were Bengali and Hindustani. In 
1870, the vernacular exams were worth 500 marks each, these were taken in addition to 
Sanskrit, also 500 marks.
203
 By 1885, the vernaculars were only worth 400 marks, and 
alternative classical languages in the form of Persian or Arabic were added to the scheme.
204
 
The Indian classical languages were offered in order to reflect the ancient or root language 
for each province.
205
 It was feared that without a compulsory language element in the initial 
process there was nothing ‘to guard against the admission of men who have absolutely no 
linguistic talent, and who go about to the end of their service talking like a bawarchi-khana 
(kitchen) dialect’.206 Linguistic incompetency was a serious concern, as it could cause the 
contempt of the local population and expose the district officer to potential exploitation or 
even corruption. In his pamphlet W. Nassam Lees emphasised how inadequate the 
probationary and Higher Standard language exams were: 
 
he is capable of reading particular books, writing with certain accuracy exercises, 
in the language he has studied, but incapable of understanding one spoken word of 
Oriental tongue, or himself of directing even a witness to be brought into his 
Court.207 
 
Nassam Lees explained that on passing two languages the junior civil servant was 
empowered to give one months’ imprisonment or 15 days imprisonment with 50 RS fine. The 
concerns surrounding the language barrier will be explored further in Chapter Five. The 
ability to speak Indian languages was crucial for the smooth functioning of district 
Government, and the rule of law. 
The law section of the probationary exams accounted for 1,200 marks. Alongside 
learning the legislation and legal frameworks of British India the probationers were expected 
to produce a series of law reports. By attending various courts the probationers were 
supposed to a produce a report which methodically described the case, assessed the evidence 
and concluded with an analytical summary. They were required to demonstrate a sound 
understanding of the role of evidence, the process of a trial, and the function of a judge versus 
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a jury. The process was laborious, over the four exams the probationers were expected to 
attend 35 different court sessions ranging from County courts, to police Magistrates, to civil 
cases, to serious criminal trials and even judicial committees of the Privy Council.
208
 There 
was a disproportionate focus on the processes of British law, which would be of limited use 
in India.
209
 Probationers also sat a political economy paper, as well as one on the history and 
geography of India. The probationary exams were envisaged as the process of more practical 
training, in theory they would eliminate any candidates who were unsuited to the work.  
After passing the probationary final exams the newly qualified Indian Civil Servants 
would travel to India, usually to the provincial capital, and then shortly afterwards they would 
be transferred to their first district. Junior civilians were instructed that they should ‘consider 
it a duty of primary importance to become familiar with the language and people of their 
districts’.210 Although the training did have slight variations depending on the province and 
region, generally the new ‘griffin’ officers were required to translate and prepare summaries 
of cases, take down evidence in court and prepare summary decisions. As part of their 
revenue duties they were required to study the relations between the Government, the 
landholders and the tenants. They were often assigned to a small locality or subdivision of a 
few villages in order to practice their limited powers. The junior civilians were expected to be 
familiar with the work of the Collector-Magistrate and he was supposed to exercise a careful 
but encouraging control over their work. Procedure dictated that junior assistant-collectors 
should accompany other district officers on their tours as it was believed:  
 
by the direct and intimate intercourse and association with the people thus 
obtained, they will acquire a more thorough knowledge of, and greater interest in, 
those whom they have to deal than they could possibly obtain in the routine of 




This emphasis on practical experience reflected the description of the idealised district 
officer. Some argued that written tests were not appropriate during the final stages of 
training.
212
 The Lower and Higher Standard examinations were conducted on the job, and 
were designed to be practical and experience based. After three years of intensive studying 
and exams, the young men were thrown in at the deep end. During the process of the Lower 
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and Higher Standard examinations, junior officials were gradually allocated greater powers 
and increases in salary.  
The Madras Civil Service regulations explained ‘the principle object of the lower 
standard is to test the proficiency, for practical purposes, of the assistant in the 
Vernacular’.213 Once the Lower Standard was passed junior officers could become head 
Assistant-Collector, and were allocated a division of the district to manage. Their wages 
increased to £45 per calendar month. The Higher Standard included required junior officers 
to familiarise themselves with the complex legal and administrative system of the locality and 
the province. By the Higher Standard, the junior officer was expected to be almost fluent in 
his first language, and capable of holding simple official conversations in his second. Success 
at the Higher Standard resulted in a wage increase to £50, and investment with the powers of 
a lower class Magistrate. Failing to pass the Lower Standard in three years and the higher 
standard by the completion of four years resulted in suspension, and potentially dismissal.
214
 
Ideally, a newly qualified civil servant would pass the Higher Standard in two years and 
achieve his first senior district role within the next seven years.  
The fledgling Assistant-Collector was supposed to be the younger model of the ideal 
Collector-Magistrate, he should be ‘accessible to all within reasonable limit and, without 
relaxing vigilance, repose confidence in their subordinates, insisting at the same time, upon 
individual responsibility’.215 However, Haggard complained that this disjuncture between the 
recruitment process and the functioning as district officer presented serious problems. 
Assistant-Collectors were ‘frequently occupied in partition cases, mutations and settlement 
cases; but before landing in this country he has never even heard of the laws by which these 
are regulated’.216 Newly qualified civilians were frequently thrust into the scene of action 
with insufficient preparation. By attempting to replicate the qualifications of an idealised 
persona, characterised by discretion and experience, the competitive examination system 
often left junior officials ill equipped for their new working lives.  
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James Fitzjames Stephen famously declared of the ICS that ‘your greatest difficulty in India 
will be having to do first rate work with second, third, fourth and fifth rate tools’.217 Concerns 
about the competition wallah threw into sharp relief the role of the idealised district officer. 
This model persona was increasingly vital when many suspected the recruits did not match 
the requirements. Nineteenth century debates regarding the competition system replicated and 
contributed to the anxieties and tensions about what kind of man should be ruling India. 
There was a conflict between the work of the practical role and the meritorious examination 
based selection process. The competitive system reflected the anxious desire to 
simultaneously capture an autonomous decision maker and a more bureaucratic and rule-
bound civil servant.  
These discussions drew frequently on the characteristics and ideals present in the model 
district officer. However, in the process of designing a system to produce this idealised model 
the Civil Service Commissioners, politicians, British and Indian commentators could not 
agree on either the core characteristics of an ideal candidate or the best means to test these 
abilities. The task of shaping an intellectual test to produce candidates for an idealised role 
defined by practicality, autonomy and experience proved problematic. Throughout the 
nineteenth century the competitive system was subjected to constant reforms, commissions 
and debates which demonstrated the concerns and tensions inherent in the scheme. Yet, this 
seemingly irresolvable and constantly criticised process remained focused on trying to 
reproduce the idealised district officer. This aspirational role was communicated to the new 
recruits by social expectations, the examinations themselves, the demands of the probationary 
period, and the practical work of the district exams.  
The competitive exams constructed and challenged the imagined district officer, but 
they were influenced by the practised persona. The working life of the district officer 
commenced with the duties of the revenue branch. As an Assistant-Collector the district 
revenue official would be faced with the challenges of survey and settlement. This everyday 
function of local administration became the focus for debates about governance, 
professionalism and the role of the district officer. Passing the exams was the first step in the 
shoes of the district officer, walking in his idealised footsteps would be the next challenge.  
                                                 
217




Chapter Three ‘Every Collector must be his own Surveyor’: Revenue, Settlement and Survey  
 
In response to the impending survey and settlement of Bihar, J.A. Bourdillion, the Collector 
of Saran, wrote to the Commissioner of the Patna Division.
1
 He stated: 
 
my feeling as a revenue officer is that much as I should like to have charge of a 
district when survey and record of rights is over, I cannot deny that the same post, 




Bourdillion’s concerns described a vital tension in the British Indian revenue administration. 
While he was aware that a successful survey and record of rights would enable him to work 
efficiently and effectively, Bourdillion was equally conscious of the complexity of this 
process. His reluctance to be a Collector during survey and settlement proceedings hints at a 
problematic relationship between the Government project and the work of local officers. 
Collectors and other district revenue officials often found themselves in anxious and difficult 
positions during the process of survey and settlement. This tension was caused by the 
perceived difference between the revenue work of the district and the professional expertise 
of the surveyors. 
In accounts of survey and settlement there has been a limited acknowledgement of the 
influence of the district officer, imagined and practised.
3
 Histories of mapping and survey 
have also neglected the functions of revenue officials.
4
 The model revenue officer was 
imagined as an independent benevolent decision maker, with experience of the local 
agriculture and in contact with the people.
5
 This idealisation of this autonomous paternalistic 
persona created expectations which were often irreconcilable with surveying practise and the 
realities of revenue administration. By exploring the process of surveying and settlement, this 
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thesis reveals the continuing influence of the idealised district officer. This chapter analyses 
the debate between the scientific expertise of the surveyor and the local expertise of the 
district official. It was in the contradictory and confused practices of revenue administration 
that the ideal district officer emerged as an intermediary between the Government and the 
people. 
Revenue administration was the core responsibility of the executive district officials. 
Settling disputes over taxation, tenure and landownership were everyday activities for 
Collectors, their Assistants and Deputies. At the district level, settlement work was often 
conducted by junior officials, and it constituted the training and early experiences of most 
district officers.
6
 In mid-nineteenth century Bengal, routine revenue administration did not 
involve regional surveys, therefore, local revenue officers were considered unskilled, and 
they were relegated to the background of surveying projects. However, eventually the 
complexity of Bengal revenue administration and the historic absence of surveys necessitated 
the involvement of the revenue officer.  
By the end of the century the revenue district officer’s discretionary abilities and local 
expertise were recognised as crucial to the proper functioning of survey and settlement. It 
was through the local experiences and processes of settlement and survey that the district 
officer reasserted his importance. There was a discussion throughout the period as to whether 
the local revenue administration or the professional surveyors were best equipped to carry out 
the work of survey and settlement, and it is this debate which this chapter explores.  
This chapter begins by outlining the current debate regarding revenue policy, and 
progresses to a summary of the work of the idealised revenue officer. This is followed by an 
outline of the key legislative moments in which the imagined and practised district officer 
was realised. This is followed by a discussion of the historiography of surveying in British 
India. This chapter then discusses how settlement and survey acted as a negotiation between 
the daily practices of the revenue officer, and the operation of the Survey Department as an 
expression of wider projects of rule. By considering the practical role of survey and 
settlement in the administration of British India, this chapter reveals the awkward and 
problematic process of cadastral mapping. At the district level, revenue reforms and 
cartographic projects did not always simplify colonial governance.
7
 The role of district 
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officials will be explored in an examination of survey and settlement in Chittagong. This case 
study further illustrates the consistent contradictions between the idealised and the practised 
as envisioned and experienced by the local revenue officer, the Survey Department, and the 
Bengal Government.  
‘The gap between professions and performance’: Revenue policy and practise in Bengal  
 
Eric Stokes has argued that:  
 
the gap between theory and practice in the land revenue system yawns so widely 
that – discounting the possibility of official hypocrisy – the impression of double-





Stoke’s ‘double-think’ refers to the anxious and contradictory process of colonial rule. This 
‘double-speak double-think’ describes the disjuncture between the centralised policy of the 
Government of India and the operation of the revenue system. The gap between policy and 
practice significantly shaped survey and settlement in British India. These tensions resulted in 
the simultaneous demand for adherence to new legislative schemes, and the enduring reliance 
on the decisions of the knowledgeable local officer.  
In 1896, T.W. Richardson, officiating Registrar of the High Court of Judicature in 
Calcutta, claimed ‘there is but little Revenue work owing to the Permanent Settlement, and 
the Collector’s chief function is Magisterial’.9 This view was misleading, but has influenced 
accounts of revenue administration in Bengal.
10
 Peter Robb argues that during the late 
nineteenth century tenancy debates there was ‘a renewed preference for the all-knowing 
paternalism of the local official, better acquainted with “his” villagers and his horse than with 
his files and his clerks’.11 However, Robb incorrectly asserts that this renewed commitment 
to an idealised district officer drew on the Punjab and not from the similar realisation of the 
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role in Bengal. This chapter challenges Robb’s account by exposing the contradiction in 
Bengal revenue administration which he does not identify. This thesis contests Robb’s 
assertion that the development of the Bengal bureaucracy eclipsed the district officer. Robb 
describes the conflict between paternalist and bureaucracy as a mutually exclusive 
arrangement rather than a complex relationship: ‘the construction of the reasoned minute and 
report was the mark of the successful officer, even when the avowed tradition was of open-air 
paternalism’.12 This tension between the idealised district official as the autonomous 
paternalist and the reality of settlement and surveying practises reveals the enduring if 
contradictory commitment by the Bengal government to the model persona of the revenue 
officer.  
This chapter argues that the idealised district officer continued to have an influential 
role in the revenue administration of Bengal. The ideal district officer was not diminished by 
a static passive bureaucratic system but instead remained a fundamental part of surveying and 
settlement practises. This chapter demonstrates that despite the Permanent Settlement the 
Government and district officers of Bengal continued to conduct surveys and settlements 
throughout the nineteenth century.  
 This thesis intends to build on Jon Wilson’s account of the Permanent Settlement, and 
his discussion of the anxious reactions of local district Government in the early nineteenth 
century.
13
  It is important to understand that policy formation was, as Wilson describes it, the 
‘search for general abstract rules, which could be applied mechanically by an authoritarian 
state’.14 District officers were the instruments of application, and revenue administration in 
Bengal involved governing a complex and varied agrarian society.
15
 In the daily practices of 
revenue administration district officers were required to reconcile vast and complicated 
Bengal agrarian social and economic structures with abstract or generalised categories. 
Categories like ‘proprietor’, ‘tenant’, ‘zemindar’ and ‘ryot’ were not wholly invented by the 
British. Indeed, they frequently drew on existing, if misinterpreted, customs and roles, and 
‘revenue terms were often administratively clear but socially imprecise’.16 During the work 
of settlement and survey, the professional and centralised Survey Department encountered an 
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agrarian society that did not always match the categories described in Government policies.  
Therefore, the discretionary powers of the district administration were necessary in order to 
fit policy to practise. The idealised district officer, as a figure of experience and local 
knowledge, became essential in the process of survey and settlement.  
‘I am a Collector and not a mere machine’17: The work of the Revenue Officer 
 
The revenue work of the district officer contained a multiplicity of daily acts of government. 
These ranged from settling disputes about rent and ownership, maintaining a record of 
landowners and tenants, managing Government estates, holding sales for land in arrears, 
assisting in the identification of land for public works, and all the other routine administration 
concerning the agricultural business and infrastructure of the region. However, despite the 
Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the idealisation of the role focused on the work of taxation 
assessment and collection. Baden-Powell argued that the role of the Collector-Magistrate was 
to ‘supervise the collection of the revenue, and watch the effects of the assessment, using 
their power to compel payment when it is necessary, but discriminating carefully where real 
misfortune necessitates a suspension or remission of demand’.18 This compassionate 
discrimination was a product of the experience of the district and its people. In theory the 
British Government in India was committed to the principles of light, liberal and fair revenue 
assessment.
19
 The revenue collected was supposed to be sustainable as well as encouraging 
profit and improvements. In order to be fair to the cultivator, the revenue official had to 
exercise the compassionate discrimination described by Baden-Powell.  
This discretionary autonomy was the product of knowledge and experience. The 
imagined revenue officer was informed and influenced by the experiences of the junior 
officials of the revenue branch. In the satirical novel Adventures of Thomas Brown a Griffin, 
the author recalled how he had watched many young Assistant-Collectors ‘trying their half-
developed wings and preening out into the vast future of possibility without so much as a 
doubt that each and will win a niche in the temple of fame’.20 Emerging qualified from the 
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probationary examinations these young men of the ICS were keen to adopt the role of the 
idealised district official.  
It was considered the duty of Assistant-Collectors to familiarise themselves with the 
language and people of their districts.
21
 One manual concluded: ‘the remarkable power of 
appreciating evidence and discriminating between truth and false hood, which can only be 
acquired in the cutcherry of the Assistant-Magistrate and in the revenue officers tent’.22 
Revenue duties occupied a considerable amount of time during the first few years of a district 
official’s career. The 1888 Manual of the Powers, Duties, Practices and Procedure of 
Revenue Officers dictated that Assistant-Collectors should be ‘employed, during the cold 
weather, entirely upon revenue duties in the interior, taking up only such criminal duties in 
the neighbourhood of their encampment as will not interfere with their revenue duties’.23 The 
investigation and trial of disputes, arrears and tenancy issues were considered excellent 
training for junior officers. They were expected to have an intimate knowledge of the locality, 
and subsequently become experts on the agriculture of the district. As this chapter 
demonstrates, the progress of the professional survey became contingent on this knowledge.  
This experience was supposedly reinforced during the Collector’s tour of the district. The 
1888 Revenue Officers Manual rules determined that the Collector must visit every part of 
his district at least once every three years. ‘The duty of visiting the interior for the purpose of 
acquiring, by personal observation, a knowledge of the actual circumstances of his district is 
one of so great importance that its neglect by a Collector is on no account’.24 Policy and 
practise were informed by the idea of a model district officer touring his district. The 
idealised district official, using his inherent governing abilities, was expected to distinguish 
between a fair rent or tax, and an oppressive demand.
25
   
In his memoir, Henry Keene described the type of deception he had to outmanoeuvre in 
his revenue officers capacity: ‘as the inspecting officer approaches, they come out to meet 
him, wearing their oldest clothes and complaining in various tones and manners of the ruin 
that has overtaken them.’26 Keene’s narrative emphasised the performative nature of the 
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experience, particularly the routine of being shown the barren or waste ground by ryots 
claiming impoverishment, and the eventual discovery of well irrigated, fertilised and 
cultivated land in the vicinity. In these accounts the idealised Collector was victorious over 
the deceitful peasant as a result of his experience and investigative powers.
27
 
The impact of this representation was significant, because the reality of working life for 
many district officers involved constant relocation from one area to another. This was 
described by Carstairs as the ‘vagabond life’, ‘that stage which comes in the career of every 
Indian civilian, the intermediate stage, when he moves on from appointment to appointment, 
never remaining long in one place’.28 Although, as Carstairs indicates, constant transfers were 
more typical in the middle years of the district officer’s career and they usually remained 
within the same division. Achieving an intimate and extensive knowledge of the district and 
its people through the annual tour would have often have been impossible, or at least short 
lived in each sub-division or district. The resulting issue was that of over-reliance on the 
subordinate official and the production of subsequent anxieties, which will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. Cultivating the symbolic persona of experience became a crucial tactic in the 
project of rule, as many Collectors had only fleeting opportunity to genuinely get to know 
their district. This commitment to the idealised district officer, despite bureaucratic realities, 
was based on and reflected in revenue policy. 
Autonomous authority was grounded not only in the idealised representations of the 
district official but also the legislation and policy under which he operated. This thesis has 
identified three key legislative moments which constructed and legitimised the discretionary 
idealised revenue official. In 1822, Regulation VII consolidated the role of the revenue 
officer and invested in his discretionary judgement.
29
 This enactment stated that under the 
auspices of the Collector, settlements would be conducted upon careful observation, 
investigation and local experience. This legislative moment established the Collector as the 
arbitrator of revenue administration, a position resulting from his contact with the rural 
community.  
The discretionary powers of the revenue official were further strengthened by the first 
Tenancy Act of 1859. The 1859 Tenancy Act ‘provided jurisdiction in rent suits for revenue 
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officials and thus a chance for paternalistic mediation between landlord and tenant’.30 This 
Act was one of many legislative changes that helped establish the conditions for the 
emergence of the idealised district officer. 1859 also witnessed the reunification of the roles 
of Collector and Magistrate, cementing the vision of the model district official. 
However, by the late nineteenth century it was generally agreed that the 1859 
Tenancy Act had failed to sufficiently overhaul the inequalities of the Permanent Settlement. 
It was therefore replaced by the 1885 Tenancy Act, and this legislation consolidated and re-
established the discretionary powers of the district revenue official.
31
 A commitment to the 
paternalistic experienced revenue official was reflected in the Act as it invested local officers 
with various powers ‘in the interests of public order or of the local welfare’.32 The most 
significant intervention of the new Tenancy Act was the provisions for survey, settlement and 
a record of rights.
33
 The grand surveying projects of the late nineteenth century were 
instigated by the 1885 Tenancy Act. As the case study in this chapter will reveal, it was in the 
execution of these surveys that the conflict between ideal and practise emerged. The idealised 
district officer as constructed by policy and in the official imagination was defined by his 
autonomy, experience and discretion. However, this commitment to the ideal paternalistic 
district officer was frequently thwarted by the working realities of revenue administration.   
In 1861, shortly after the reunion of the roles of Collector and Magistrate, Mr W.L.F. 
Robinson, Collector of Purneah, complained of the routine minutiae that constantly 
interrupted him:  
 
a Collector’s time is so broken in upon and frittered away by petty duties which 
may almost be called mechanical; that he is unable to dispose of the same quantity 





Mr Robinson’s principal grievance was the constant demand for his signature for small 
payments or grants. This was the gradual creep of bureaucratisation edging into the daily 
work of the Collector. In Robinson’s opinion this mechanical work was a waste of his time 
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and resources. He was advised to deputise the work as much as possible within the 
regulations. Eventually such responsibilities were devolved amongst the various stamp and 
treasury departments, but the Collector was still the overseer and co-ordinator of all district 
activities. The district officer was increasingly reliant on reports and statistics rather than his 
own personal experience, yet his decisions were validated by his alleged knowledge of the 
locality.  
By 1895, Mr Windsor, Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum complained: ‘a 
Collector’s first duty is to Collect but I can’t collect if I am permitted no discretion’.35 
Windsor found himself frustrated by the demands of his office and the limits placed on his 
authority by bureaucratic process. He no longer felt empowered as a discretionary 
autonomous official. As the scope of the revenue official grew wider, the work was broken in 
to multiple departments and responsibilities. There was a concern that the Collector had 
become the servant of the administration, rather than the deciding force over the various areas 
of his work. The Collector was believed to be at the mercy of so many departments and 
responsibilities, accountable to so many processes, and, yet, paradoxically he remained the 
ultimate decision maker. The consensus was that the final responsibility still lay with the 
Collector. It was his duty to co-ordinate and lead a bureaucracy which simultaneously 
dictated the methods of his work.
36
 This contradiction echoed the governing conflict in the 
persona and work of the district officer. While the role of the Collector was established in the 
official imagination and in policy, integrating this role into the working realities of survey 
and settlement proved problematic.  
The practical issue in the process of revenue administration was that the role of district 
official became identified with authority and expertise, regardless of the limited training the 
individual possessed.
37
 Although, as discussed above, revenue administration formed the 
foundational training and experience of junior district officials, in the permanently settled 
province of Bengal, there was limited attention to surveying techniques. Therefore, in 1881, it 
was considered a logical step to extend the revenue training of Assistant-Collectors to include 
the science of surveying.  
The Bengal Government concluded that even if this training was not utilised during a 
professional survey the skills obtained would ensure that maps and records were 
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appropriately maintained and it would obviate the expense of a further resurvey.
38
 The Board 
of Revenue consulted the Government of Bombay, as it already had a training scheme in 
place. Junior revenue civilians with under seven years’ experience were required to attend 
surveying work if any should take place in the locality for a period of six weeks.
39
 The 
Bombay Government stated that they did not expect junior revenue officers to become 
experts, they would not be:  
 
either a skilled measurer or classifier of soils, but it is there wish that he should 
obtain such a general knowledge of the methods of procedure in each case as will 





H.L. Dampier argued for the introduction of a similar scheme in Bengal. Dampier stated that 
there was a constant need for cadastral surveying. He insisted ‘it is obvious how the want of a 
knowledge of practical survey must be felt in such cases by the Controlling Collector.’41 The 
Secretary of State, Governor-General and Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal all concurred with 
Dampier. It was agreed that, subject to availability, two junior covenanted revenue officers 
could be deputised to nearby survey work as part of their training. The Lieutenant-Governor 
added, the training would have the ‘further advantage of taking young officers into the fields 
and villages, of which it is at present difficult for them, owing to their other duties, to see 
enough’.42 The debate regarding the survey and settlement training scheme demonstrated 
how, despite bureaucratic pressures, the Government of India was committed to the 
experienced and knowledgeable idealised district official.  
However, putting this policy into practice proved problematic. In 1890, encouraged by 
the new scheme, the Collector of Dacca, L. Hare, suggested that his two Assistant-
Magistrates should be sent to Tipperah and Barisal where a survey party was engaged.
43
 
Despite the previous commitment to the training by the Bengal Government, the 
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Commissioner of Dacca was censured for failing to notify the Government of Hare’s 
intentions.
44
 The Board concluded that such training was only appropriate for recently 
qualified civilians.
45
 Instead, the training for more experience revenue officials should be 
facilitated not by field work, but by the surveying classes already provided in order to train 
local agency during the rains.
46
 This decision was characteristic of the ‘double-think’ 
described by Stokes. The Government of Bengal simultaneously wanted an experienced and 
discretionary local revenue officer to be part of surveys, and yet, these efforts were frustrated 
by contradictory policy decisions.  
As the confused implementation of survey training demonstrated, the Bengal 
Government found it difficult to reconcile the idealised district official with the technical 
practises of surveying. Throughout the nineteenth century the work of survey and settlement 
was a constant battle between the scientific supremacy of the survey and the daily grind of 
the settlement. The constant attempts to integrate the practise and procedure of survey with 
that of settlement revealed the anxious commitment to the discretionary authority of local 
revenue officers. This tension is remarkably absent from histories of surveying in British 
India. By interrogating the role of the idealised district officer in the policies and processes of 
survey and settlement this chapter reveals a complex dimension previously neglected in 
accounts of surveys in Bengal.  
 ‘Surveys may be more or less exact’: Survey and Settlement in British India 
 
This chapter challenges Cohn and Scott’s account of the simplifying, universal and coherent 
role of surveying.
47
 Grand cartographical schemes did successfully map a coherent imagined 
India, but they did not facilitate the daily work of Government.
48
 The British Indian scientific 
surveys rationalised landscape and territory into definable categories and understandable 
space.
49
 As Barrow explains the objective and scientific nature of the Trigonometrical 
Surveys, ‘permitted British surveyors and bureaucrats to indulge in the fantasy that accurate 
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cartography knowledge would both demonstrate British superiority and lead to better control 
over the land and people’.50 The official mind was committed to these fantasises of control, 
and believed settlement and survey would result in practical administrative knowledge.
51
 
However, this chapter demonstrates that mapping at the district level did not always provide 
coherent and comprehensive governing information. 
This chapter makes an intervention in the existing historiography by analysing the 
practises of surveying and settlement at the district level. As Deborah Sutton explains 
‘cadastral mapping at the district level had a more substantive and interesting history than 
simply as a “lower stratum” in the larger story of colonial cartography.’52 Through an 
examination of the operation of revenue policy at the local level, this chapter calls attention to 
the significant influence of the idealised district officer on the practise of survey and 
settlement. Matthew Edney argues that the history of surveying in India has been neglected, 
and that ‘when historians have noticed the institutional circumstances of the new surveys it 
has been to cast the surveyors in the role of heroes-of-science who overcame the stupidity of 
decision makers’.53 This thesis agrees that the historiography has tended to focus on the 
heroics of the men scaling the Himalayas and often casts the ICS in the guise of the 
frustrating bureaucracy. Yet, this dichotomy of the scientist versus the civil servant is worth 
further exploration. By examining the interaction between the revenue administration and the 
work of settlement and survey, this chapter explores the role of the Surveyor and the 
Settlement Officer in the governance of India 
The operations of a survey and settlement, although involving contingent and 
overlapping processes, were consistently viewed as distinct procedures. It was within this 
dislocation between policy and practice that the revenue and district officers were awkwardly 
located. These issues arose because surveying was defined as scientific and professional. 
Robb explains that as surveying developed in British India ‘measurements and the drawing of 
plans were separated from the recording of landholders and from economic, social, and 
historical assessments of the conditions in every village and in regions’.54 As a result, the 
science of the survey and the recording of agricultural life were gradually separated. 
However, contrary to Robb’s claims this separation was not total. Indeed the confused and 
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partial separation of settlement and mapping caused dysfunction between the work of the 
revenue administration and the process of cadastral survey.  
In the definitive surveying manual of the nineteenth century, Captain R. Smyth and 
H.L. Thullier stated that a survey, in comparison with a settlement, should be: 
 
performed on scientific principles, with first-rate instruments and by experienced 
Europeans and East Indians, aided also by natives trained and educated for the 
purpose; the former [settlement], on the contrary, appears to be conducted by the 




This narrative of professional and skilled work compared to local and rudimentary practices 
continued to define approaches to survey and settlement in the nineteenth century. The 
scientific identity of the survey came about through its independent military origins. 
Surveying in British India began in the eighteenth century but the Survey of India, as a 
Government institution it did not formally exist until 1878.
56
 Surveyors were relatively 
independent from centralised Government, a Department for the Surveyor General existed in 
Bengal from 1779 in an attempt to tie the surveys to the Government, but for the majority of 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries surveying remained under the Military 
Department.
57
 The maps produced by the Survey of India and Trigonometrical Survey were 
of limited use to district officers, and primarily functioned as contributions to grander 
projects of knowledge production. They were always drawn out using large scales, and were 
more focused on areas of geographical significance. Often trigonometrical survey maps were 
not even supplied to district libraries. These maps were not created for the everyday practices 
of government.  
By the later nineteenth century, as a result of the information resources at its disposal, 
the Survey Department became more integrated in the Government of India.
58
 This premium 
on knowledge and skilled labour justified the continuing autonomy of the surveyor within the 
Government of India. It was the gradual transitioning of the Survey Department from a 
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predominantly military geodesy enterprise into a tool of governance that holds relevance for 
this discussion.  
This chapter is primarily concerned with revenue or cadastral surveying. Scott’s 
account of the simplifying State does not reflect the anxious and complex development of 
cadastral surveying in British India.
59
 Instead, Bernado Michael presents a more satisfying 
description of the piecemeal and confused emergence of cadastral mapping.
60
 The cadastral 
surveying developed in the early nineteenth century did rationalise territory into manageable 
administrative units, and created a more systematic revenue record. However, this 
rationalisation was subject to several policy revisions which in practice depended on the 
discretionary powers of the district officer. The absence of the district officer from accounts 
of cadastral surveying has limited our understanding of mapping in practice. The style of 
cadastral mapping that emerged through the revenue surveys fundamentally relied on the 
work of settlement. This chapter seeks to address the absence of the practise of settlement in 
discussions of the history of survey.  
Settlements have usually been associated with grander legislative projects like the 
Permanent Settlement, and there were no regional surveys in Bengal until the 1880s. 
However, it is important to recognise that settlements were also an everyday mundane 
revenue process.
61
 Settlements were conducted during any change in agrarian relations. A 
settlement could be caused by a dispute, death or other routine changes in land holding. In 
Eastern Bengal alluvial settlements were regularly required due to the movement of rivers 
and water channels.
62
 A settlement could affect the rent or the revenue. The settlement of 
land taxation or revenue was ‘the determination of the amount of revenue payable by 
proprietors, tenure-holders, or raiyats, directly to Government, whether under the 
denomination of revenue or rent’.63 Routine acts of investigation included ascertaining and 
investigating landholding patterns, agrarian socio-economic relations, crop output, soil 
classification, standards of irrigation, and tenurial obligations and rights.
64
 The daily practice 
of the revenue courts depended on the experience and knowledge of revenue officers, who 
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frequently acted as on the spot courts. Furthermore, as Settlement Officers, district officials 
held the premium on local knowledge. 
During the processes of settlement, revenue officials distinctly embodied the idealised 
district officer. As Richard Saumarez Smith explains, ‘the published reports of the officials 
who directed Settlement operations in a district quickly became the foundation of official 
knowledge concerning local conditions of agriculture, land tenure and much else besides’.65 
The role of revenue official contributed to the representation of the district officer as a 
persona of expertise and discretion. However, settlements were usually conducted by local 
revenue officers, with the majority of the work undertaken by uncovenanted Deputy 
Collectors and overseen by British district officers. The idealised revenue official was always 
imagined as the autonomous paternalistic British man, but in reality these decisions were 
undertaken by Indian officials. The discretionary authority of the district officer frequently 
relied on the collaboration of his Indian colleagues and their relationships with local 
communities.  
New surveys and settlements instigated after the Tenancy Acts provided fresh 
information about agricultural conditions, which often sat awkwardly with the concept of 
Bengal as the land of Permanent Settlement. This new information was frequently contingent 
on the work of the Settlement Officer. The Settlement Officer provided the main point of 
contact between the local population and the British Government of India. This role drew 
upon the idealised revenue official as embodied in the persona of the Collector. Therefore 
this chapter now considers the training of revenue officials and the work of the Collector.  
‘The exercise of a sound discretion is required’: The Process of Settlement and Survey  
 
Revenue administration supposedly relied on the discretionary experience of the district 
officer, but in the practices of survey, local officials were disregarded as inexpert and 
unqualified. A distinction emerged between the professional knowledge of the Surveyor and 
the mundane unskilled labour of the revenue officials. However, these representations 
impeded and frustrated what was a fundamentally collaborative process. The 1895 Survey 
and Settlement Manual provided a clear definition: ‘surveys are divided into two classes i) 
professional i.e those conducted with the assistance of officers of the survey Department; ii) 
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nonprofessional, those conducted solely by the revenue officers’.66 These definitions 
developed in the later nineteenth century as a result of the evolving practical work of survey 
and settlement. In order to better understand the conceptualisations of the varying roles and 
competing projects this chapter examines the process of the work itself and the function of 
the officials within it.  
The 1879 Thakbast Manual explained the two aspects of a Revenue Survey:  
 
A demarcation in which only the boundaries of mouzahs and estates are laid down 
is called a mouzahwar and mahalwar demarcation. A demarcation which defines 




The professional survey usually only dealt with the external boundaries of the village. Under 
the guidance of a Superintendent of Survey a map would be produced showing the boundary 
and total area of each village. Professional surveyors were uninterested, but more importantly 
inexperienced, in the conduct of the cadastral or thakbast survey.
68
 The Thakbast Manual 
explained that the professionally orchestrated survey was ‘expensive and is inapt to deal with 
questions of tenure and disputes about boundary, which requires local knowledge and 
experience’.69 While the local knowledge and experience of the revenue officers was 
necessary, they were lambasted for being unskilled. The majority of the actual measuring was 
conducted by Indian Amins, usually under the supervision of an uncovenanted Deputy 
Collector. Smyth and Thullier described the process as conducted according to:  
 
the primeval custom of the district. With no compass, or any thing, but his rope to 
guide him, the native Ameen is expected to measure a village, the total area of 
which must agree with the area defined by the Professional survey within a certain 




It was the use of crude instruments and Indian agency which rendered the local field-by-field 
cadastral surveys unprofessional. Although the professional survey parties were larger, 
usually overseen by European Superintendents, and used scientific instruments, they were 
equally dependent on Indian agency. Thuillier described an average establishment for a 
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Revenue survey in Bengal in the 1850s as containing a Revenue Surveyor, one Sub-Assistant, 
four Indian Assistants, twenty Indian Measurers, and four Field Guards. This cost roughly 
31,876 RS per annum. Over the seven months of the field season, from November until the 
beginning of June, they were expected to complete a survey of a thousand square miles, with 
the average size of a village being one and a quarter square miles. The rest of the year, during 
the rains and the very hot weather, was spent perfecting the maps, registers and calculations. 
This was a demanding work schedule as surveys were frequently delayed and could take up 
to three years to complete.
71
 
The field work of the professional revenue surveyor was contingent on the 
unprofessional work of district officials. Although the professional surveyors measured and 
mapped out the mouzahwar and mahalwar, the local agency provided the initial boundary 
demarcation. The boundary unprofessional survey party worked one season ahead. As the 
Thakbast Manual explained ‘demarcations preparatory to professional survey are conducted 
by the Collector of the district or other officer vested with the powers of a Collector’. 72 The 
Manual outlined the process of the thakbast as follows: 
 
They measure and map the boundaries of villages and estates, deciding all 
boundary disputes. Subsequently they perform all the registration work, 
embodying the results. The professional survey party maps the mouzah 





These boundary maps or thakbast maps were usually drawn by eye and sketched with a 
pencil. Figures 8 and 9 are from the 1845-1850 revenue survey of Rajshahye 
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Figure 9 – Thakbast map of Rajshahye no. 3275 
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Boundary sketch maps were annotated by the Amins and confirmed by the Settlement 
Officer. In figure 8, it is possible to see the boundary markers indicated in the demarcation 
line and theodolite stations represented by the arrows. These theodolite stations would have 
been erected for the use of the topographical and trigonometrical surveys later in the process. 
Figures 8 and 9 reflect the varied and complex nature of land holdings in Bengal. Surveyors 
and revenue officers had to map and record cultivated areas ranging from individual strips of 
fields to entire estates. The intricacy of farming patterns in Bengal necessitated the 
experience and knowledge of local revenue officials and Indian subordinate officers. This 
level of detail is reflected in the boundary sketch maps. The documents are dominated by text 
more than the actual map, the information contained in these sketch maps related to 
possession, location within larger estates or village areas, rent, tenure, soil type, and crops. 
Both documents include an official stamp and three signatures including those of the Record 
Keeper and Sheristadar. These sketches were usually the first stage in the process of survey 
and settlement, and acted as the initial information gathering exercise for settlement officers.  
The professional surveyors would crosscheck their own work against the boundary 
maps. Once the mouzah and mahal boundaries had been confirmed the professional maps 
were returned to the local officers for the internal field by field cadastral mapping. While 
surveying was represented as a professional enterprise there was a considerable amount of 
activity undertaken by the local district functionaries. As indicated above the main duty of 
district revenue officers was to erect demarcation boundaries. This process and the 
discussions around its execution provide important insight into the work of the idealised 
district official.  
‘Professional work mainly depends on clearly defined boundaries’: Boundary Mapping  
 
Boundary demarcation procedures were developed in response to the sense of disorder 
experienced during settlement and survey operations.
76
 The discretionary capacity of the 
revenue officer was essential for the smooth functioning of boundary demarcation, and 
subsequent survey and settlement operations. It was in the process of boundary marking that 
the survey had a visible impact on agrarian society. E.W. Collin, the Settlement Officer in 
Mozufferpore, explained that survey ‘was, as one gentleman told me, a name to frighten 
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children with’.77 Therefore, the role of the idealised district official as knowledgeable 
intermediary was necessary in order to alleviate the concerns and manage the resistance of 
the local population. Furthermore, demarcation practices were influenced by the idea of the 
man-on-the-spot decision maker.  
In his 1874 revenue manual, E.H Winfield complained about the lack of legislative 
provision for permanent boundaries.
78
  This issue was aggravated by the absence of 
legislation to compel landlords to maintain boundary markers. The initial boundary marks 
were often ‘obliterated and the use of the survey for practical purposes is thus very much 
diminished’.79  The absence of clearly defined roles in boundary demarcation procedure also 
contributed to the general frustration and confusion. It was an overlapping and unclear 
process. In the mid to late nineteenth century, confusion in the thakbast and cadastral surveys 
was primarily caused by failing to involve the district officers in the process.  
In the summer of 1870, in Rajshaye, the lack of clarity regarding the function of the 
Survey Department and the role of the revenue officers caused an expensive 
misunderstanding.
80
 When the professional team began to formally measure out the villages 
and estates they realised the initial thakbast boundary demarcation was incomplete. Several 
trijunction pillars, used to indicate the intersection of village boundaries, were absent. This 
survey would have depended on the integrity of the 1848 to 1850 sketch maps. These records 
were usually available and familiar to district officials, but surveyors were not well versed in 
the nature of revenue archives. Captain Stewart, the Surveyor, failed to provide appropriate 
information and instructions to the Collector. In May 1870, an Amin was sent to fix the 
trijunction boundary pillars. However, Stewart had provided an incomplete list, and so the. 
Amin noted the omissions, and re-measured the sites for the pillars. The pillars were faulty, 
although erected in stone they were too short and many were incorrectly located. The Board 
of Revenue complained:  
 
All the delay, misunderstanding, and confusion, which has taken place in the 
Rajshaye districts, concerning the simple matter of putting up pillars, shows a 
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The failure to properly mark out the boundaries before the full measurement work of the 
Survey teams could cause serious difficulties. Henry Ricketts reported to the Board of 
Revenue ‘the terrible evils which beset us in Mymensingh of never having done with the 
boundary dispute, of altering survey plans one, two and three years after Survey or 
Demarcations, seems to cling to us in Dacca’.82 The majority of the issues faced by surveyors 
and the Board of Revenue were the result of failed co-ordination with local district revenue 
officers.  
Finally, the Survey Act of 1875 provided some clarity and a procedural framework for 
boundary marking. The Survey Act described the process of funding and erecting permanent 
boundary markers, and placed the Collector as central arbitrator. The Collector was 
empowered to erect any permanent boundary marks ‘of such materials, and in such number 
and manner as he may determine to be sufficient to distinguish the boundaries of the estates, 
tenures, mouzahs or fields for which the same are to be erected’.83 Phillip’s revenue manual 
described the process of boundary delineation as follows:  
 
Demarcation of Boundaries is made in the first instance by villagers themselves. 
They are called upon beforehand to set up such marks as shall suffice to indicate 




The revenue officer overseeing the demarcation could legally compel the attendance of ryots, 
the landowner or a representative of the landowner. If anyone summoned refused to point out 
the boundaries or provided information known to be false they were imprisoned until they 
complied.
85
 Naturally, the demarcation process instigated disputes over landholdings. All 
boundary disputes were supposed to be settled on the spot, and the Collector was to be 
involved if the boundary affected a Government estate.
86
 However, the professional 
surveying could not continue until the boundaries were settled and demarcated.  
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The cost of the boundary marks and the labour involved was covered by landlords.
87
 
The Collector was instructed to apportion the cost according to the number of boundary 
marks attached to each tenure and the distance of the land holdings from each boundary 
pillar.
88
 Procedure stipulated that after the cost estimation had been performed, the revenue 
officer had to allow the proprietors to undertake the work. If they declined or failed to do so 
within a specified time frame, the revenue officer could do it himself or contract the work 
out. 
89
 In 1879, during an alluvial survey in Dacca, Deputy Collectors were encouraged to 
raise the money for erecting boundary pillars in camp: ‘where he fails to realize summarily 
on the spot, he will follow the procedure laid down in the law’.90 The immediacy required of 
boundary demarcation decisions rendered the discretionary autonomy of the revenue official 
necessary, but this policy was influenced by the idealisation of the district officer as 
independent and experienced. As this chapter demonstrates, surveying and settlement 
legislation often encouraged or preferred on the spot decision-making.  
The Thakbast manual described the construction of and materials required for the 
boundary markers, temporary field markers were made of ‘small mounds of earth of about 
three feet in height; but when three boundaries meet, stone marks are to be laid down’.91 
These stone boundary pillars were then usually used as the theodolite stations by the 
surveying party.
92
 It was also the Collector’s role to ensure the maintenance of these 
boundary markers and bring to justice anyone who damaged them. The earthen mounds could 
easily be damaged by monsoon rains, or appropriated to shore up paddy fields or irrigation 
ditches.  
However, sometimes boundary markers were intentionally damaged. In 1892, the 
talukdars of Comila resisted the survey and settlement of the region by destroying the 
boundary stakes.
93
 Boundary demarcation acted as a direct intervention in the agrarian 
society of Bengal. It forced tenants and landowners to identify their physical space, and the 
law compelled them into defining the landscape. However, the legislation regarding 
demarcation reveals that the revenue authorities anticipated and punished resistance. 
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Occupants were instructed to ‘give immediate notice to Collector if any such marks are 
injured, destroyed, removed or require repairs’.94 A fine of 200 RS was imposed for any mark 
that was erased, moved or damaged. Fines were also payable if cultivators or landholders 
failed to notify the Collector of any problem. While part of the fine realised could be given to 
the informant, the occupants became responsible for the fine and cost of repairs if no 
perpetrator was found.
95
 Cultivators and landlords could find themselves involved in 
complicated disputes, forced to pay for boundary markers or punished for obstructing the 
demarcation process.  
The litigation produced by boundary marking occupied a considerable amount of time 
in settlement proceedings. Whether as a result of the rights granted by the Tenancy Acts or 
during the physical marking of boundaries, the decisions of revenue officials had a visible 
impact on agrarian society. Boundary disputes were conducted on the spot or in camp by 
revenue officials, with only appeals and financially significant cases reaching Court.
96
 These 
were tangible moments, during which the power of Government was visibly exercised 
through the instrument of the district official. 
The concluding stage of demarcation was the act of mapping. Surveyors 
cartographically committed the decisions enacted by the revenue officers into official maps. 
Figure 10 shows an example of a khusrah field map taken from Thuillier’s manual.97 As 
demarcation concluded, boundary sketches were rigorously compared with the surveyors’ 
maps, and any discrepancies were corrected.
98
 Then the internal field plots would be mapped 
out. Each plot was numbered, and would correspond to a series of documents, including rent 
rolls and revenue records. The mapped out plots reflected clearly defined administrative units 
and enabled the smoother functioning of the revenue Government.  
                                                 
94
 Phillips, Manual of Revenue and Collectorate Law, 892.  
95
 Ibid., 905-906.  
96
 For example see Mundir vs Sahoy, 16
th
 August 1864, C. Steer & E. Jackson (pusine judges), 886 of 1864, 
under Act X of 1859, in, David Sutherland, The Weekly Reporter (Calcutta, 1895), vol. 1, 36.  
97
 Smyth and Thullier, A MANUAL OF SURVEYING,585.  
98






























Figure 10 – Specimen of a khusrah field map, Captains R. Smyth and H.L. Thuillier, A 
MANUAL OF SURVEYING for India detailing the mode of operations on the Revenue 








Traditionally, the cadastral or khusrah survey was made by the Settlement Officer with 
the help of the Patwaris and trained Amins. Phillips argued ‘this agency though not scientific, 
nor organised as a permanent department has always been found perfectly adequate’.99 The 
alternative was a professional field survey. These were more expensive, but they tended to be 
more accurate in terms of measurement.
100
 This debate, over whether the field survey and 
operations of the settlement should be conducted by the professional survey team, the 
revenue officers or a combination of the two functions, was the defining and crucial 
discussion of this period. In order to more fully explore this debate, this chapter now 
examines the roles of the Surveyor, Collector and Settlement Officer.  
‘Putting his own shoulder to the wheel’: Surveyor, Collector, and Settlement Officer 
 
The constant shifts in the roles and responsibilities of the Collector, Surveyor and Settlement 
Officer resulted in confusion over practice and procedure. In British India the Surveyor was 
considered a scientific professional.
101
 By comparison the work of the revenue official was 
represented as tedious and unskilled. It was the conflict between these imagined and practised 
personas which shaped survey and settlement procedure. The 1875 Survey Act consolidated 
the role of the Survey Department, and was the penultimate step in creating the Survey of 
India. It clarified the work and powers of Superintendents of Surveys, and it authorised the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to order a survey whenever he thought it appropriate.
102
 A 
Superintendent of Survey was granted the powers of a Collector under the Act, and could also 
appoint Deputy-Collectors to act as Assistant-Superintendents. However, there was an 
enduring commitment to the importance of the revenue official. It remained within the scope 
of the Act to empower a district officer to undertake responsibility for the work of survey and 
settlement: ‘it shall be competent to the Board of Revenue to direct that the Collector shall 
perform any duties under the act within the said tract’.103 The 1875 Survey Act formalised the 
tensions between the district officer and the scientific work of the surveyor.  
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It was the leading role played by Indian uncovenanted revenue officers which 
contributed to tensions and anxieties about the process of survey and settlement. According to 
H.R. Thuillier, scientifically able Indians were simply not to be found, and therefore their 
work was crude and inaccurate.
104
  However, Amins, Patwaris and Deputy-Collectors all 
played significant roles in surveys and settlements. Assistant Settlement Officers were 
usually junior Indian revenue servants who conducted the bulk of the work.
105
 The on the 
ground boundary disputes while co-ordinated by the British district officers were usually 
resolved by Deputy-Collectors.
106
 This unspoken reality of revenue practice explains the 
reluctance by the Government of India to depend on the local administration during a survey. 
The Surveyor was also supposed to exercise control over the large parties of Indian Amins, 
Indian Surveyors and European Assistants. Thuillier concluded that ‘the best results may be 
expected from an active personal super vision in the field, and indeed without this there can 
be no hope of proper and systematic progress or of the quantity of work’.107 Complaints about 
the cost or inefficiency of the Survey Department were often targeted at the overreliance on 
British labour. Despite the financial implications, a predominantly British surveying team 
was deemed superior to the local and experienced revenue officials. The Government of India 
was unwilling to admit that the process of survey and settlement was made cheaper and easier 
through the collaborative labour of Indians. 
This reluctance was strengthened by the fundamental belief amongst senior Surveyors 
that district officials were incapable of conducting scientific work.
108
 This criticism did 
reflect a perceived gap in the knowledge of district officers. For the official mind, the work 
and role of the Surveyor was fixed and clearly defined. By comparison the revenue official in 
the capacity of Settlement Officer or Collector occupied a more awkward and fluid position. 
The Surveyor possessed a more tangible skill set than any other role in the governing of 
India. This perception was as a result of the military background of the Survey Department. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, surveyors continued to be military men. In 1887 there 
were 32 military officers and 1 civil official in the survey department.
109
 Surveying was a 
technical and mathematical practice based on the need for reconnaissance. Surveyors were 
expected to competently demonstrate superior ability in arithmetic, geometry, trigonometry 
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and other mathematical skills. Also required was ‘a knowledge of Plan Drawing or at least 
proof of some degree of taste in Drawing and Printing so as to warrant the expectation that he 
may turn out a good Draftsman’.110 As Edney argues, this skillset was the preserve of 
gentlemanly military officers and engineers.
111
 However, the majority of the district officials 
were not of the same class as military officers. While mathematics was one of the more 
popular exam papers, and did include trigonometry and geometry, the practical application of 
these equations beyond plotting out a field sketch did not feature highly in the 
conceptualisation of the district official. The monopoly over these scientific abilities retained 
by the Survey Department was problematic as it exacerbated the unscientific quality of the 
settlement and boundary demarcation.  
Instead of appropriately training revenue officials, governing literature was considered 
the most efficient and effective means of providing clear information, and guiding district 
officers through the work of survey and settlement. In 1875, F.W. Kelly drew up a basic 
surveying textbook in response to the lack of skills he had identified amongst district officers. 
Kelly complained of the existing surveying manuals, including Thuillier’s: ‘they are, 
moreover, too comprehensive, abstruse and technical, to be of much use to non-professional 
men and students, who do not as a rule possess the previous training required to enable them 
to understand the entire subject’.112 Kelly’s manual endeavoured to close the gap between the 
scientific expertise of the surveyor and the practical experience of the district officer.  
In 1850, the Board of Revenue issued instructions after concluding ‘a great diversity of 
theory and practice prevails in the different Districts in making settlements of Land 
Revenue’.113 The Government issued several Settlement and Survey Manuals during the mid 
to late nineteenth century.
114
 These assisted in the navigation of new legislation, explained 
under which acts officials were empowered and provided information to revenue officers who 
received insufficient training. The 1895 edition was drawn up and ‘intended to point out to 
Collectors the most important rules of this Manual which govern details of work and the 
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general course of procedure for survey and settlements’.115 Even in 1895 these were 
processes which required explicit guidance. While district revenue officials might have been 
lacking in the technical expertise, they were at least more familiar with the agriculture and 
people of the district. 
The surveyor was consistently portrayed as a scientist, removed from the practicalities 
of governance, but they were also expected to traverse and experience the locality:  
 
a Surveyor should always endeavour to obtain a good knowledge of his District, 
or the portion of country under survey, by constantly riding over it, in every 
direction, and thus getting a sort of bird’s-eye view in his own mind.116 
 
There were evident parallels with the ideal district officer. H.R. Thuillier stated that the only 
civil officers in the Survey Department were ‘selected from those who have proved 
themselves to be thoroughly qualified for the charge of a survey party’.117 This contradiction 
was revealing, revenue officers were simultaneously dismissed for their local unsophisticated 
practices, and yet allegedly qualified by their experience of settlement establishments. The 
Surveyor was a scientist on the spot, applying his skills to an inert landscape which he had to 
understand through the lens of his instruments. However, frequently, that lens had to be 
refracted through the local revenue officer.  
H.L. Thuillier emphasised the necessary relationship between the district officer and the 
surveyor. He wrote, ‘on the Revenue Surveys in India, the Surveyor is not merely dependant 
on his own resources, he has to look to the proceedings of another and distinct establishment, 
that of the Civil or Settlement Officer’.118 The procedures and practices of Settlement relied 
on an imagined Settlement Officer who had personal and intimate experience of the locality. 
As Henry Rickett’s explained ‘the settlement officer holds in his hands the welfare of the 
whole of the agricultural community’.119 After the demarcation had been confirmed it was the 
job of the Settlement Officer to investigate rents and revenues, and ultimately produce the 
record of rights. The work was complicated, as Settlement Officers frequently had to make 
decisions based on inaccurate or incomplete records.  
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The revenue roll was often just ‘a list of the proprietors of the estate, shewing the extent 
of the interest of each, whether measured by proportionate share (as so many annas in the 
rupee), or by actual division of the lands; and, finally the assessment of the estate’.120 These 
documents were usually incomplete, out of date and often damaged. It was not unusual for a 
settlement to be conducted in a district without any existing map.
121
 Surveyors and revenue 
officials had to rely on records of ownership that could be thirty years old. The unreliability 
of the documentation made the experience and independence of the district official even more 
important. Due to the inaccuracy of the existing records, Settlement Officers were given the 
discretion ‘to recognise a claimant of proprietary interests though his name may not have 
been registered. This discretion should only be exercised when there is practically no doubt 
that the claimant of proprietary right is really the proprietor’.122 The Settlement Officer was 
tasked with determining ownership, tenancy and revenue payments. All of these duties were 
made simpler if the Settlement Officer had local district experience.  
The discretionary capacity of the Settlement Officer was contingent on his familiarity 
with the agrarian community and the agriculture of the region. The Settlement Manual 
suggested that during the initial assessment procedure the deposit for the cost of the survey 
and settlement could be secured on the spot from the proprietor. The Settlement Officer was 
advised ‘to exercise his discretions as regards the requisition of security, with due reference 
to the means and character of the farmer’.123 However, the transient nature of the district 
officers’ career meant that this impression was often made on the spot and not as a result of 
personal familiarity. It was an even greater difficulty for Surveyors with no experience of 
revenue procedures and limited contact with cultivators. The result of this tension between 
the imagined settlement officer and the reality of practice was a more scientific means of 
assessment. The settlement could instigate detailed investigations into soil classification or 
irrigation systems. However, despite these more technical procedures, the Settlement Officer 
was still required to judge the fairness of the revenue assessment based not on what ‘the land 
may pay for one year, but what can be paid with regularity in average years. It is especially 
incumbent on him not to conclude too hastily that what appears to be an appropriate 
assessment is actually so’.124 The capacity for and exercise of discretion was fundamental to 
the functioning of survey and settlement. This thesis argues that this empowered discretion 
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rested upon the premise that the district official was the interface between the colonised and 
the coloniser.  
This emphasis on the discretion of the revenue officer was echoed in calls for the 
honesty of the Surveyor. The lack of contact or local experience, while rendering the 
Surveyor more professional, could make him less invested in the benevolent and improving 
aims of the project.
125
 Surveyors were cautioned against rushing work or claiming more than 
their dues: ‘it may be difficult for him to refrain from injudicious haste, when he knows that 
some of his brother Executive Officers are working with greater rapidity than himself, and 
are likely to gain more credit than he does’.126 Surveys were vital in the production of 
knowable statistics in British India, but often the surveyor was more interested in big results 
than practical information.  
The macro agenda of the Survey Department and its staff frequently created tensions 
during revenue surveys. This conflict between the centralised aims of the Survey Department 
and the local circumstances of the district influenced the policies and practises around survey 
and settlement. H.L. Thuillier insisted ‘there should be such an understanding between the 
Surveyor and Settlement Officer, as may prevent all hindrance to the progress of the work; 
the object of both should be to co-operate mutually with each other, and so overcome all 
difficulties that may present themselves’.127 This guidance was not without substance, as was 
revealed during the complex survey and settlement of Chittagong. 
‘Settlement work is harder in Bengal’: The Survey and Settlement of Chittagong  
 
Chittagong was the border region of the province of Bengal.
128
 Chittagong clung to the North 
East corner of the Bay of Bengal, stretched through delta plains, jungle and up into the hill 
tracts bordering Burma. In 1891, it measured 2,492 sq miles with a population of 
1,290,167.
129
 Previous suggestions about resurveying the region in 1877 had been rebuffed, 
but subsequent to the Tenancy Act the local officers proposed a new settlement.
130
 After an 
initial and successful survey of the Thana of Ramu, Finucane, Director of Land Records, 
visited in September of 1889, and sanctioned a new survey and settlement of the region. 
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Finucane concluded that the ‘the supervision of the work was to be entrusted to Mr Slack, 
who was then officiating as Collector of the district, assisted by two Deputy Collectors’.131 
The primary aim of the Chittagong survey and settlement was ‘to ascertain the existing rents 
paid by the raiyats to the talukdars, and, after allowing a percentage to the talukdars, to fix the 
balance as the revenue payable to Government’.132 The discretion of the revenue officer was 
kept at the centre of the settlement, owing to the specificities of the district.
133
 In his report 
Allen, Mr Slack’s successor, explained that Chittagong presented many difficulties in the 
process of the settlement. The complexity of the work was aggravated by the minute size of 
the plots, the intermixture of different estates and the ignorance of the people as to which 




Each had a history, each peculiarities of its own. It was a wise policy, therefore, to 
leave the officers locally employed a free hand to assess each taluk in the manner 





This discretionary freedom allowed to the revenue officer was the outcome of a rather 
problematic start to the proceedings. The initial demarcation of the boundaries was taxing, 
especially as the local officers were following an 1848 map. They found the old markers were 
‘very ill-defined. They pursue a tortuous course, sometimes through the centre of fields, 
sometimes intersecting houses and tanks’.136 After the demarcation was completed the 
cadastral work was handed over to Mr F. Grant, the Superintendent of Survey. However, 
there was a problem. The Survey Department were using ‘up-country’ Amins, who spoke 
Urdu, not Bengali: ‘having no knowledge of Bengali or of the local tenures, were unable to 
write the records (khasras), hence a dual establishment was necessary, viz., a staff of up-
country amins to do the cadastral survey, followed by Bengali-knowing amins who wrote the 
records’.137 Unsurprisingly this caused considerable errors and confusion. The Survey 
Department cadastral Amins sketched out the map, irrespective of occupancy, and used 
physical markers like field ridges rather than the boundaries of actual tenurial holdings. This 
pencil map was then handed to the Settlement Officer, who deputised the khanapuri Amin to 
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write up the records of the holding (khusra). The khanapuri Amin had to revisit the site and 
consult the collectorate records to ascertain who was in actual possession and occupancy.  
This arduous system of record writing was commenced under the auspices of the 
Survey Department, but it was found to be so inaccurate that it required a complete revision 
before the attestation settlement procedures could begin. As a result the work was handed 
back to the Settlement Officer in May 1891. Slack and Allen concluded that this could have 
been avoided if the Survey Department had not given up so quickly on using local agency. 
Allen stated ‘I have no wish to blame the survey officers. I merely desire to point out that a 
great part of the complication of procedure was due to the inability of the survey officers to 
get correct khasras written’.138 
As the survey and settlement were being conducted according to the provisions of the 
Bengal Tenancy Act, there was considerable emphasis on the record and the rent roll: ‘each 
landlord was compelled to show each tenant of each of his estates in his rent-roll, and the 
amin to identify each tenancy so entered’.139 Five assistant Settlement Officers worked on 
attestation and they were instructed to insist on documentary evidence. The tenants were 
compelled to produce pattas (rent receipts). For the Survey Department settlement attestation 
‘was a disagreeable and unfamiliar task which they accordingly postponed till the end of their 
work’.140 This postponement was unacceptable and against standard procedure. The process 
of accurately recording the rent involved ascertaining if enhancements were required. Rent 
could be enhanced if waste lands had been cultivated or the holdings had been expanded. 
This had a subsequent impact on the revenue rate to be collected from the proprietor. 
Attestation involved considerable amounts of paperwork, bureaucracy and decision-making. 
There were 16,638 petitions, registered as objections under section 105 of Bengal Tenancy 
Act, and 984 boundary dispute cases.
141
 According to the report, this was an average volume 
of settlement work for a Bengal survey.  
Disputes and petitions were instituted at all stages of the survey and settlement. Mr 
Harrison, former subdivision officer of Tajpur explained: ‘Raiyots combine very easily when 
they see a prospect of success, and will stop all payment of high rates when there is a chance 
of their being supported’.142 Anand Yang has discussed these everyday forms of agrarian 
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resistance, especially the use of collective petitioning by ryots. Yang argues that usually 
‘such occasions represented only momentary breaches in the systematic structures of 
control’.143 The Bengal Tenancy Act enabled and facilitated these acts of resistance by 
providing legal frameworks for disputes and the assertion of rights. Mr Henry, formerly of 
Chumparun argued: ‘Mr Collin’s report shows how eagerly the raiyots come forward to 
receive what they deem authoritative evidence as to the area of their holdings and the rates of 
rent’.144 Local officers like Henry and Harrison had experience of such forms of resistance 
and recognised the role of the survey and settlement in positively assisting cultivators.  
It was in these procedures that the discretionary and experienced nature of the idealised 
revenue officer was most felt: ‘whenever a Revenue Officer pitched his camp in a village for 
the purpose of assessment he was inundated with a flood of petitions of this nature’.145 It was 
for this reason that many had argued for the continuing role of the Collector and his Revenue 
Department in the work of settlement and survey. Their absence was keenly felt: 
 
the people recognised the essential difference which must always exist between 
the functions of a Revenue Officer and of a regular tribunal. They were satisfied 
with the Settlement Officer’s decision as to actual possession, but they preferred 




According to the Chittagong settlement report, the agriculturalists were satisfied with the on-
the-spot decision-making unless it necessitated a serious change in socio-economic relations, 
for which they required the procedure of a court. The recourse to the civil court removed the 
dispute from the locality. In the courtroom the zemindar and ryot were no longer on an equal 
footing, as the zemindar could utilise his superior personal and financial resources. By 
comparison, in the field, any coercion could be undermined by investigating and questioning 
tenants around the estate.
147
 The Bengal Tenancy Act did afford the revenue officer 
considerable discretion before recourse to the courts was necessary.  
Throughout the Chittagong survey and settlement revenue officers were encouraged to 
exercise their discretion.
148
 Surveyors were encouraged to consult with the Settlement 
Officers: ‘they will together decide on the proper course of action’.149 The involvement of 
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local revenue administration was strongly influenced by the belief that the opposition of the 
cultivators decreased in proportion to the presence of civil Settlement Officers. P.C. Lyon, 
Director of Land Records and Agriculture, Bengal, explained: ‘survey officers are not, and 
cannot be expected to be, as much in touch with the people as civil officers, or have the same 
power of exercising influence over them and securing their assistance’.150 The idealised 
district officer, as the intermediary between the Government and the people, shaped the 
attitude of the Bengal Government towards the process of survey and settlement.  
Chittagong presented the opportunity to demonstrate the importance of the discretion 
and knowledge of the revenue officer. Indeed, the overall success of the survey and 
settlement was attributed to Mr Slack, Collector and Settlement officer: ‘his patient scrutiny 
of detail, his exactitude and experience’.151 In a typical example of the ‘double-think’ of 
revenue policy, the outcome of the Chittagong settlement was a proposal to provide surveyors 
with khanapuri (record writing) training. Instead of recognising the appropriate work of the 
Settlement Officers, the Surveyors were awarded yet another specialised skill. P.C Lyon 
reported the progress of the newly trained establishment, stating, ‘we have at its head an 
officer who has long since learnt that accuracy in khanapuri is one of the essentials of the 
work of his subordinates’.152 Despite the crucial role of the Revenue and Settlement 




Finucane described the contradictory tension at the centre of the survey and settlement 
project:  
 
Repeated injunctions have been imposed on settlement officers, in the settlement 
and survey rules and elsewhere, to give every assistance and support to survey 
officers; but yet complaints are received from the survey officers of “want of co-
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This report, and the tensions it described, encapsulated the anxious and complicated work of 
settlement and survey in Bengal. There was an irresolvable conflict between the imagined 
revenue officer and the working realities of settlement and survey. The model district officer 
was defined by his autonomy, discretion, experience and paternalism. This persona drew on 
the official imagination and revenue policies, but was irreconcilable with the increasingly 
bureaucratised revenue administration.  
The idealised imagined district official influenced the discussions regarding the work of 
survey and settlement. However, integrating this role into the practises of survey and 
settlement proved problematic. The ‘double-think’ of the Bengal Government simultaneously 
demanded adherence to legislation, privileged the professional Survey and yet insisted on the 
discretionary role of the decision making revenue official. The district officer’s discretionary 
expertise was considered essential to the practises of settlement and survey, but it also 
contradicted the modern administration and scientific enterprise.  
Revenue officials were able to reassert their role in the settlements produced by the 
1885 Bengal Tenancy Act. As the process of boundary demarcation demonstrated, legislation 
did support the discretionary decision-making process, and recognised the value of on the spot 
interactions. Furthermore, in Chittagong, the government was forced to admit the essential 
role played by local officials. The enduring commitment to the idealised revenue officer, 
despite the contradictions and anxieties which the role created, reveals that this persona was 
not eradicated by the growth of the bureaucracy. Instead, the official mind continued to 
endorse the imagined district officer in legislation and attempted to enable it to function in 
practise. The position of the district official in the survey and settlement of Bengal in the 
second half of the nineteenth century provides another insight into the uncertain and thorny 
functioning of Empire. However, it was in the role of Judge and Magistrate that the district 
officer was most able to use his experience to influence policy and practice.
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Chapter Four ‘A very suitable form of punishment’: The Whipping Act and the District 
Officer 
 
In 1837, Thomas Babington Macaulay and his fellow Law Commissioners drafted an Indian 
Penal Code.
1
 The code was designed to function as a simple and consistent application of the 
law. In true Benthamite spirit it was envisioned to have universal appeal and the potential for 
implementation across the Empire. Macaulay was determined to impose a comprehensive and 
explicit legal structure on the existing quagmire of confused contingent practice in Company 
ruled India. The greatest fault of the existing system was the discretion of Court and the 
primacy of the Judge in what Macaulay called ‘court-made-law’.2 For Macaulay personal 
discretion was the worst symptom of Oriental despotism.
3
 Macaulay believed the Civil, 
Criminal and Penal Codes would eradicate the discretionary practices which tainted and 
compromised the rule of law. With their detailed definitions, categories and clauses the Civil, 
Criminal and Penal Codes were supposed to leave little room for manoeuvre.  
This chapter argues that the discretionary Judge continued to have a role in the legal 
system of British India. By focusing on the criminal work of the judicial branch of the ICS 
this chapter charts the construction, representation and contestation of the persona of the 
Judge or Magistrate. The role of Judge or Magistrate was one that often came later in the life-
cycle of the district officer.
4
 Governing literature frequently referred to the bench as a last 
resort for aging district officers.
5
 Ashley Eden explained that a Civil and Sessions Judge 
required extensive experience of executive revenue matters.
6
 This experience was essential 
for the discretionary work of the judicial official.  
While, the Magistrate’s work and role was defined through the process of codification 
in the 1860s, his enduring autonomy was visible in the law itself. Through an examination of 
the Whipping Act (Act VI of 1864), this chapter demonstrates how discretionary practice, 
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personal experience and the default reliance on the district official as a strategy of governance 
subverted and contradicted the legal framework of the Raj.
7
 It was often in the moments of 
crisis and contestation that the district officer’s judicial powers were increased and relied 
upon. First, this chapter will locate this discussion within the current historiography, followed 
by an examination of the prominence of the imagined benevolent and autonomous judge, then 
after contextualising the development of the Whipping Act this chapter will analyse the role 
of the district officer as empowered by the discretionary powers of corporal punishment.  
‘An intrinsic feature of imperial rule’: Historiography 
 
As Mark Brown argues, ‘crime and criminality had, for most of the nineteenth century, 
played a central role, if not in shaping, then at least in drawing out many of the conflicts, 
principles, limitations, anxieties and aspirations of colonial rule.’8 This was certainly the case 
for the persona of the district official. The role of district level judicial process and violence 
have been notably absent from existing accounts of crime and punishment in India.
9
 Instead, 
the existing historiography on crime and punishment in Empire follows the Foucauldian 
narrative of the transition from bodily punishment to the reforming individualising discipline 
of the modern prison.
10
 As Carolyn Strange argues this account primarily focuses on histories 
of incarceration and ‘the pace of historiography on physical punishment loses momentum’.11 
This chapter seeks to address the absence of both violent punishment and district level rule of 
law through an examination of the judicial functions of the district officer and the Whipping 
Act.  
Recent efforts to address the neglect of modern violence in accounts of British India 
include Elizabeth Kolsky’s work on colonial justice. Kolsky argues ‘physical violence was an 
intrinsic feature of imperial rule. This is a fact widely acknowledged but narrowly explored, 
particularly in the Indian historiography’.12 Kolsky primarily discusses how the British Indian 
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legal system was developed to protect the coloniser. Therefore, this chapter borrows from 
Kolsky’s attention to the policies surrounding unofficial acts of violence, and expands it into 
the criminal law sphere. It is by interrogating policy, practice and procedure that this chapter 
reveals the role of the idealised district officer in the rule of law.  
As Brown argues the Whipping Act became a focal point for debates regarding crime, 
punishment, the rule of law, race, local Government and the legislative process. There has 
been a limited discussion of the use of corporal punishment in British India.
13
 Steven Pierce’s 
work on whipping in early twentieth-century Nigeria provides a useful comparison. Pierce 
argues that ‘administrative approaches to flogging scandals thus juxtaposed apologias for 
flogging as a practice with a minute attention to procedural detail – record keeping, methods 
of administration, means to apply penalties properly to the various categories of person’.14 
The same response occurred in British India in the late nineteenth century. Controversy was 
met with emphatic justifications based on a specific local understanding of the issue 
combined with a detailed attention to the legislative procedure. This is particularly evident in 
the attitudes towards child criminals. Satadru Sen has explored juvenile penal reform in 
nineteenth-century India.
15
 Sen has demonstrated that the Reformatory movement, which 
culminated in the 1876 Reformatories Act, must be understood as part of the simultaneous 
development of modern penal systems and the continuation of corporal punishment. Crucially 
Sen identifies the tension at the heart of the colonial discipline paradox: 
 
what emerges is a bifurcated and hierarchical vision of juvenile delinquency and 
punishment that reproduces the colonial encounter with adult criminals: prolonged 
confinement, redemption, and rehabilitation for one set of boys; incorrigibility, 




It was the overlap between the treatment of the child criminal and the conceptualisation of 
Indians as the childlike race which informed the corporal punishment debate. Sen effectively 
uses the reformatory movement to assess the problematic issue of the child criminal in British 
India, but by focusing on whipping only as an alternative to imprisonment, Sen’s argument is 
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limited. By examining the debates surrounding juvenile punishment this chapter expands 
upon the tensions between an allegedly moral and benevolent Government and a violent 
legislative system. This paradox of colonial violence was resolved through the reliance on an 
idealised judicial official supported by a much deliberated body of law. It is this tension, 
between acts of violence, the rule of law and the discretion of the individual that is absent 
from current discussions.  
While Brown acknowledges the role of the district official, especially in the context of 
the Punjab, he fails to understand the centrality of the persona to the development of 
governance. It is Taylor C. Sherman who has best identified the importance of local district 
officials in the function of violence within colonial law. By tracing the revisions of the 
Whipping Acts in the mid-twentieth-century, Sherman demonstrates that the discretionary 
application of violence was characteristic of the reaction to anti-colonial movements. 
Sherman draws particular attention to the autonomy of the district official: ‘requests or 
suggestions could be made to local officers from the higher levels of government, but 
ultimately it was not the place of provincial or national authorities to dictate how local 
officers acted. It was their duty, to stand in solidarity with the man on the spot’. 17   
  By claiming that discretionary violence was specific to the context of the late colonial 
state, Sherman fails to clarify the unique context under which some officers were operating, 
for example, martial law in Amritsar. This chapter demonstrates that this discretionary 
capacity was embedded in to the governing practices of British India nearly a hundred years 
earlier and that the debates surrounding whipping nationalists and civil disobedients was the 
same rehearsed rhetoric which had informed the act in its original form in 1864. Fundamental 
to the autonomous exercise of corporal punishment and legal power was the 
conceptualisation of the district official as an independent decision maker. However, this was 
a persona which potentially contradicted a legal system which had been codified in the mid 
nineteenth century. It is this supposed conflict between the autonomous judge and the 
codified rule of law which requires further exploration.  
‘We should trust to the discretion of the Magistrate’: The Judicial District Officer 
 
In 1875, Mr Saunders, Resident at Hyderabad, complained that the judicial branch of district 
administration was ‘more fettered by law and regulation and necessity, affording less scope 
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for the play and display of individual talent and energy’.18 The tensions described by 
Saunders defined the judicial aspect of the idealised district officer’s persona. These anxieties 
were in many ways the product of the British Indian legal system. As Margot Finn explains: 
‘British jurists and administrators essentially invented a corpus of timeless Indian legal 
“traditions”, a unified system of legal practice that was compatible with their own 
understanding of and commitment to the English Common law’19. The British Indian legal 
system involved a series of categories or conceptualisations, like the Hindu joint family, on 
which the mechanisms of the law were based.
20
 The exploration of the discretionary role of 
the judiciary has been limited to their role in the construction and contestations of 
‘traditional’ and ‘customary’ categories.21  
The codification of British Indian law fixed these categories into legislative practice. It 
is for this reason that legal governing literature was more formulaic and the texts were 
frequently limited to commentaries on matters of law and the business of the court. The Civil, 
Criminal and Penal Codes included example cases to illustrate the operation of each law. 
Each section had suggested specimens of cases and outcomes in order to guide the judicial 
officer towards the correct decision. The Commissioners stated ‘the publication of this 
collection of cases decided by legislative authority will, we hope, greatly limit the power 
which the Courts of Justice possess of putting their own sense on the laws’.22 This 
prescriptive legislation and the attached case studies further cemented ideas about Indian 
legal tradition and customary society. While codification did harden some legal practices the 
judicial district official continued to be imagined, and frequently empowered, as an 
autonomous decision maker able to exercise discretion.  
Autonomy in the decision-making process was central to the imagined and practised 
model judicial district officer. The figure of the benevolent paternalist was suited to the 
senior judicial officers in the latter half of their careers.
23
 In his memoir Andrew Fraser, 
former Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, expressed his disapproval of the formulaic 
application of the law. Fraser believed the legal system of the later nineteenth century had 
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removed the district officer from the locality and thereby compromised the fair exercise of 
justice: ‘judges live apart from the people, and do not understand their circumstances’.24 For 
Fraser, it was imperative that the judicial officer should personally investigate as often as 
possible:  
 
When he is on the spot, sees the matter in dispute with his own eyes, and hears the 
evidence in regard to that matter in the presence of the villagers, themselves, he 
has some ground to hope that the evidence given before him is both truthful in 




Fraser was not alone in this view, and the memoirs of district officials were peppered with 
proud anecdotes of personally conducted justice. There was an enduring perception that a 
judicial officer would get to the truth of the issue on the spot compared to in the deceptive 
environment of the court room.
26
 As with the revenue work, the settlement or crime was 
better observed in the moment rather than misrepresented by pleaders and witnesses later. 
However, as feared by Macaulay, judgement on the spot was liable to serious bias and 
maladministration. Henry Cotton claimed in his early career he was ‘encouraged then to 
exercise considerable executive interference with the ordinary course of justice’.27 He 
recalled riding off to investigate cases on the spot, seizing papers from subordinate officials 
and giving evidence before himself in court. The problem with rendering the Judge as the 
autonomous decision maker was the subsequent size and nature of the sphere of his activities. 
As Henry Keene explained the district Judge was simultaneously:  
 
head of the police, responsible for all the conduct and discipline of the force, and 
for the detection of all reported crime; sometimes sitting to hear cases in which he 
himself had directed the preliminary investigation and was represented in the 




A district Judge could find himself acting as investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and 
executioner. This was exactly the kind of judge made law practice that Macaulay was 
determined to eradicate. However, these powers were not given up easily by the district 
officers. One judicial official disliked the new practice of recording evidence, a procedure 
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previously delegated to subordinate Indian officials, and he complained ‘this New Criminal 
Procedure Code makes everything so long’.29 The new Civil, Criminal and Penal Codes 
required judges to evidence and record their decisions, thereby stripping away some of their 
independence.  
This idealisation of the judge as an autonomously empowered decision maker 
reflected the attitudes of the Bengal Government. Demonstrable experience of independent 
decision-making was considered a necessary qualification for the judicial branch. Although 
the senior position of Sessions Judge was usually held by older officers, as Assistant-
Magistrates trainee civilian officials were empowered to try civil and criminal cases on 
qualification. In 1867, the  administrative personnel reports insisted that the junior district 
officials were not gaining sufficient experience in deciding original suits. Instead they were 
relying on appeal cases. For example, it was said of Mr Bright, of Midnapore: ‘he should 
endeavour to make time to try a fair proportion of original suits, as it is by doing so that his 
individual capacity will best be developed’, and so he would ‘acquire a practical knowledge 
of procedure’.30 Avoiding original suits and relying on appellate court work was viewed as 
likely to undermine the independent experienced image of the judiciary.
31
 It was not just 
experience of the law that was considered important but also the practice of assessing 
offenders and evidence in person.
32
 This emphasis on practical experience as the best means 
for the development of autonomous and discretionary skills was reflected in the career ladder 
of the district official.  
Henry Cotton recalled being empowered as a first class Magistrate early in his 
working life. Even as a junior officer he could award sentences of up to two years in prison, a 
fine of 1000 rupees, and inflict whipping up to thirty stripes.
33
 These legal powers were part 
of the routine administration of India undertaken by district officers. On reflection Cotton felt 
that learning on the job in possession of these powers was grossly inappropriate, ‘I was, in 
fact, too young to have been invested with them, and to some extent, therefore, may plead to 
have been the victim of a bad system.’34 At the time Cotton was encouraged to be harsh in his 
judgements, following the example of his senior officers he wanted to be a strong Magistrate, 
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severe in his sentencing and feared rather than loved.
35
 Cotton candidly admitted in his 
memoir that he was zealous in the infliction of corporal punishment, ‘it is with shame and 
sorrow I record that I was addicted to it’.36  This confession about the abuse of legal power 
and the desire to be a strong and severe judge was at odds with the image of a benevolent and 
moral district officer. Colonial violence was a paradox, simultaneously undermining and 
justifying the civilising and moral justifications of rule.
37
 In order to explore the role of the 
district officer as the arbiter of violence, this chapter first discusses the origins of corporal 
punishment in British Indian legal practice. 
 ‘The temper of the individual judge’: The origins of the Whipping Act 
 
Macaulay claimed that in the early Company legal system the barbarity of Islamic and Hindu 
law had been primarily avoided by the ‘discretion and humanity of the judges’.38 In 
Macaulay’s opinion the absence of a civilised coherent body of law necessitated the exercise 
of the Judge’s rational faculties.39 The moral compromise involved in a legal system based 
upon Islamic or Hindu practices was deeply problematic for reformers like Macaulay. 
Radhika Singha explains during early Company rule that ‘the public infliction of pain and 
ignominy, through such rituals as the public execution, gibbeting, tashir, public flogging and 
labour in fetters on the roads, was accepted as a crucial component of deterrence’.40 This was 
a period characterised by a more militaristic style of rule, so the strategic employment of 
violence and force was an effective means of deterring resistance and ensuring cooperation. 
Magistrates were expected to exercise discretion in the use of corporal punishment, and take 
into account the rank, caste and status of the offender.
41
 As Singha explains, it was not in the 
Company’s interests to punish and offend collaborators among high caste groups. This 
sensitivity to caste and rank continued to inform British Indian law.  
                                                 
35
 Ibid., 78-79.  
36
 Ibid., 80.  
37
 Pierce and Rao, (eds.), Discipline and the Other Body, 5.  
38
 Kolsky, ‘Codification and the Rule of Colonial Difference’, 639. 
Cameron and Elliot, The Indian Penal Code, xiii.  
39
 Sandra Den Otter has explored the disjuncture between discretionary, customary and codified legal practice in 
British India, Sandra Den Otter. ‘Rewriting the Utilitarian Market: Colonial Law and Custom in mid-nineteenth 
century British India’, The European legacy, toward new paradigms, 6, 2 (2001), 177–188. 
40
 Radhika Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in early colonial India (Calcutta, 1998), 231. 
41
 Ibid., 231. 
171 
 
In Britain, public flogging was practised until the 1830s, and it continued to be used as 
a judicial punishment throughout the nineteenth century.
42
 Therefore, while corporal 
punishment was familiar, it was rendered specifically challenging by the Indian environment. 
For example, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the number of lashes inflicted 
was often determined by the Islamic law employed in Company courts. During the 1830s 
discussions concerning the instrument of infliction were consistent with the desire to move 
away from the perceived barbarity of ‘Oriental’ law. The rattan was dismissed by some as it 
was considered an instrument of torture which permanently scarred the recipient. Whereas 
the cat o’ nine tails was rejected on the basis of the brutality of the public display it involved. 
Members of the Bengal Judicial Department objected to the length of time involved in using 
the cat: ‘the disgusting spectacle of continued punishment at our Courts, throughout a major 
portion of the day, would be held up to the eyes of the people’.43 This was not the image of 
civilised Government the reforming generation desired to cultivate.  
In 1834 the Governor-General William Bentinck settled the matter by abolishing 
whipping in British India.
44
 The preamble to the regulation stated that the British Government 
should be based on enlightened principles:  
 
and should endeavour by its own example, to encourage the native states to 
exchange their barbarous and cruel punishments of maiming, or torturing, or of 
loss of limb, for those of a more merciful and wise character, by which the 





Bentinck’s beliefs about the civilising force of law and the reforming impulse of enlightened 
legislation fits pleasingly with a Foucauldean narrative of Utilitarian influence over the 
colonial legal system. However, Bentinck’s regulation flew in the face of governing opinion. 
and within ten years the Bengal Government insisted that whipping was resurrected as a 
punishment for petty larceny and juveniles. Bentinck’s regulation epitomised the colonial 
discipline paradox, ruling through violent means to establish a more civilised society was a 
problematic narrative in the benevolent civilising mission.  
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Macaulay refused to include corporal punishment in his project of codification. He 
believed that whipping was only resorted to by regimes with insufficient custodial institutions 
and that his reforms would facilitate alternatives: ‘we are inclined to think that the effect of a 
few days passed in solitude or in hard and monotonous labour would be more salutary than 
that of stripes’.46 However, it was generally agreed in Bengal that incarceration was 
unsuitable for Indian criminals.
47
 Racist discourses of the body insisted that Indians were 
contaminated by imprisonment.
48
 In 1843, the Medical Board at Fort William argued that due 
to the Eastern manner and character: ‘it would highly conduce to the welfare of the country 
and to the happiness of the people to revert to Corporal Punishment and thus set at liberty to 
maintain themselves and their families perhaps about 20,000 individuals’.49 The commitment 
to corporal punishment was strongly influenced by the belief that incarceration was 
significantly damaging to Indian health. The discourses surrounding imprisonment centred on 
the belief that Indians did not fare well mentally and physically when forced to remain 
indoors.  
The contamination of the incarcerated body was twofold. The bodily health of the 
Indian prisoner was more fragile as a result of his traditionally outdoor lifestyle. Secondly, 
the criminal environment of a prison could have a corrupting and negative effect, especially 
for the young or first time offender. As David Arnold explains, Indian prisons were disease 
ridden and rife with corruption.
50
 Grand centralised jails as envisioned by Macaulay and 
Bentham, like those at Agra, Salem and Multan, were considered unfit for purpose, the 
watchtowers were left without guards, and the solitary cells remained unpopulated.
51
 When 
compared with incarceration, whipping was considered an efficient, effective and beneficial 
measure. However, the perceived inadequacy of incarceration was not the sole factor in the 
decision to reintroduce corporal punishment. The district official and his exercise of judicial 
discretion occupied an influential position in the whipping debate.   
In June 1880, William Macpherson, Legal Secretary to the Judicial Department at the 
India Office, wrote a memo summarising the official history of the Whipping Act. This was 
forwarded to Hartington, Secretary of State for India, who was about to face a question in the 
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House about the possibility of discontinuing whipping as a judicial punishment. In 
justification of the Act, Macpherson explained: ‘there was a great preponderance of Indian 
Official Authority in favour of the Bill, which was chiefly on the grounds of the state of gaols 
and the contaminating influence of prison life.’52 The Whipping Act was drafted in response 
to demands by local Governments who challenged the absence of corporal punishment in the 
new Penal Code. The failure to include corporal punishment was considered a serious error, 
and this omission was the cause of confusion and alarm. Hartington explained to the House 
that ‘from 1862 to 1864 the punishment was not inflicted. During that time complaints were 
made by all the local Governments of the difficulty experienced in this interval’.53 The needs 
and opinions of the local Government were privileged in these discussions. District officials 
were considered best placed to report on the necessity of corporal punishment, and in the 
1880s, Hartington believed this was sufficient justification to dismiss challenges to the 
Whipping Act. The necessity for the Whipping Act was consistently expressed in terms of the 
unsuitability of imprisonment for Indian subjects, and the demand for the powers of infliction 
by district officers.
54
 In order to better understand the role of judicial discretion in corporal 
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Figure 11 – J.J. Cotton dispensing justice in Bengal, 1860s.55 
                                                 
55
 Fig. 1 in David Gilmour, The Ruling Caste, 117. 
 
Figure 11 – J.J. Cotton dispensing 






‘The rod as an instrument of good’: The Whipping Act 
 
The Whipping Act (VI of 1864) established the legal mechanisms for awarding corporal 
punishment.
56
 It was a separate piece of legislation to the IPC and it detailed the specific 
offences which came under its cognizance. Whipping could be awarded for first offences of 
theft, extortion, house-breaking, trespass and receiving stolen goods, with subsequent 
offences receiving whipping in addition or in lieu of fine or imprisonment, a condition that 
also applied to second offences of fabricating evidence, assault, rape, unnatural offences, 
robbery, habitually receiving stolen property, forgery and house-breaking or trespass.
57
 A 
further caveat focused on minor offences which were part of more aggravated or violent acts. 
Whipping could be awarded if house-breaking was the means of committing assault. The Act 
ruled that corporal punishment could not be inflicted on women or girls. Corporal punishment 
was conceptualised as an effective deterrent, and an appropriate punishment for petty 
offenses and crimes of aggression or physical force. Furthermore, it was considered an 
effective remedy for disorderly conduct, and an efficient means of establishing the rule of 
law. The Act could also be put into force in any wild or frontier tract of the country. This 
clause gave local Governments free reign to utilise corporal punishment as a means of 
implementing order and obedience in areas not technically settled by the British. Each 
province was left to determine the means and methods of corporal punishment. Considerable 
thought was given to the mode and process of infliction based on existing perceptions of pain 
and the impact of different instruments. 
During the introduction of the Whipping Act the Government of Bengal debated the 
instrument of infliction. It was agreed that one stroke of the rattan was the equivalent of five 
lashes of the cat o’ nine tails.58 The Governor-General in Council concluded that there would 
be few circumstances under which the maximum number of strokes or lashes would be 
awarded.
59
 The only conceivable circumstances for maximum infliction would involve either 
a particularly hardened criminal or an outrageously violent crime. It was agreed that it was 
necessary:  
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to proportion the dimensions of the instrument to be used, and to regulate the 
mode of inflicting the punishment, that in no case shall any risk of serious or 




The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal decided upon a rattan not exceeding half an inch in 
diameter.
61
 It was also directed that the whipping should be inflicted on the breech, meaning 
buttocks and upper thighs, and that ‘precautions should be taken to prevent the blows from 
falling upon any other part of person’.62 Henry Cotton described the practice of corporal 
punishment, ‘the way of flogging was and is to tie a man up by his hands and legs to a 
wooden triangle so that he cannot move and then to inflict the punishment on his bare 
buttocks with a rattan’.63 Cotton claimed to have seen men’s skin cut to pieces, men fainting 
as a result of the pain and even to have heard of men dying during the punishment. Cotton 
stated ‘the triangles in Bengal are an unpleasant feature outside every criminal court, and they 
used to accompany me into camp’.64 Cotton’s own addiction to whipping was a source of 
serious regret and he spent the rest of his career campaigning against corporal punishment. 
The traumatising violence of whipping contradicted the image of a benevolent judge sitting 
under canvas and administering civilising justice to his people. Yet, the use of whipping 
triangles while in camp epitomised on the spot justice. The whipping triangles acted as a 
symbolic reminder of the preferred method of punishment and represented the discretionary 
power of the district Judge. The idealised district official was negotiated into this practice by 
recasting him not as the arbiter of violence, but as the man-on-the-spot, most able to 
understand and admonish the subject race.  
The contradiction created by the insistence on violence was managed by integrating the 
persona of the Magistrate into the Act. The Act explicitly stated:  
 
The punishment shall be inflicted in the presence of a Justice of the Peace, or of 
an Officer authorized to exercise any of the powers of a Magistrate, and also, 
unless the court which passed the sentence shall otherwise order, in the presence 
of a Medical Officer.
65
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The insistence on the presence of a judicial officer, or at least the representation of the 
judicial persona, during the infliction of the punishment was a combination of accountability 
and authority. The presence of a judicial officer justified corporal punishment. Primarily, by 
being physically present the Judge could ensure that the sentence was correctly administered. 
Secondly, the mandated presence of the judicial officer acted as a physical representation of 
the law. This was the realisation of the rule of law. The experience of monitoring the 
infliction of the whipping would enable the officer to make informed and appropriate 
sentences in the future. Practical experience was an essential skill for the idealised district 
official. This intimate experience of whipping added weight, and, value to the voice of the 
district officers, especially during calls for reform.  
Fundamental to the idealisation of the discretionary judicial officer was the 
demonstrable confidence and belief in his own decisions. By witnessing the infliction of 
punishment the Magistrate or Judge was literally standing by his decision. In the first few 
years of the operation of the Act there was some discussion around the significance of the 
discretionary role and physical presence of the judicial officer. Although not empowered by 
the Whipping Act, Police Magistrates were authorised to give out sentences of corporal 
punishment under the auspices of the 1856 Calcutta Police Act.
66
 The Magistrate of the 
Northern Calcutta police division stated that when he awarded corporal punishment he 
usually asked the offender to remove some clothing so he could inspect his state of health. If 
the accused appeared to be ill or frail the Magistrate would instead choose a sentence of 
imprisonment. The Magistrate of the Northern division had attended inflictions of the 
punishment in order to observe the ‘immediate effect on the person of the convict, to guide 
my judgement when passing sentence’.67 However, he did not think it was necessary to 
always be present. The Magistrate of the Southern Calcutta police division concurred, and 
added in sentencing corporal punishment ‘common sense alone is my guide’.68 He argued 
that his functions were merely judicial: ‘the carrying out of my sentence lies with the 
executive police’.69 While both Magistrates clearly believed their personal discretion was 
relevant to the decision-making process they did not think it extended to the process of the 
punishment. Both men indicated that they thought it was the responsibility of a central 
department to ensure the police followed proper guidance.  
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V.H. Scalch, the Calcutta Commissioner of Police, disagreed and believed it was 
indeed the duty of the Magistrates to observe that the punishment was carried out correctly. 
Scalch did admit this was partly a practical requirement, as they did not have a permanent 
medical officer for the purpose, but most importantly he concluded that it was ‘the duty of a 
Magistrate to satisfy himself that the punishment he orders to be inflicted is a fit and proper 
punishment’.70 As was often the case in British India, provincial law often overlapped or even 
contradicted the central Government legislation. The Police Magistrates were compelled to 
follow corporal punishment practices as detailed in the Whipping Act.  
No officer inferior to the position of Subordinate-Magistrate of the 1
st
 first class could 
pass the sentence of whipping, unless specifically empowered to do so.
71
 As corporal 
punishment was considered essential to the everyday functioning of district administration it 
was a routine activity. Therefore, with the increasing Indianisation of the service, especially 
in the judicial branch, Indian officials were frequently empowered to award sentences of 
corporal punishment. In April 1896, Mr A. Forbes, the Commissioner of Patna, complained 
of the reluctance of Indian Magistrates in passing sentences of whipping. Forbes believed this 
unwillingness to inflict corporal punishment arose ‘partly from a feeling of not liking to 
inflict pain; but it is, I think, more often owing to the rule under which a sentence of 
whipping has to be carried out in the presence of the Magistrate who passes it.’72 
Squeamishness was considered a specifically Indian weakness. The fear of pain was one of 
the fundamental rationales behind the Whipping Act. This was the result of the widespread 
belief that Indians feared pain more than the average British criminal. It was for this reason 
that whipping was both an appropriate punishment and an effective deterrent.  
In his criticism of his Indian colleagues, Forbes was referring to a circular issued in 
January 1876. The new rule dictated that in instances where whipping was the sole 
punishment it should be inflicted immediately in the Magistrate’s office.73 This order aimed 
at avoiding incarceration overnight, as had become a habit in district administration. The 
offender was usually sent to the jail, and the corporal punishment was carried out the 
following day by the jail superintendent. However, this contradicted the representation of 
whipping as swift and fair justice, and involved unjust imprisonment. The circular enforced 
the original requirements of the Act by insisting on corporal punishment being overseen by 
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the Magistrate but it was also framed specifically with the appeal problem in mind. By 
ensuring that whipping was inflicted instantaneously an appeal could only ascertain the 
correctness of a sentence rather than prevent the punishment. This tightening of practice 
further bolstered the decision-making power of the judicial officer. It demonstrated the 
confidence of the Bengal Government in the district judges, and encouraged the use of 
corporal punishment as a means of practical on the spot justice.  
Forbes’ was frustrated at the reluctance of his Indian colleagues to embrace whipping 
as an effective punishment. He blamed the prevalence of juvenile and petty crime on Indian 
judicial officers’ habit of preferring sentences of imprisonment to whipping. His solution was 
to order all judicial officers in his division to corporally punish all offenders 21, thereby 
treating them as juveniles. This was in direct contravention of the law which defined a 
juvenile as a person under 16 years of age. Forbes’ orders revealed how significantly racist 
discourses regarding age, bodily pain and character had shaped his understanding of corporal 
punishment. He argued that whipping was the most suitable punishment for the precocious 
youths of India. Forbes’ belief that the corrective nature of pain was most useful when 
administered in early life was one shared by many of his contemporaries. Surgeon Lieutenant 
Colonel R. Maerae asserted ‘the trial under the village tree that one reads of and the flogging 
and releasing on the spot seems to me the ideal system for juveniles’.74 For Forbes corporal 
punishment was an effective deterrent and would act as a demonstration of force. He believed 
this was the best way of reducing petty crime in the locality.   
As Forbes and Maerae demonstrated, this belief in on the spot governance informed 
judiciary practice throughout the period. The use of corporal punishment was a powerful act 
of instantaneous law giving. Forbes was censured for encouraging Magistrates to ignore the 
provisions of the law and for attempting to interfere ‘with the discretion, vested in them by 
law’.75 Forbes’ efforts to circumvent the law were condemned but his recommendations were 
inspired by the belief in the autonomy of district justice. The appropriate exercise of this 
autonomy was central to maintaining the representation of corporal punishment as fair and 
swift justice. It is to the scope and impact of independent decision-making this chapter now 
turns.   
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‘I went to the spot myself’: The case of Mr Monro 
 
The British Indian Association consistently opposed the use of corporal violence and 
frequently drew attention to contentious cases.
76
 By effectively reporting scandals the 
Association exposed malpractice, and hinted at the potentially despotic nature of British rule. 
For example on the 29 April 1867, an article appeared in the Hindoo Patriot detailing an 
incident in Jessore. The Magistrate, Mr Monro had passed the maximum sentence of thirty 
stripes for the petty theft of an umbrella. This appeared to be a harsh sentence for a minor 
crime. Furthermore, the Association claimed the offender was a respectable member of the 
community.
77
 The punishment was inflicted as the case was being appealed and the 
Association lamented the futility of the appellate court in corporal punishment sentencing. 
Primarily the article condemned the use of the Whipping Act, arguing that it was not only a 
barbarous and unenlightened piece of legislation, but that it failed to either reduce the number 
of criminals or prevent jail overpopulation. The Association further claimed:  
 
the exercise of the power to inflict it is notoriously liable to abuse in the hands of 
capricious or violent Magistrates, and when it is once unjustly inflicted it is past 
all remedy, not to say that the chances for such abuses of power are the greater in 
the Mofussil where the Magistrates are not under the wholesome check of public 




For the Association, corporal punishment exemplified the abusive tendencies of the Raj. 
Justice could only be considered civilised if it was fair and in accordance with the law. This 
critique of district judicial discretion was emphasised by raising the issue of accountability. 
District officials in more remote regions enjoyed greater autonomy. They were supposedly 
the best examples of the idealised role and thus the most trustworthy. It was not in the 
interests of the British Government for the Association to imply that distance from the centre 
of control resulted in abuse and enabled maladministration. The autonomy of the district 
official was not meant to be freedom from consequences, but a bond of trust, an expression of 
confidence, and the liberty to act with benevolent discretion.   
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The Association’s accusations caught the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Bengal and the Governor-General of India. The Divisional Commissioner, R.B. Chapman, set 
about drawing up a report in order to clarify the situation.
79
 H.B. Lawford, the Sessions 
Judge, who oversaw the appeal case, stated that there was an ongoing problem with shoes and 
umbrellas being stolen in the Cutcherry. The offender, Rojoni Kanth Nandi, was accused of 
stealing an umbrella from a veranda near the district courthouses. Chapman concluded there 
was limited evidence on which a conviction could have been made, as there was no clear 
understanding as to which veranda the umbrella had been originally left on. The umbrella 
was found either beside or between two men, who claimed to have no knowledge of how it 
had come to be next to them.
80
  
The second issue raised by the Association and by the investigation was that Rojoni 
Kanth Nandi was a respectable individual. Monro did not inquire into his character or caste. 
Monro did not know the accused and failed to ascertain if he was a habitual offender.
81
 The 
use of corporal punishment was supposed to be proportionate to the crime, and to the 
offender. This proportionality was dependent on the proper exercise of judicial discretion. 
The man-on-the-spot justice conducted while on tour was an exercise in understanding the 
character of different caste groups and communities. This experience and knowledge was 
essential in the practice of the law. Codification still relied on the local experience of the 
district officer, and his ability to exercise his knowledge in the process of interpretation of 
and discretion. The belief that the Magistrate had the capacity to determine the nature of an 
offender’s character in the court room was demonstrative of the commitment to personal 
discretion in the judicial process.  
In his defence, Monro argued that apart from his failure to use his personal judgement 
he had followed proper procedure. Monro was accused of being too hasty, as the whipping 
took place shortly after the trial, and the appeal was too late to prevent the infliction of the 
punishment. The appeal process was considered necessary only to establish the facts of the 
case rather than remedy the punishment. On this basis Lawford had to withdraw his 
accusation of undue haste. Nandi had been taken to the Civil Surgeon and deemed fit to 
undergo the punishment. The infliction was observed by a medical officer, Monro and the 
Joint-Magistrate. Monro stated ‘the prisoner fell into no swoon but continued to make 
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outcries during the infliction of the sentence; no part of his punishment was remitted by me, 
and he walked away from the triangles without assistance.’82 Monro also claimed he was 
unaware of the appeal until after his court had finished business for the day. He was notified 
the appeal was in process during a cricket match. Monro also insisted that he had evaluated 
the evidence correctly. He wrote: 
 
I made the witnesses shew in action the facts which they related. I went to the spot 
myself and there made the witnesses go through the scene which they described, 
saw the position of the accused, his mat and the umbrella, and I came to the 




Monro’s defence centred on his practice of man-on-the-spot justice. Monro insisted on his 
personal experience and capacity as a Magistrate. He believed he was best equipped to 
understand and judge the case. Chapman supported him, and argued ‘the Officer who tries a 
case and has opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and prisoners, is likely to 
form a much more satisfactory judgment upon it than any Appellate Court, or than any 
authority criticising his proceedings’.84 Monro’s personal judgement was privileged over the 
opinions of senior officials, and the correct functioning of the law. He was able to defend his 
actions by demonstrating he had followed the practice established by the idealised role of the 
judicial officer.  
It was Monro’s reputation as a district officer which cleared him from any wrong 
doing. Monro was described by Champan, and the Lieutenant-Governor as a man of excellent 
character, hardworking and useful. The Lieutenant-Governor acknowledged, and emphasised, 
that Monro had committed a very serious and lamentable error. However, he concluded that it 
was not ‘incumbent on the Government to visit, nor, in a general view, even politic that the 
government should visit such an officer for a single error with the extreme punishment of 
degradation from an office which he fills with great efficiency’.85 Monro’s actions were 
interpreted according to the potential they had to damage Monro personally, as well as his 
official role and public order more generally. The reputation of the district officer, and the 
Government, was more important than the impact of the mistake on Nandi. While Monro’s 
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decision resulted in a severe and unjust punishment, he had mostly followed the agreed 
practice and procedure. Monro was given the benefit of the doubt, his reputation as a district 
officer of merit and standing was too valuable. His misinterpretation of the function of the 
Whipping Act was forgiven, because overall his capacity and judgement were trusted. It was 
this commitment to the judiciary that continued to shape the operation of the Whipping Act. 
‘A flogged back and an empty stomach’: Famine, Corporal Punishment and the District 
Officer 
 
The trust in the judicial discretion at the district level was truly tested during the famines of 
the 1870s and 1880s.
86
 This period of crisis only hardened the commitment to man-on-the-
spot justice. On 28 June 1880, Mr T.C. Thompson put a question to the house regarding the 
offences behind the 72,650 floggings inflicted in 1877.
87
 Thompson requested further 
information about the nature of the crimes which had caused such a substantial increase in the 
use of corporal punishment. Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, explained that 
‘owing to distress among the people, petty crimes increased greatly, and the magistrates 
exercised largely their discretionary power of inflicting whipping instead of fine and 
imprisonment.’88 Hartington justified the increase in corporal punishment by portraying it as 
a decision made on the ground by the best informed members of the Government. This 
answer publicly delegated the decision-making processes onto the district officers, as a result 
the India Office could deflect challenges in Westminster, and at the same time bolster the 
position of local administration in India.  
Famine and whipping controversies were bedfellows throughout the nineteenth century. 
Although the Great Famine of the late 1870s was primarily restricted to the Madras 
Presidency, famines in Bengal and Bihar preceded and followed it.
89
 It was during the early 
1880s that Parliament’s attention was most consistently occupied by the whipping issue. In 
response to the determined MPs repeatedly lobbying about the whipping question, Hartington 
explained that whipping was preferable compared to fines or imprisonment, as these took the 
breadwinner away from the home. As well as keeping the main earner out of prison, 
whipping saved the offender from the demoralising effects of prison life and avoided injury 
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 Corporal punishment was represented as a benevolent and civilised act, a means of 
preventing further distress and asserting the rule of law. This same defence was repeated by 
the Secretaries of State for India throughout the period.
91
 The India Office consistently 
argued that the use of corporal punishment was best judged by the men on the ground. The 
Westminster debates about whipping in British India, despite statistical evidence and moral 
challenges, were consistently defeated on the grounds of the specificity of the Indian 
circumstances and the trust in the district judicial officers.  
The confidence of these arguments was rooted in the success stories of established 
practice. In 1866, W.J. Herschel, Magistrate of Midnapore, took advantage of the clause in 
the Whipping Act which enabled the temporary use of corporal punishment to maintain law 
and order in an unstable territory. Herschel reported to the Commissioner of the Burdwan 
division that the results had been most satisfactory. Herschel dismissed the naysayers who 
had claimed a whipping was a mere ‘let off’ for dacoities or grain rioters.92  Herschel asserted 
that critics had not enjoyed the advantage of witnessing the effects of corporal punishment. 
Even the hardened criminal tribes of the Sonthals and the Koormees had been successfully 
deterred. Herschel elaborated: 
 
A flogged back and an empty stomach are much more dreaded by the strong able 
bodied, but hungry men, who mostly commit these crimes, than good food and 
loss of liberty; and now that prices are falling to a reasonable level again, the 
punishment of imprisonment will have the greater terrors.
93
   
 
Herschel’s argument demonstrates that racialised understandings of the body justified the use 
of corporal punishment. His characterisation of the tribal Sonthal and Koormee people as 
hardened and less likely to be affected by corporal punishment was typical of the period.
94
 
For Herschel whipping was the most effective means of maintaining law and order, especially 
during moments of crisis or food scarcity. According to Herschel prison life was appealing 
due to the provision of good food. Yet, in the 1880s, MP Frank O’Donnell consistently raised 
the issue of diet scaling. This was a standard prison punishment which involved restricting 
access to food. Flogging was also used as a prison punishment, and the two could be 
                                                 
90
 NAI, Home, Judicial June 1905, No 243–246, 23rd March 1882, Hartington Secretary of State.  
91
 Earl of Kimberly, HL Deb 06 July 1883 vol 281 cc581-5 581 and HC Deb 28 April 1890 vol 343 cc1515-6 
1515. St John Brodrick, HC Deb 28 April 1908 vol 187 cc1083-4 1083. 
92









 This commitment to the belief that criminals were seeking an easy 
prison sentence continued to justify the use of whipping during famine. District officers 
argued that corporal punishment acted as a deterrent, it discouraged petty crime by being a 
painful experience and by removing access to the supposed comforts of prison. The 
successful use of whipping in Midnapore, and similar contexts, influenced the policy during 
the famines of the later nineteenth century.  
Eventually, the India Office’s justifications regarding the famine and corporal 
punishment issues were seen as inconsistent with the practice of benevolent government. 
Shortly after the Secretary’s response to Mr T.C. Thompson, Mr A. Sullivan queried 
‘whether people in an emaciated condition were considered fit subjects for flogging’.96 This 
image of violence and poverty began to challenge the idealisation of district administration as 
men on the ground sympathetic with the people. The attention the issue received in the 
Commons demanded at the very least recognition of the significant increase in the use of 
corporal punishment. On the 20 July 1880, Sir Ashley Eden, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 
issued orders instructing the judiciary to review the awarding of sentences of whipping and 
ordered an enquiry into the use of corporal punishment in prisons.
97
 Eden desired to 
discourage the overreliance on, and habitual use of, corporal punishment. In addition to this 
appeal for restraint, in March 1882 the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure called for the 
abolition of the cat o’ nine tails.98 The rattan was to be the only instrument used going 
forwards, but the maximum infliction of stripes remained at 30. Eden’s reaction and the 
subsequent shifts in attitude, and policy were necessary in order to avoid contradicting the 
allegedly civilised nature of the rule of law. However, these changes ultimately had limited 
impact on the discretionary powers of the district officer. By continually emphasising the 
specificity of the famine environment the judiciary were protected from the reaches of drastic 
reform. Eden’s circular encouraged the greater application of discretion and experience, 
casting the solution not in legislation, but in the trust and responsibility given to the judicial 
officer. Despite legislative changes and Eden’s appeal for leniency the issue continued to 
haunt Westminster.  
In 1883, Lord Truro read out to the House of Lords a list of offences which had been 
punished by whipping in British India. They were all petty crimes, involving the theft of 
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small and inexpensive objects. The majority were punished severely with sentences of 20 
stripes or even in once instance 50 lashes. Truro’s list included the case of a 12 year old boy 
who received 12 strokes for stealing a bottle of eau de cologne.
99
 For Truro, these acts 
represented grave misconduct and threatened the integrity of the Empire. However, he 
received the same rehearsed response from the Secretary of State, Lord Kimberly. Kimberly 
explained that when local Governments had been asked about the use of corporal punishment 
they returned a unanimous reply, and asserted:  
 
the propriety and necessity of retaining whipping as a form of punishment. The 
inhabitants of India had always been familiar with that form of punishment, and in 
the opinion of the Indian Government the advances made by the people in 





The condemnation of corporal punishment at Westminster was consistently bypassed by 
responses based on the collective voice of the district officials. The issue did not disappear 
and it remained an awkward and contradictory narrative. By framing the problem as 
specifically Indian, the British Government cast itself as the benevolent guiding hand, 
cultivating the subject race into the capacity to experience a liberal legal system. This 
representation reimagined whipping as necessary in the process of civilisation. The belief that 
India was not ready for a justice system free of corporal punishment was intimately tied to the 
principle of tutelage that informed the racial discourses of the period. The characterisation of 
whipping as an appropriate punishment for uncivilised people was contingent upon the 
representation of Indians as childlike.  
‘The supposed difficulty of ascertaining a boy’s age’: The Age Debate 
 
Whipping in India was justified by the necessary authority of the district officer and childlike 
status of the colonised subjects. As W. Stokes asserted ‘I cannot help thinking that whipping 
is an excellent kind of punishment for people who, like the natives of India, are in many 
respects like children’.101 C. Bernard, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India 
concurred, and added ‘I should expect that a revision of the Flogging Act would stir up a 
good deal of agitation, in which many excellent (though perhaps misguided) people both in 
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India and in England would take part’.102 Bernard’s claim that misguided people would be 
influenced by foolish sentiment was the basis for the constant dismissal of the whipping 
question in Whitehall.
103
 Bernard and others could recognise the moral incentive behind the 
desire to reform corporal punishment, but they believed it was misplaced as India was not 
ready for modern liberal government. During attempts to reform the Whipping Act the 
district officer frequently emerged as the trusted arbiter of the rule of law. The Raj was the 
stern father ready to admonish and improve the erring Indian child. It is the fundamental 
tension between the juvenile criminal and the childlike race that this chapter now considers. 
In 1894, several amendments were proposed to the Whipping Act on the basis that 
certain terms were too vague and offered a range of interpretations. This was symptomatic of 
the increasing codification of policy and practice of the late nineteenth-century. Central to the 
debate was the definition of the term juvenile. These discussions focused on the role of the 
Magistrate in determining the age of the offender. The existing clause stated that juveniles 
who committed any offence not punishable by death could be awarded a sentence of corporal 
punishment in lieu of any other punishment.
104
 It was proposed to add an explanatory clause 
to the Act in order to fully define the meaning of the term juvenile.  
This debate focused primarily on the ability of a judicial officer to determine the age of 
an offender based on his experience. Existing practice dictated that the decision lay with the 
court, and specifically with the presiding Judge or Magistrate. It was generally agreed that 16 
years of age marked the transition from childhood to adult life in British India. J. Knox-
Wright, Additional and Sessions Judge 24 Parganas, saw no problem with the existing clause. 
Knox-Wright argued that as the decision lay with the Court it did not matter whether or not a 
doctor was able to determine the exact age of the offender.
105
 Medical opinion was not 
necessarily required as the judicial officer was trusted to be experienced and knowledgeable 
enough to determine the age of an offender. There was a prevailing opinion that age could not 
be solely determined by medical assessment. Age was contingent on other factors which a 
doctor could not take into account.  
F.H. Harding, District Judge of Mymensing, suggested that if the decision regarding the 
age of the offender was challenged the opinion of a more senior Sessions Judge could 
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determine whether or not the individual was a juvenile.
106
 Similarly to Knox-Wright, Harding 
was more willing to privilege the opinion of senior district officials rather than rely on 
medical tests. An amendment was agreed upon which clarified that the final decision lay with 
the Court: ‘In this section the expression “juvenile offender” means an offender who in the 
opinion of the Court is under sixteen years of age, the decision of the Court on such matter 
being final and conclusive’.107 The Lieutenant-Governor supported this outcome by quoting 
C.A. Wilkins, District Judge of the 24 Parganas. Wilkins claimed ‘manifestly strict proof of 
the fact should be unnecessary; for, if whipping is the proper punishment for an offender 
whose age is just below 16, it would also be the proper punishment for an offender who has 
passed that age by a few days or months’.108 Adulthood was not a fixed concept or achieved 
after a definitive period of time. The age of an Indian was subjective and only validated by 
the opinion of a British judicial officer.  It was for the Judge to decide when an Indian had 
achieved maturity.  
This debate continued and remerged during the subsequent revision of the Whipping 
Act in 1899 and 1900. This discussion demonstrated that the British found the concept of 
childhood a difficult issue in India. The British Government in India faced the same problem 
regarding imprisonment. As Sen has demonstrated the Indian reformatory movement was 
offered as a potential solution to the problem of juvenile corporal punishment.
109
 The Indian 
reformatory was developed as both punitive and reforming, as it separated the child from the 
criminal influence at home, and avoided the hardening effects of an adult prison. Sen’s 
argument frames flogging as the preferred alternative, after reformatories were deemed 
expensive and impractical. In theory, corporal punishment simultaneously corrected both 
hardened criminals who only recognised violence, and petty, or first time, offenders who 
would be swiftly reprimanded, and discouraged from the criminal life. Metropolitan 
commentators, and colonial officials, constantly disagreed over which class of criminals 
belonged to which set, and juveniles added a further dimension to this debate. The need for 
preventative measures was even greater in children, but the children of criminal tribes and 
other low caste groups were considered hardwired towards a life of crime, and therefore most 
deserving of corporal punishment.  
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Many argued, especially in the context of children, a sentence of whipping would avoid 
the degradation of prison, and act as a swift, but fair corrective. E.P. Chapman, Registrar of 
the High Court, expressed the popular view that prison had a significant, sometimes 
irreparable, contaminating influence on juveniles and corporal punishment had a chastising 
but not a humiliating effect.
110
 However, while many agreed that a quick reprimand in the 
form of corporal punishment was preferable to the impact of a prison sentence, the issue of 
age once again caused controversy. A presiding school of thought believed there was an 
alternative progression to adulthood in India. This perception stemmed from the British 
interpretation of various cultural practices. The Hon’ble justice Rees argued:   
 
it may happen that the whipped boy is a married man – at such an early age do 
striplings in this country take upon themselves the pains and pleasures of 
manhood. The higher caste, the earlier the marriage – and the less suitable 




To subject a respectable high caste 15 year old to a caning was not ideal and had the potential 
to sour the feeling in the district. Although Indian juveniles achieved social, cultural and even 
economic maturity at an earlier age than their British counterparts, they were still considered 
childlike. Cultural practices, like child marriage, were considered further proof of the 
backward and uncivilised nature of Indian society. Denzil Ibbetson believed that a boy who 
physically resembled a 16 year old must have the same mental capacity.
112
 For Ibbetson, and 
others, if a juvenile resembled an adult in his social position, physique and acts then he 
should be treated like an adult. The British were conscious of balancing recognition of the 
achievement of adulthood, in the context of Indian society, while remaining committed to the 
improving effects of corporal punishment.  
This issue was brought to the fore in 1899. An amendment was proposed which would 
bring local and special laws under the cognisance of the Whipping Act. These local and 
special laws ranged from Railway regulations to Forestry rules. The proposal suggested that 
corporal punishment could be awarded to any juvenile breaking a local or special law. This 
amendment would offer district officers greater discretionary powers. District judicial 
officers would have the ability to shape the rule of law to fit their experience and locality. 
Again, the fear of abuse in the hands of overzealous Magistrates was discussed. F.J. 
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Monahan, Chief Commissioner of Assam, gave the following example ‘a Magistrate, who 
saw children playing with fire-works on the highway, caused them to be locked up for the 
night, convicted them himself, on his evidence the next day, and then inflicted corporal 
punishment on them with his own hands.’113 This act of on the spot justice took the idea of 
paternalistic punishment too far. The policy amendment was not designed to give the judicial 
officer free reign but rather allow him to determine which local and special laws should be 
included as whipping offences.  
Those who were not in favour of the inclusion of local and special laws drew attention 
to offences which would be incompatible with corporal punishment. Mr Rees raised the 
possibility of a young farmer keeping a gun to ward off tigers and failing to renew his 
license.
114
 Whipping would be most unsuitable as a punishment for this kind of infraction.
115
 
Critics believed that by allowing whipping to be used as a punishment for nearly all juvenile 
crimes, it would take the meaning out of the punishment. It would act less as a deterrent, and 
seem more of an inevitable consequence of any wrong doing. The most significant contention 
over the extension of the whipping to local and special laws was that it was a passive rule. 
The responsibility to decide which local and special laws were deserving of corporal 
punishment remained in the hands of the district officers. It required the local officers to 
highlight the specific instances where whipping would be severe or inappropriate. The issue 
with this passive enactment was that any abuse of corporal punishment would only be 
revealed after the fact. These exceptions would not be exposed unless the local Government 
actively intervened, and the Act would ‘continue to operate in cases where its application 
may ultimately be found to be improper’.116 Woodroffe had limited faith in the discretion of 
his colleagues, and he believed they were inclined to error if left without strict guidance. He 
stated that many Judges and Magistrates lacked common sense, and punished ‘without rhyme 
or reason, ignorantly and sometimes even improperly? Is it advisable to permit them to 
wander without a guide amidst this maze of “other laws”’.117 
Woodroffe concerns reflected general anxieties regarding the autonomy of the 
judiciary. This desire to codify and guide the Magistrate was symptomatic of the power he 
was perceived to possess. The amendment to extend the powers of the Whipping Act to 
special and local laws passed. This turn-of-the-century legislation embodied the contradictory 
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tensions of British Indian governance, as through further codification they upheld the 
autonomy of the district official. Just as with determining the age and social position of an 
offender Magistrates were trusted to discern which local and special laws were suitable for 
corporal punishment. The local and special laws amendment trusted in the expertise and 
discretion of the district officer. Furthermore, it expanded his decision-making powers. While 
the amendment regarding special and local laws had clarified the legislation, the method of 
infliction was still under debate. Ibbetson claimed he could not:  
 
understand the assertion that a moderate whipping, inflicted upon a young lad 
under proper conditions, must necessarily harden and degrade him. It would not 
do so if inflicted by his father, or by his schoolmaster: and I fail to see why it 




By representing the whipping of juveniles as the act of a paternalistic official the Government 
of British India avoided accusations of over-dependence on corporal punishment in the legal 
system. Comparing this punishment to the improving chastisements of a teacher or parent 
rendered it more palatable and relatable.
119
 However, even if it had been established that the 
offender met the definitions of juvenile and that whipping was an appropriate punishment, 
there were further decisions to be made about how the punishment should be carried out.  
‘The most degrading form of punishment’: Juveniles and the Whipping Act 
 
On the 18 June 1893 Deputy-Magistrate Opendra Chandra Mazundar gave Durga Chan 
Nandi 26 strokes with a rattan on the palms of his hands.
120
 Throughout the case Nandi’s age 
remained an issue, and the court was unsure whether he was a juvenile or not. He was given a 
good character reference by one witness, but he was accused of being a licentious drunkard 
by another. The Commissioner of the Division, J. Luttman-Johnson censured Mazundar and 
stated that the strokes should have been inflicted on the buttocks. By striking the hands the 
punishment rendered the boy disabled and unable to pursue his work.
121
 This incident sparked 
a debate in the Legislative Council. The members focused the discussion on the term school 
discipline, which referred to the punishment of juveniles in clause X of the Whipping Act. In 
theory, the term distinguished an effective reprimand from an unnecessarily cruel or injurious 
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act. It also encouraged judicial officers to interpret the awarding of a whipping sentence in 
the same context as school discipline. In practice, officers were being likened to teachers and 
parents.
122
 Drawing on their own experiences the Legislative Council members debated what 
school discipline entailed:  
 
If when a small boy at a private school, I got twenty cuts on the hand before 
breakfast at 8.45am, I had to do my work in the school room from 9am to 12 noon 
immediately afterwards. My first headmaster, however, used a cane (hard enough) 




One member of the Legislative Council claimed the skin on his left hand was thicker than 
that of the right due to the ‘pandyings’ he had received at school.124 British officials 
frequently referenced their own experiences of childhood corporal punishment when 
discussing the law and practice in India. Mr Woodroffe argued that Indian opinion had to be 
recognised and reflected in the propriety of the punishment. He explained that ‘the disgrace 
attendant upon a whipping in this country is not looked upon in the light of a tunding at 
Winchester or similar punishment at our public schools.’125 When summarising the operation 
of the act in a memo to the Secretary of State, W. Macpherson referred to what was probably 
a shared experience of corporal punishment amongst the Civil Service: ‘I do not know 
whether you know the swishing broom at Eton – kept in the cupboard … as formidable as 
anything used in our own prisons on natives of India’.126 Despite the fears expressed 
regarding a lack of esprit des corps, the competition generations still had enough shared 
experiences in one area to shape a common opinion. These personal memories meant 
corporal punishment was framed according to racist understandings of the Indian body and 
character. In the Nandi case, the Legislative Council condemned Mazumdar’s practice of 
securing the arms of the offender. In comparing the sentencing of an Indian criminal and the 
experience of a British schoolboy one law member recalled: ‘my arm used not to be held. I 
suppose it is not the fashion for the juvenile native of India to take his caning, as a matter of 
honour, without flinching’.127 This belief that Indian children were unable to endure the pain 
of corporal punishment, compared to the character building effects it had on the British 
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constitution, shaped attitudes towards policy and practice. Mazumdar was reprimanded for 
inflicting the punishment on the hands of the offender, and the general opinion was that the 
thighs or buttocks were preferable sites in the administering of the whipping, as was the 
tradition in British public schools.  
Beatings were a routine aspect of British Victorian childhoods especially amongst the 
boys of the middle and upper classes.
128
 The corrective nature of bodily punishment was 
widely accepted and advocated. Lord Curzon, later Viceroy of India, wrote about his own 
experiences of physical punishment at the hands of a particularly sadistic Nanny: 
 
She spanked us with the sole of her slipper on the bare back [read bottom], beat us 
with her brushes, tied us for long hours to chairs in uncomfortable positions with 





Winston Churchill had a harrowing experience at his preparatory school, St George’s Ascot. 
He recalled witnessing classmates being dragged off into a room ‘and there flogged until they 
bled freely, while the rest sat quaking’.130 The birch rod at Eton, mentioned by Macpherson, 
measured 4ft in length.
131
 For some the memory of childhood chastisement encouraged 
compassion. F.A. Robinson a Judge in the Chief Court of the Punjab believed that thirty 
stripes of a rattan on a boy’s thighs would cause grievous injury.132 For the majority these 
personal experiences appeared to have reinforced the commitment to juvenile judicial 
flogging in India. In 1894, after the Legislative Council had discussed the relative meanings 
of school discipline, the Lieutenant-Governor decided the definition should remain in the 
power of the court rather ‘than impose on Government the responsibility of framing general 
rules’.133 The Government of Bengal did not want to enact prescriptive legislation, and felt 
the on the spot decision was the better method. The mode of inflicting corporal punishment 
on a juvenile was then, a truly personal decision.  
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‘Make the provisions of the law more explicit’: Whipping as the instrument of the Rule of 
Law 
 
The debate regarding the term juvenile was part of a broader re-examination of the Whipping 
Act in 1894.
134
 Several amendments were proposed on the basis that certain phrases in the 
Act were too vague and offered a range of interpretations. These calls for reform 
encapsulated the tension between the desire for clarity and the expansion of codification. The 
explicit mapping out of the law clarified the decision-making process, and acted as a means 
of legitimising policy and practice. However, there were concerns that by demanding exact 
meanings and definitions from the law, the process of autonomous interpretation could 
become circumscribed. The discussions surrounding the Whipping Act reforms revealed the 
space between codification and autonomy in the rule of law.  
During the debate leading up to the 1894 reforms, district officials complained that they 
could not inflict whipping on adult offenders who had committed a similar but not identical 
crime on the second offence. One reforming lobby wanted the capacity to award corporal 
punishment on second offences for similar crimes, but Macaulay’s code had rigidly divided 
offences into component parts, and varying types. Henry Cotton explained that if a man was 
convicted of theft as a clerk (section 380 or 381 IPC) he could not be punished with whipping 
in addition to any other penalty if he had previously been convicted of simple theft only 
(section 379 IPC). Cotton, on behalf of the Bengal Government, argued ‘it is very desirable 
that this anomaly should be removed; but the proposed amendment goes very much further 
than this.’135 While the Government recognised that the existing act was restrictive it did not 
want to give complete free reign to the judiciary.  
This was an anxiety shared by several district officers. W.H. Grimley, Commissioner 
of Chota Nagpur, was concerned that although a second offence may be similar to the first, it 
may be a minor offence and therefore whipping would be too severe a punishment.
136
 The 
limits and boundaries of similar offences needed to be clearer. Some district officers felt 
disabled by the inflexibility of the existing definitions. Mr Bompas, Magistrate of Puri and 
Balasore, wanted the Whipping Act to function more effectively as a deterrent, with an 
increase in the severity of the punishment proportionate to the crime: ‘it is even more 
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desirable, for the more complicated nature of the subsequent crime tends to show an increase 
in criminality.’137 This desire to fit the punishment to the crime, rather than base the sentence 
on the quantity of crimes was shared by other district officers. R. McCleod was convinced 
that the criminal classes might take advantage of the second offence loophole. McCleod 
suggested that criminals would commit a serious or violent first offence and a minor second 
offence in order to avoid the lash.
138
 The logic and experience of district officers was utilised 
in this debate to point out the flaws in the potentially restrictive legislation.  
W.H. Page, Sessions Judge at Tirhut, was staunchly opposed to the amendment. Page 
argued that whipping was already used excessively as a punishment.
139
 Page claimed 
Magistrates were under the impression that superior courts would not approve of any other 
sentencing. This reflected Cotton claims that severity in sentencing was encouraged. Also, 
Magistrates did not want to see their decisions overturned, and sentences of corporal 
punishment avoided that eventuality. Like Grimley, Page suspected that minor second 
offences would receive harsh whipping sentences which would not reflect the nature of the 
crime. Therefore, he proposed a clear defined list of cognate offences. Page concluded: 
‘ignorant, perverse and unscrupulous Magistrates are apt to disregard the intention of the 
Legislators, and I should object to any changes in the law which made this easier’.140 Page 
suspected that widening the scope, and meaning, of second offences, would leave the Act 
open to abuse. A.E. Staley, district Judge of Backergunge, was concerned that the amendment 
phrasing was too general, as it failed to define what constituted a minor offence.
141
  
Autonomy of interpretation formed the central tension in this discussion. District 
officers appeared to either need greater clarification as to how to apply the legislation, or 
were concerned that too much independence of action would have negative consequences. 
The Government resolved the issue by following Page’s suggestion and grouped the offences 
into categories of similar crimes.
142
 This solution provided the guidance requested, but also 
recognised the ability of the official to identify similar crimes and exercise appropriate 
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discretion in the awarding of sentences. This debate revealed that while the discretion of the 
Magistrate was paramount, it was increasingly exercised within set parameters. The 1894 
reforms of the Whipping Act demonstrated that expanding codification in British India did 
not necessarily curb autonomy, frequently it merely further defined it.  
The decisions to extend the discretionary powers of district officials were a vindication 
of the man-on-the-spot made law, and a distinct rejection of Macaulay. In 1899, encouraged 
by the autonomous powers granted to the district judiciary, it was suggested that rioting with 
a deadly weapon should be added to the list of offences punishable with whipping.
143
 It is 
unsurprising that this clause was proposed at a time of increasing nationalism, protest and the 
accompanying violence.
144
 As with the challenges of famine, it was the idealised judicial 
district officer who maintained order and shaped policy.  
At the turn of the twentieth-century, the pressure from anti-imperial and nationalist 
groups encouraged the Government to extend the scope and power of corporal punishment. 
Similar to the use of whipping in frontier regions, this expansion of the Act was intended to 
establish law and order in an unstable environment. It was the district officer, as 
representative and enforcer of Government, who could utilise the spectacle of corporal 
punishment to discourage resistance. J. Sanders Slater, Chief Presidency Magistrate at 
Bombay, recalled how effective he believed a sentence of whipping on a juvenile rioter had 
been. The punishment was carried out in the court, in front of Sanders Slater and:  
 
in the presence of a considerable number of the class of people who were attracted 
to the Court by the trial – probably including many sympathisers with the rioters, 
if not actual, but undetected rioters – and I feel confident that the punishment so 




Sanders Slater’s awareness of the symbolic impact of the punishment of whipping acts as an 
awkward reminder of the brutality of the spectacle. This was the ideal enactment of on the 
spot justice in full sight of the intended audience. Corporal punishment when administered 
this way was a demonstration of power, and it acted as a warning, this was the consequence 
for resisting the rule of law.  
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However, it was the opposition of the Bengal district officers which prevented rioting 
with a weapon being added to the list of punishable offences. A. Porteous, Deputy-
Commissioner of Sylhet, argued that such an amendment was only relevant to urban rioting. 
Porteous explained that by including it in the Whipping Act, routine disputes of local 
landholders would be subjected to an inappropriate and harsh punishment. Porteous explained 
that it was normal amongst the agriculturalists of his division to carry a lathi, fish spear or 
other implement that could technically be considered a weapon. He was keen to emphasise 
the difference between hired lathials and rural disagreements. Porteous argued ‘it is difficult 
to conceive how any one with the smallest judicial experience of mufassil rioting cases could 
soberly suggest whipping as a “suitable” form of punishment’.146 Echoing the concerns 
regarding the inappropriate whipping of high caste juveniles, Porteous warned the 
Government that bringing rural disputes under the cognisance of the Whipping Act could 
threaten the stability of many collaborative relationships. This was a view supported by the 
Government of the NWP, Sir Anthony McDonnell insisted that whipping as a punishment for 
rural rioting would alienate the cultivators, and the zemindari class from the Government.
147
 
The resounding message was that it would be an insult to the landowning classes to, by 
corporal punishment, group them with hardened criminals and rapists. Local officers like 
Porteous were communicating to the central Government that they knew when a legislative 
change could damage the rule of law, and the Government listened. The amendment failed. 
The failure of the amendment was a validation of the reliable knowledge and discretion of the 
local officers.  
Conclusion 
 
In 1910, Henry Cotton, as a representative of the Humanitarian League, sent a pamphlet to 
the India Office. He stated: 
 
nothing is commoner in India than for the higher authorities to encourage 
whipping as a punishment. This is occasionally done in published reports and 
resolutions, and district officers frequently enjoin the practice on their 
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subordinates. A subordinate magistrate who refrains from sentences of whipping 




Cotton explained that the punishment of whipping was perceived as a tangible exercise of 
power. Any reluctance towards corporal punishment was routinely interpreted as weakness 
rather than compassion. It was a demonstration of the capacity of the judicial officer to 
enforce the rule of law and confirm not only his authority but his innate ability to understand 
and determine the appropriate use of violence. The debate surrounding the Whipping Act 
provides a crucial perspective on the role of the district Magistrate, the rule of law, and the 
systematic violence of colonialism.  
The Whipping Act became the site of discussions focused on autonomy, interpretation, 
violence, justice and the rule of law. This legislation and the efforts to shape it reflected the 
attitudes towards governance in nineteenth-century British India. The district officer emerged 
from these debates as a man-on-the-spot, dispensing justice in order to maintain the rule of 
law and develop civilisation. The Government in British India overcame the paradox of 
violence by integrating the language of reform into the logic of corporal punishment. By 
arguing that corporal punishment had a corrective function, especially in the context of 
juveniles, the representation of the benevolent district official was strengthened even in the 
face of criticisms. The opinions of district officers were privileged in these debates and their 
claims to experience, knowledge, and responsibility enhanced their position and influence. 
The conceptualisation of the judicial officer as a paternalistic figure who was best placed to 
understand the function of the law served as a platform from which district officials were able 
to shape policy and legislation. This ability to mobilise an idealised representation, in order to 
further benefit the district officer, was a demonstration of the power of the role and the 
support and confidence of the Government in the district official. However, this confidence 
was frequently tested by those district officers who failed to live up to the idealised role.
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Chapter Five ‘Ignorance of law excuseth no man’: Incompetence, debt, corruption and the 
District Officer  
 
In his 1876 history of the district of Backergunge, Henry Beveridge stated that it had ‘been 
from the earliest time what a friend of mine once called it, “the dustbin of Bengal”, and that 
no officer was sent to it except as a punishment, or because he was not thought good enough 
for a better district’.1 The civil servants of Backergunge were often incompetent, inefficient, 
and in a few instances corrupt. They usually had a career history of mistakes and ineptitude 
in the Dacca or Chittagong divisions. These were the men who had failed to live up to the 
idealised role.  
This chapter addresses the absence of misconduct and incompetence in accounts of 
nineteenth-century British Indian Government. Through a better understanding of the failings 
of the ICS this chapter argues that the Government of India and the ICS were not 
characterised by stability and coherence.  By exploring the policies regarding official 
conduct, this chapter reveals the enduring but anxious commitment to the idealised district 
officer. The regulations regarding incompetence, debt and dismissal helped to define the 
boundaries of the model district official. Furthermore, the idealised persona shaped, and 
dictated. the nature, impact, and meaning of transgressions. Policy concerning official 
behaviour gradually transitioned from an effort to preserve the good character of the district 
officer, to a more rigid insistence on professional conduct. 
The increasing emphasis on professionalism at the end of the nineteenth century 
exposed the conflict between the desire for an independent decision maker and the fears 
about the impact of unregulated autonomy. The escalating desire to codify and regulate this 
persona exposed the intentions and ambitions of the official mind. This man-on-the-spot was 
trapped between the vision of independent and personal rule, and a new modern bureaucratic 
and scientific government. This chapter first explores the historiography regarding 
incompetence and misconduct in British India. This is followed by an analysis of the role of 
the conduct manuals and governing literature. This chapter then explores the problematic 
relationship between the private and public life of the district officer. This tension between 
public and private persona is further examined through a discussion of indebtedness in the 
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ICS. This is followed by an account of working practices, first through a discussion of 
management and office conduct, and, second, by an exploration of judicial incompetence. By 
investigating the development of more rigorous rules regarding communication and public 
image, this chapter charts an increasingly anxious ICS, and a more strictly regulated idealised 
district officer. Finally, this chapter examines the rarely utilised procedures for dismissal. 
The characteristics and limits of the anxious and contradictory district officer were tested and 
occasionally compromised by human error. It was through these moments of failure, that the 
persona of the district official was contested, re-imagined and reconstructed. 
 ‘Exceptions, complications and inconsistencies’: The historiography of corruption, 
incompetence and debt 
 
Clive Dewey argues that punishment posts like Backergunge were necessary because ‘unless 
they committed serious breaches of discipline, Civilians were virtually unsackable’.2 The 
systematic reluctance to dismiss civil servants has received limited attention in the historical 
accounts of the ICS.
3
 Rendered either a romanticised elite or a modern bureaucratic force, the 
ICS has escaped the scrutiny which has been focused on the early Company period. This 
chapter also demonstrates that the tensions which emerged in the early twentieth century 
were not merely a response to the threat of nationalism, but the product of historic concerns 
about the management of the ICS.
4
 As William Gould argues ‘the public and private 
activities of the “public servant” have perhaps been avoided as outdated relics of an older 
historiography’.5 The absence of misconduct in the historical narrative has obscured the 
complex and contradictory nature of the Raj. The idealised district officer provides a crucial 
perspective on the anxious governance of British India, as his ‘professional conduct formed 
part of a national project’.6  
There has been considerable discussion of the excesses of the EIC during the 
eighteenth century.
7
 Nicholas Dirks argues that the Asiatic corruption of the early Company 
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period resulted in a legacy of scandal. The perceived threatening influence of the EIC in 
Whitehall, and the immoral conduct of the Government of India, left an enduring impression 
in the British political consciousness.
8
 The extravagance of the Nabobs had to be rectified 
through the moral civilising mission of the early nineteenth century.
9
 As a result of the 
conscious rebranding of British India in the 1830s, scandal transitioned to ‘a feature of 
generic Indian custom rather than personal English excess’.10 There was a conscious 
distancing from Company extravagance throughout the nineteenth century, as the Conclusion 
of this thesis will discuss.
11
 A significant part of this moral and civilsing work was correcting 
the previously blurred racial and cultural boundaries, specifically around the problems of 
inter-racial relationships.
12
   
The scandal of sexual encounters has dominated the historical account of early colonial 
India. Ann Laura Stoler argued that sex was a marker of colonial dominance and that 
categories of coloniser and colonised were frequently secured through sexual control.
13
 As a 
result of Stoler’s conclusions, there has been considerable historical attention on the role of 
inter-racial relationships in social and political life in British India.
14
 Durba Ghosh 
successfully challenged the existing narrative that mixed race relationships were accepted 
until the arrival of British women in the early to mid-nineteenth century.
15
 However, Ghosh 
does establish that these relationships, and especially the children that they produced, were a 
source of considerable anxiety to the Company.
16
 This anxiety was partially resolved by the 
institutional interventions of the Company, and for a time the definition of ‘family’ was 
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broadened to encompass mixed race children.
17
 Indeed, the enduring pension, widow and 
orphan funds in the ICS had their origins in the mechanisms envisioned for supporting 
Anglo-Indian children. While these histories of sexual encounters have provided fertile 
ground for investigation, they have dominated our approach to scandal in British India. This 
thesis does not dismiss the complexity and anxiety surrounding inter-racial relationships, but 
this issue does not appear to have seriously concerned the official mind, or governing 
literature, in the mid to late nineteenth century. It is not the aim of this chapter to make 
comparisons between attitudes to inter-race sexual encounters and other types of scandal. 
Instead, this chapter seeks to draw attention to an issue which has not received similar 
historical investigation, indebtedness.
18
 The fear of the debt ridden district officer was a 
consistent problem in governing literature, and it is this alternative scandal that this thesis 
wishes to explore.  
The British Government in India increasingly viewed indebtedness as a threat to the 
representation of the ICS as a moral organisation. Excess and responsibility defined the 
policies surrounding insolvency. Margot Finn argues that ‘contemporaries clearly understood 
character to constitute an essential form of social capital’, and credit relations were intimately 
tied to the maintenance of this social capital.
19
 Finn explains that from the late eighteenth 
century ‘a wide range of solvent and insolvent customers enjoyed generous (and flexible) 
credit terms’.20 However, by the mid-Victorian period Finn states that the individualising 
commercial state with its emphasis on personal liability was encouraging the reimagining of 
‘the innocent debtor as a culpable legal agent’.21 The social capital of credit lost its flexibility 
and as networks of friendship faded away the district officer was simultaneously more 
accountable for his financial conduct, and more vulnerable to the corrupting influences of 
India.  
India and Indians were increasingly considered a corrupting and degenerative influence. 
It was argued that the traditional practices and values of India were incompatible with the 
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modern administrative British Government, and, therefore, corruption was inevitable.
22
 This 
account of a modern rational Government coming into conflict with a customary society 
requires further unpacking. As the interface between colonised and coloniser the district 
officer was frequently at the centre of these conflicts. By explaining away inconsistencies and 
embarrassments as a result of the challenging environment, the Indian Civil Servant could 
maintain his integrity. Not only did the specificity of the Indian experience absolve the 
district officer from guilt, it was also the basis for his claims for the legitimate exercise of 
independent decision-making. Gould explains that the late colonial state was pragmatic, and 
that ‘representing certain forms of rule breaking as “petty”, and “customary” allowed the Raj 
to go about its business undisturbed, as to protect the interests of its principal allies and to 
maintain an image of stability, control and legitimacy’.23 In short, the corrupt nature of Indian 
society necessitated an independent decision-making idealised district officer.  
Furthermore, as Akhil Gupta has argued, a discourse of corruption necessitates a 
discourse of accountability.
24
 The accountability of the Indian Civil Servant to the 
Government will be explored throughout the chapter, but it is worth noting, as Gupta does: 
‘expectations of “right” behaviour, standards of accountability, and norms of conduct for 
state officials, in other words, come from social groups as well as from “the state”’.25 The 
development of a more rigid regime of conduct management was utilised by nationalists, 
landowners, and even agriculturalists. This resistance, or even the possibility of resistance, 
made adherence to a more professional code of conduct even more necessary. Accountability 
was enforced through policies detailed in governing literature. As Gould explains, ‘texts 
employed a more subtle terminology to describe activities of ambiguous legality that had to 
be adjudicated by asserting the paternalistic authority of the district officer’.26 This chapter 
now considers the conflict in these texts, and the ambiguous practices of the district officer. 
‘A compact set of rules’: Conduct Manuals  
 
The conduct manuals, civil service regulations and professional policies of the mid to late 
nineteenth century revealed that the process of determining ethical behaviour was confused 
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 Codes of conduct were somewhat incompatible with an idealised 
autonomous experienced district officer. The legitimacy of this model persona was supposed 
to be his inherent morally superior character. However, the increasing, and not wholly 
unjustified, paranoia of the Government of India resulted in a sustained effort to regulate, 
confine and shape the model district official according to an agreed set of standards and 
practices. This set of shared values was initially set out in the covenant signed by all 
members of the covenanted ICS. On qualifying members of the Indian Civil Service were 
required to make a legal declaration, a promise of their good conduct.  Henry Beveridge’s 
1857 pledge asked him to swear to be ‘a faithful honest and diligent servant’, and it contained 
individual clauses about financial conduct, the preservation of documents and information, as 
well as promises about refraining from violent conduct.
28
  This initial promise set the tone for 
expectations surrounding official behaviour. These expectations were reinforced through the 
private and official conduct guides and civil service rules.  
In governing literature, the measuring, codifying and managing of personal and 
professional conduct shifted from advice designed to cultivate inherent character to a rule 
bound regime dictating the duties of a professional. In 1904, the British Indian Government 
issued The government servants' conduct rules: 
 
the form of the orders has thus become obscure and confusing and the 
Government of India have thought it desirable to reproduce their substance in the 





The production of a text which explicitly collated rules about conduct was the culmination of 
a gradual trend. The conduct manual had been an essential item throughout the period under 
consideration. Ranging from domestic etiquette guides, to civil service regulations, to 
professional handbooks, these texts were overt in the regulating of the ideal district officer’s 
persona. They aimed to provide concise information on the plethora of rules regarding ethical 
government and professional behaviour, which increased considerably after 1880. The 
contradictions and limits of the model district officer were imagined within an evolving and 
responsive set of rules.  
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The official civil service regulations went through several editions in the late 
nineteenth century.
30
 As Government authorised texts, they were issued to district libraries 
and civil servants. Although they claimed to be nothing more than a record of existing 
practice, the development of these books marked a departure from the general trust in the 
district officer. These manuals also committed to text the codified limits of the district 
official. Despite the zeal for official Government manuals there were still privately authored 
alternatives. In August 1887, The Englishman reviewed I.C. Bose and G.D. Pudmujee’s 
conduct manual thus: ‘We have no motive for advertising it, but in these days every public 
servant should provide himself with a copy of this pamphlet in self-defence’.31 This text was 
more than an informative guide, it was a defence against the machine of Government and the 
mystery of the regulations.  
As indicated by the 1904 conduct rules, regulations had been in place throughout the 
period under consideration, but they had been created through a reactionary and pragmatic 
process. There was a need to consolidate, clarify and emphasise the policy on the 
management of conduct. Yet, the conduct guide was the antithesis of the autonomous man-
on-the-spot. This was the source of a fundamental tension in the official mind. The urge to 
codify and control was a response to increasing fears about the impact of autonomy at the 
district level. The continuous effort to consolidate practice regarding incompetent or corrupt 
officials indicated an irresolvable anxiety at the core of the governing project.  
The investment in policy and procedure regarding conduct and professional behaviour 
was considered a safeguard. The rules and regulations were designed to maintain the prestige, 
and therefore the symbolic power, of the district official and avoid the exposure of 
incompetent individuals. The rhetoric of conduct focused on a public self, which could not be 
separated from private behaviour. This interaction between character, vocation, and 
professionalism defined attitudes to policy and procedure. Conduct in the home, and in 
society was considered of equal significance to the professional attitude in the office. The 
boundaries of the private self and the public official persona were often confused or ill-
defined. The private life and acts of a district official were often as constructed and contested 
as the working practices of his office.   
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‘Unfortunate in domestic relations’: Private Conduct  
 
Unofficial and official conduct manuals provided guidance on private, social and domestic 
life.
32
 The idealised district officer was not just a job, it was a persona. This role existed 
beyond the office and the court house. It was this space, between social pursuits and official 
duties, which caused anxiety about personal conduct. The idealised persona had been 
constructed on a framework of moral authority and good character, and these attributes were 
also forged in the personal life of district officer. This attention to social and domestic 
conduct reflects the increasing regulation of behaviour exercised by the Government over its 
servants in the later nineteenth century. 
The duties of a civil servant often extended into the blurred line between semi-official 
functions and social activities. J.H. Stocqueler advised that the Collector acted as ‘head of the 
society of whatever place he may be stationed at, while the juniors are regarded, as much 
from their position as their generally superior attainments, with deference and respect’.33 
Indian Civil Servants were supplied with information and advice about moral and social 
conduct in India. This was due to the specificities of the social environment in India, but also 
due to the cultural expectations and standards the British in India were expected to 
maintain.
34
 Bradshaw explained, ‘the MORAL BEHAVIOUR of all classes of Europeans 
should be extremely discreet, not only to preserve that inestimable blessing-health — but to 
command the respect of the native community’.35 Bradshaw was drawing attention to the 
necessity of preserving a morally upright reputation. Failure to adhere to the moral or racial 
standards of British colonialism brought the entire project into disrepute. Even in his private 
affairs the district officer was made increasingly aware of his public responsibilities. 
Many of the guidebooks explored the differences between social conduct in India and 
Britain. Hull dedicated several chapters to the rules of social etiquette and in particular the 
paying of calls: ‘one of the first objects of the new comer to an Indian station, who wishes to 
make himself a comfortable social position, will be to become acquainted with some of the 
older residents.’36 In such an intimate and claustrophobic social circle like a district station, or 
even in some of the presidency towns, social faux pas like failing to observe the proper mode 
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of ‘calling’ could put a black mark against a civilian for his entire career.37 Addison described 
the hierarchical complexities in Indian society: ‘much more fuss is made about artificial rank 
than in circles where real and hereditary right of assumption exists’.38 Dinner parties, balls, 
picnics and tennis matches were all regulated by strict adherence to precedent.
39
 Kerr gave 
advice on how to avoid bad company during social interaction. He proposed a series of 
coping mechanisms for when another civilian’s ill manners threatened one’s own social 
advancement: ‘give to such, a simple curry, and tell them in a joking manner, that you are too 
poor to afford “lall shrub” or “hodgson”’.40 The competition wallahs were criticised for 
failing to keep up the generous hospitality of the previous generations. Hull argued it was a 
public duty of the district official to provide hospitality to fellow Europeans.41 A.B. Birks 
justified the reluctance of his colleagues to provide food and lodging to strangers by arguing 
it was an expensive custom, and in a larger less intimate society it was an unnecessary 
burden.
42
 However, as heads of society, and frequently, as managers of civil service domestic 
residences, district officers were publicly and officially responsible for the provision and 
maintenance of Home.  
Beyond the official provision of an actual building, which was not guaranteed, the civil 
servant was left to his own devices. Hull recommended that a quiet and unostentatious 
bachelor  ‘may manage to get his curry and rice cooked, his bed made and his shirts washed, 
by no more than ten or eleven men, and at a cost not exceeding sixty or eighty rupees a 
month’.43 This number of servants was a considerable escalation from what a young middle 
class man may have previously experienced in their own homes. Furthermore, the majority 
would have had limited contact with domestic life having been sent to school at seven, 
followed by university or a tutor at seventeen and then straight to India in their early twenties.  
Conduct manuals dedicated considerable attention to the management of servants. Each 
role was described carefully, including duties and pay. Bradshaw listed twenty-one different 
types of servant ranging from valet, to water carrier, to punkah wallah. Bradshaw insisted: ‘it 
is mere folly for a European to leave the supervision of his domestic establishment to an 
Indian butler, for he only fleeces him a hundred-fold: but he should divest himself of all 
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lethargic feeling and caste prejudice and inspect everything himself’.44 These texts reflected 
substantial anxieties about the selection and management of servants. In particular, these 
concerns focused on the fear of the racial other in the home.
45
 The intimate knowledge 
servants possessed was a tool with which they could dominate a master, and any abuse of this 
power could have serious ramifications. Officials were advised against beating or maltreating 
servants.
46
 To be managed by one’s servants was shameful as it compromised the inherent 
authority of the civilian. Authority over servants mirrored the administrative arrangements of 
power in the district, and this parallel was frequently indicated in the advice given.
47
 
The task of creating a Home in Empire without the experience, knowledge or cultural 
value of a Victorian woman was challenging.
48
 One solution was to find a wife to manage the 
home and absorb many of these responsibilities. Bhattacharya claims that ‘proper female 
agency domesticates the colony by re-appropriating it as a home from improper agents’.49 
The establishment of ‘home’ in ‘Empire’ countered the inherent dislocation of imperial rule 
and maintained the distance from the ‘other’ through the re-fashioning of the ruler in his 
imperial domestic space. This was ‘the ideological work performed by gender in the 
construction of empire’.50 Therefore female agency was essential to this public domesticity, 
as it was the British woman who upheld the management of private social spaces. 
 According to one satirical novel it was the duty of the junior district officer ‘to marry 
the spin of the station if she is under thirty, and to flirt moderately with her if she is on the 
further shore; and so step through the paths of self-sacrifice and devoted heroism, in the 
interests of his country, to qualify for a Collector.’51 As this quotation indicates, even marital 
connections were fundamental to the assumption of the role of the idealised Collector. 
Qualities like self-sacrifice and duty were located in social etiquette as much as under the 
mango tree or on the district tour.  
The management of conduct was extended to private acts and personal life because 
character, duty and vocation were contingent on private and official life. In 1864, a petition 
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was forwarded to the Government of Bengal, from the district of Bancoorah in West 
Burdwan, regarding the unusual and concerning behaviour of the Judge, Mr G.C. Fletcher. 
The petitioners claimed he had been showing signs of insanity. They recounted one occasion, 
which took place at the house of the Moonsif of Oundah, during which Mr Fletcher ‘entered 
the interior apartment, took away all the gold and silver ornaments of the females, and with 
these on his person, walked the entire way back to his house. Even now he puts on these 
ornaments and sometimes decks the persons of his Amlah and Vakeels’.52 Mr Fletcher was 
known to eat in the market, and have Muslim food served at his house. He smoked a hookah 
in court, and delivered ‘whatever judgement strikes his fancy without at all perusing the 
papers’.53 Fletcher was further accused of offering nepotistic promotion to the principal 
Sudder Amin. He was infamous for ignoring proper procedure in court, and disposed of 
twenty cases in one day. The petitioners claimed an investigation had taken place, but the 
Commissioner had only interviewed the uncovenanted officials under the influence of 
Fletcher. The High Court at Calcutta was aware of his unusual judicial conduct, and 
concluded that he had ‘shewn persistent inattention throughout the past year, until December, 
to their repeated admonitions regarding his insufficient work and utter disregard to the proper 
administration of justice.’54 
Mr Fletcher was censured for his incompetent judicial conduct. Fletcher’s flamboyant 
and intimate behaviour with his subjects and subordinate officials went unremarked upon. He 
was approaching the end of his career, so perhaps his eccentricities were passed off as being 
characteristic of an old civilian, soon to be sent home.
55
 Although details are not given of the 
consequences of Fletcher’s actions, in his correspondence he described himself as the late 
Judge of Burdwan. In their final remarks, the petitioners implored the Government of Bengal: 
‘we, the people of this District, pray that an Officer of judgement and ability may be sent to 
this District’.56 Fletcher had failed to live up to the idealised model of a district officer. He 
had transgressed the racial distance and aloof conduct expected of a district officer. In the 
petition, Fletcher’s private conduct and over-familiarity with his subjects was connected with 
his incompetence as a Judge. The petitioners expected competence. They wanted an officer of 
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good judgment and ability instead of Fletcher. The residents of Burdwan had attempted to 
hold George Fletcher accountable to a perceived standard of governance.   
As George Fletcher’s misconduct demonstrated the most compromising activities were 
not violent but intimate.
57
 Any intimate moral compromise of the district officer in his 
personal life was inexcusable. In 1873, Richard Gwatkin Melvill, the officiating deputy 
commissioner of the Sirsa district, was discovered to be in a relationship with a married 
woman. Under the guise of his official duties, Melvill was conducting an affair with Haidari 
Begum, a teacher at a local school. However, the scandal was not merely limited to an 
extramarital affair: ‘while he was engaged in this intrigue he made public profession of the 
Mahomodean faith, and went through the form of marriage with the daughter of Haidari 
Begum, a girl not ten years of age’.58 The outrage was exacerbated by the information that the 
marriage to the girl had been attended by four Indian Government officials, including the 
District Record Keeper and the Head of the Municipal Commission.
59
 Melvill’s behaviour 
violated moral decency and entirely compromised his professional status. Condemnation of 
his actions was further intensified by his rampant disregard and apparent ignorance of the 
seriousness of his conduct. He stated ‘I don’t suppose it is an official matter, and I certainly 
hope you wont consider it necessary to take any notice of my conduct officially’.60 It is 
highly unlikely that he was unaware of the severity of his transgressions.
61
  
The Government of India was horrified, and unequivocally stated that ‘his open 
disregard for public decency, and of his incapacity to appreciate the ordinary standard of right 
and wrong compel us to determine that he is no longer fit for employment’.62 Mr Melvill’s 
actions constituted an absolute violation of the moral, benevolent and paternalistic persona of 
the idealised district officer. The official condemnations of Melvill’s behaviour were severe 
in tone, and the judicial proceedings against him for the extramarital conduct were swift and 
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 Melvill’s case was one of the few instances of clear, direct, public and absolute 
condemnation regarding the behaviour of a civil servant.  
While Melvill’s case can be considered unique, it was revealing of the anxiety 
surrounding personal conduct, and of the view taken by the British Government. The rules 
regarding personal relationships were not explicitly codified, it was considered unnecessary 
to explain to the ICS why intimate contact with Indian women would be unacceptable. 
Melvill’s misconduct was only brought to the attention of his superiors by his colleague. The 
integrity of the ICS relied on the collaboration of its members in the maintenance of the 
idealised identity. The persona of the idealised district officer had to be consistent in its core 
attributes of benevolence and moral character. There were mutually agreed standards of 
conduct, and any infringement of these core values necessitated breaking the bonds of 
civilian brotherhood. There was a continuing effort to regulate and discourage anything 
which might threaten the benevolent and moral public role of the ICS. Yet, the overlap 
between personal acts and public identity was often inconsistent and confused. Concerns 
around private behaviour resulted in legislation focused on the public persona of the district 
official.  
‘Their influence with the community’: Public conduct 
 
As the representative of Government in the locality, district officers had to exhibit a uniform 
official public identity.
64
 In the public spaces outside of the office or court he was expected to 
demonstrate a moral, benevolent and paternalistic persona. The potential overlap between 
private actions and public consequences resulted in increased management of conduct. This 
regulated and rule bound culture marked the transition from the inherent morality of the 
gentlemanly administrator to the professional bureaucrat.  
The management of official conduct particularly focused on the role of the district 
officer in ceremonies and public events. The rules around public engagement in a ceremonial 
setting were rigidly enforced.
65
 It was a problematic area, the conceptualisation of India as a 
customary society meant that civilian officials, especially in the Political Department, were 
expected to engage in ceremonial exchanges. In 1875, officials were instructed that they 
could receive a gift, but that it would be immediately taken in to Government possession. The 
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expense of a return present would be covered by the Government. There was a minor 
concession, however, ‘any Government servant may accept a complimentary present of 
flowers or fruit or similar articles of trifling value. The practice of giving such presents 
should however be discouraged’.66 This severe tone was typical of conduct management 
regulations. In the later nineteenth century district officials were no longer trusted to exercise 
discretion in the management of customary interactions. By 1887, the Government of India 
demanded ‘exact obedience to these regulations’.67 Removing the district officer from the 
space of customary exchange and denying him public recognition severed a crucial site of 
contact between the official and his people. At the end of the twentieth-century, the public 
role of the district officer was visibly more professional, and the Government of India was 
uncomfortable with the style of personal rule which had formed the foundations of this 
idealised persona.  
The presence of a district official at a public event, outside his strict professional 
capacity, became unacceptable. This was especially the case in any political context. In 1890, 
civilian officials were advised that they did not have ‘the same liberty of action as private 
individuals, and are bound to hold themselves aloof’.68 The Government of India wanted the 
district official to fully assume his idealised persona, extinguish his personal interests and 
rule from a distance. Yet, this model district official was based on local experience and the 
specificity of an individually curated knowledge. Although aware of this contradiction, under 
the increasing pressure of anti-colonial sentiment, the official mind resorted to policies which 
attempted to create a more easily managed and codified professional civil servant. 
Government servants were further forbidden from taking part in or subscribing to any 
political movement in India relating to Indian affairs. They were not allowed to attend any 
meeting at which their presence was ‘likely to be misconstrued or to impair his public 
usefulness.’69 The main concern was that the presence of a civil servant could create ‘a false 
impression in the minds of ignorant persons that such movements have the countenance of 
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Government’.70 The regulations surrounding political contact with Indians reflected a wider 
general concern about inappropriate interactions with the subject race. Regulations and rules 
about the conduct of the ICS had always been framed with an India public audience in mind. 
However, as the nineteenth century progressed, legislation regarding the management of 
conduct was influenced by the perceived judgement of a more politically conscious and 
potentially hostile population.  
Regulations regarding conduct management made the district officer accountable to the 
British Government, but also to the Indian people. Knowledge of governmental processes 
could be utilised by Indians against the British administration. In November 1906, W.L. 
Scott, the Subdivisional Magistrate in Backergunge, dismissed a case which had been brought 
against J.C. Jack, the Settlement Officer. Scott noted that during the proceedings the pleader 
for the prosecution ‘made an earnest appeal to me to forget the “colour” and the “high 
position” as he put it, of Mr Jack’.71 The pleader was calling attention to the symbolic power 
of Jack, and challenging Scott to enforce fair and accountable procedures. Throughout this 
case, the district officials were held to account and measured against their own standards and 
procedures.  
In May, J.C. Jack had been conducting a settlement in Backergunge. He believed the 
tenants of an estate in Patuakhali were being exploited by the land agents of an absentee 
landlord. Jack had been informed that a group of lathails, posing as Government officers, had 
evicted the village, and so he proceeded to the spot to investigate. J.C. Jack was accused of 
committing mischief in a boat, verbally abusing, beating and arresting Baikuntha Nath Gupta, 
Amodali Manjhi and others.
72
 Scott concluded the episode was ‘a concocted story. He makes 
the mistake of saying that Mr Jack gave his orders in Hindustani.’73 Jack did not speak 
Hindustani. Although the accusations of violence were dismissed, Jack had unlawfully 
arrested the men.
74
 Gupta and Manjhi were aware that Jack, as a Settlement Officer, was not 
empowered to arrest them, and had felt confident enough in this fact to bring a case against 
him. Indeed, the Government of Bengal concluded that Jack had acted injudiciously, but with 
a proper motive.  
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The Government of India were relieved to conclude that ‘the matter has no connextion 
to the Swadeshi movement or the partition agitation but arises solely out of disputes between 
Hindu landlords and Mohammedan tenants’.75 H.H. Risley subsequently argued that district 
officers had to be constantly on the watch for oppression of Muslim tenants in the region, 
thereby recasting Jack as the benevolent man-on-the-spot.
76
 Gupta and Manjhi had 
unsuccessfully attempted to challenge Jack’s authority and hold him accountable to an 
increasingly vigilant system of Government. The accusation was an act of resistance enabled 
by an increasingly rule bound regime of district governance. As Akhil Gupta has suggested, 
by the turn of the twentieth-century the ICS could not avoid being accountable to the society 
it allegedly served and protected.
77
 The increasing Indianisation of the civil service, the 
pushes for local self-government, and the development of anti-colonial movements all put 
pressure on the model persona.  
In the increasingly tense and accountable atmosphere of the late nineteenth century 
violent or coercive actions posed a threat to the stability of the British Raj. The legitimacy of 
the Government in India relied on a vision of moral and benevolent rule, in which the 
idealised district officer played a crucial role. As the century progressed, the district official 
found himself gradually more accountable for his private and his public actions. An issue 
which blurred the boundaries between private and public misdemeanours was indebtedness.  
‘The rope of debt around your neck’: Indebtedness and the district officer   
 
The spectre of the debt ridden Indian Civil Servant loomed large in policy and governing 
literature.
78
 The British Indian Government abhorred the public consequences of this private 
transgression. The attitudes towards debt also reflected the transition from the district officer 
being a man of gentlemanly honour and character to a more professionally guided and 
regulated official. Company policy regarding debt was first consolidated in 1815. Junior 
officers were discouraged from the practice of getting into debt as would:   
 
not only prove a source of great personal embarrassment to them as individuals 
but are likewise entirely incompatible with that independence and freedom of 
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action, which is essential, on public grounds, that persons succeeding to 




The combination of personal embarrassment and public conduct characterised the attitude 
towards debt during the period. As Margot Finn argues, while financial matters were still 
private they were intimately linked with public character.
80
 This early legislation indicated 
that the idea of an autonomous, responsible, and moral public character developed in tandem 
with concerns about embarrassments and personal failings. The memories of Indian 
corruption and Company extravagance lingered awkwardly around these policies, but 
concerns primarily focused on the inability of civil servants to manage their own finances. 
District officers lacked financial experience, especially in domestic arrangements. The 
solution for this inexperience was to ensure clarity, and regularly reissue legislation. For 
Bengal, the defining policy regarding indebtedness was enacted in 1823. It stated that all 
officers exercising the powers of Collector were:   
 
prohibited, under pain of dismissal from office, from borrowing money from, or 
in any way incurring debt to any zemindar, talookdar, ryot or persons possessing 
real propriety or residing in or having a commercial establishment within the city, 




This regulation was the basis for all future rule surrounding debt and civil servant. The role of 
Collector was specifically emphasised within these regulations. As the head of the district he 
was the guardian of the moral integrity of the district officials. This specific emphasis on 
preventing financial connections within the district officer’s sphere of activity was a 
necessary act of distancing. The district official had to maintain appropriate distance and 
avoid financial or personal associations, but yet simultaneously have experience and 
knowledge of his people. This was the fundamental contradiction of the aloof but benevolent 
paternalistic district officer. Furthermore, this policy further severed reciprocal financial 
relationships by making it illegal to become the creditor of a public officer.
82
  
The enforcement of Act VII of 1823 was confused. It was continually cited anecdotally 
in the guides and handbooks, but always with the presupposition of an unaware audience. In 
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James Lyons’ handbook he explained, that the British Government was ‘required to impress 
upon their Servants the discredit attaching to a resort to the Insolvent Court’.83 The 1850s 
appears to have marked a moment of consolidation in policy regarding indebtedness. In 1854 
the Government of India issued the following circular: ‘a declaration of insolvency as is 
involved in a resort to the Insolvent Debtor’s Court for relief is quite incompatible with the 
maintenance of that high character for independence, which we regard as essential in those 
filling offices of trust and authority in the service.’84 This policy essentially reiterated the 
existing 1823 enactment, and it was evidently in response to the advent of the competition 
system. The Government of India wanted to emphasise the importance of moral character, 
trust and responsibility to its new generation of civil servants. While there was still emphasis 
on the role of trust, responsibility and independence, which were personally cultivated 
attributes, the enactment of further legislation acted as a safeguard. 
The character of the debtor, the nature of the debt, and the means by which it was 
incurred continued to shape the attitudes of the British Government. In 1854, shortly after the 
reissuing of the regulations, Mr Campbell Limond was forced to resort to the insolvent 
debtors court. The Board reported: ‘we do not find in the circumstances attending this 
insolvency any thing affecting the personal honour of Mr Limond.’85 Limond’s debts were 
simply larger than his assets, and therefore his debts were considered discreditable but 
crucially not dishonourable. If debts were not the consequence of extravagance the 
transgression was forgivable. Indebtedness was incompatible with the authority and 
responsibility of a Government official. However, if the debtor could demonstrate the money 
owed was the result of unfortunate circumstance, rather than unrestrained moral weakness, he 
could be excused. The leniency afforded to Limond reflected the ideals of gentlemanly 
conduct of the mid-century. It was Limond’s personal duty to repair his moral reputation. 
However, the British Government in India was increasingly reluctant to leave the 
responsibility of moral reputation in the hands of its district officers.  
In his 1871 handbook, Edmund Hull commented ‘indebtedness among Anglo Indians 
officials has of late years attracted the attention of the Government’.86 Hull further concluded 
‘that such a condition must interfere with the morale and spirit of untrammelled 
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independence which ought to characterise its servants’.87 The definition of this independence 
and the interpretation of freedom of action caused tension in the late nineteenth-century Raj. 
As the Government increasingly cast itself in the role of manager of conduct the meaning of 
independence shifted. During an investigation into his debts A.G. Walker, an Assistant 
Commissioner in Oudh, asserted ‘I have come to the conclusion that you are not justified in 
interfering in my private affairs’.88 Walker’s conceptualisation of his independence was at 
odds with the official mind. He had run up a multiplicity of debts in Calcutta including, 
hotels, wine merchants and other extravagant expenditures. In the opinion of the Government 
he left them ‘unpaid so systematically as to show that he incurred them without any apparent 
intention of paying them’.89 Walker’s disregard for the rules, indifference to the Government 
and serial habit of pecuniary obligations ‘rendered his retention in the service a public 
scandal and a source of weakness to the Administration’.90 Walker was unable to see the 
connection between his private spending and his public persona. The Bengal Government 
believed that he was no longer a model of high character and responsibility. For Walker, this 
was an invasion of his privacy, but for the Government it was a necessary intervention in 
order to preserve the moral reputation of the ICS. In his final, albeit obstinate, defence, 
Walker argued ‘if there is no promotion in the Commission, it really is not surprising that a 
man with a large family should be in debt’.91 Walker’s wine bill was somewhat inconsistent 
with his claims about an expensive family, and this was clearly an attempt to recast his 
spending in a more moral and honourable light.  
The constant unstable blur between personal and public was the fundamental issue for 
the governing of conduct. The debtor was a problem precisely because he occupied the space 
between public office and private finance. Thus far this chapter has primarily discussed 
indebtedness as a product of personal private expenditure. With the eradication of private 
profiteering, and the increasing codification of misconduct, the British Government in India 
was forced to create policies around other forms of income.  
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In 1885, the Government issued orders reminding district officials that they could not 
hold land or property within their province beyond that which was required for residence.
92
 
Not only was it inappropriate for district officers to be landowners or landlords, there was 
also a concern that too much time would be dedicated to property management instead of 
official duties.
93
 Three years later, the same rules were applied to any ‘property held by, and 
managed by wives of officers or other member of their families living with, and in any way 
dependent on, them’.94 As the nineteenth century progressed, the sphere of public office 
extended to encompass the family not only as economic agents but as fellow moral 
flagbearers.  
The tone of the regulations regarding business and public finances relied on a 
commitment to transparency and irreproachability. In particular, the conduct manuals of the 
late nineteenth century emphasised the strict protocol of any pecuniary relations. If a civilian 
official wished to sell or transfer ownership of any valuable property such as a bungalow, 
elephant, horse or carriage to an Indian he was required to ‘report his intention to the Local 
Government to which he is subordinate, stating the facts and circumstances and the price 
offered for the article to be sold’.95 Less valuable items like furniture, live-stock or household 
goods were subject to less stringent rules, but the transaction had to ‘be open and patent to 
everybody on the spot’.96 Conduct manuals frequently insisted that district officers should 
demand and retain receipts from all local tradesmen in order to avoid accusations of being 
indebted on leaving a district.
97
 Financial conduct at the district level was of particular 
concern, but the Government of India was also hyper-vigilant about officials carrying on 
business whilst on the job.  
In 1873, the Government of India issued a warning that ‘habitual speculation by 
officials has always been held to be a habitual evil and the Government has reserved itself 
full power to deal stringently with the practice whenever it appears’.98 Market profiteering 
was incompatible with the idealised district officer. It was reminiscent of Company 
corruption, and did not fit with the model of a benevolent and simultaneously disinterested 
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official. As Government employees it was not appropriate for district officials to privately 
speculate on the Indian economy. However, the Government of India had:  
 
No objection to Government servants holding shares in mining or any other 
companies (including agricultural companies) having for their object the 




District officers were prohibited from managing financial schemes which benefited India but 
they could invest and participate. The Government of India faced a contradiction between the 
rights of individuals to exercise financial independence and the potential threat to the moral 
reputation of the ICS. By investing in beneficial agricultural or mining schemes the district 
officer was echoing his own role, investing in the community and assisting India towards a 
more stable and civilised future.
100
 Therefore, the awkward taints of profiteering and 
speculation were rendered more palatable by re-imagining investments as projects of 
improvement. 
These policies necessarily permitted freedom of financial action, but in doing so created 
the potential for the abuse of independence, at the expense of trust and moral authority. In 
March 1894, Mr N. Warde-Jones attempted to coerce a local zemindar into giving him the 
tenancy of a village and adjoining lands. The Bengal Government explained that these actions 
were ‘a direct breach of the most definite rules governing the conduct of Deputy 
Collector’.101 Warde-Jones had forced the zemindar to give him the land at a discounted rate 
in return for past favours and official assistance. He claimed ignorance of the rules regarding 
ownership of land, but insisted that he had meant to inform the Government before 
proceeding further. Yet, he had already taken possession of the village and ‘paid a 
professional man to bore for coal’.102 Warde-Jones continued to assert his ignorance of the 
policies surrounding speculation and land, and in his defence he railed against the testimony 
of the zemindar:  
 
I never dreamed that the word of a responsible Government officer was no longer 
considered enough, to controvert the combined allegations of even an entire 
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Warde-Jones confidently believed in his unimpeachable authority. However, he was not 
immune, and his Commissioner reminded him of his accountability by pointing him towards 
the rules. Once again, Warde-Jones attempted to avoid the consequences by feigning 
ignorance: ‘I am much obliged to you for your kind reference to the rules, which I found, 
after some tribulation, in a loose slip at the end of my office copy of the Revenue Officer’s 
Manual’.104 Warde-Jones had overstepped his autonomy. He abused his influence, and 
disregarded policies governing conduct. His attempts to shift the blame onto the zemindar, 
and alleged ignorance of regulations revealed an official out of touch with the increasing 
accountability of his position. This breach of the rules was unacceptable as it violated the 
position of trust which was so crucial to the district officer both practically in the exercise of 
his work and in the representation of his benevolent character. Therefore, Warde-Jones was 
dismissed from the service.
105
  
Throughout the nineteenth century the approach of the British Indian Government to 
insolvency was characterised by inconsistency. In 1887, the Home Department declared: ‘that 
there are no uniform executive orders on the subject of the pecuniary relations of Government 
officers with persons who are subject to their authority’.106 The majority of policies regarding 
indebtedness were haphazard and pragmatic. There was a consistent concern about the impact 
of the debtor on the image of the idealised civilian official, and the subsequent implications 
for an allegedly benevolent Government. The enlarged scope of policy which eventually 
encompassed even daily financial transactions diminished the ideals of trust, gentlemanly 
character, and responsibility. The sporadic issuing of policy surrounding conduct and 
professional behaviour revealed the uncertainty in the official mind, and the inefficient 
relationship between local, provincial and central Government. Incompetence, indebtedness 
and corruption undermined the idealisation of the district officer and his centrality to the Raj. 
Similarly the necessity of policy and procedure which regulated and codified a supposedly 
autonomous individual sat awkwardly with the desire to preserve the independent decision-
making capacity of the district officer. This conflict between independence, authority, 
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discretion, and increasing accountability to procedures and rules was similarly evident in the 
daily working practices of the district official.  
‘Close, constant and personal’: Management and supervision  
 
The desire to regulate and manage personal conduct was part of a broader trend in codifying 
and regulating the district official persona.
107
 Central to this shift was the reconceptualization 
of working relationships. There was a transition from the idea of the benevolent paternalistic 
senior officer to the stratification of the working environment and the evolution of a 
management culture.
108
 The 1866 rules for Revenue officers insisted ‘Commissioners and 
Collectors are expected to exercise a general control over Assistants, influencing them in 
what is right and endeavouring to reform any thing that is objectionable in their conduct’.109 
This emphasis on the responsibilities and duties of care and supervision were part of the 
imagined system of governance. Commissioners and Collectors were supposed to instruct the 
Assistant-Collectors in the ways of the idealised district officer, and in the administrative 
work of British India.
110
 
In his handbook Young advised, ‘Collectors should occasionally perform, personally, the 
duties of the nature of those ordinarily as trusted to their subordinates’.111 This emphasis on 
personally engaging with the work of subordinates typified the imagined paternalistic role of 
the idealised district official. However, this gradually transitioned away from personal 
management to more mechanical and bureaucratic monitoring. By the late nineteenth century 
the Government of India established procedures for checking the work of subordinates. The 
1888 Revenue manual described the process of inspection:  
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with a view to ensuring a more careful supervision by District Officers of the details 
of office management the Board have directed that every District Officer shall make 




The policy and procedural language of inspection, supervision and management reconfigured 
the ideals of trust into a recordable fact rather than an honourable relationship. Assistant and 
Deputy Collectors were expected to present diaries detailing their activities and decisions to 
the Collector. This accountability was enforced by making the Collector ultimately 
responsible for the behaviour of his subordinates.  
These policies of accountability were the product of legitimate anxieties about 
management and inadequate supervision. The emphasis on autonomy and independent 
decision-making was a solution to the limited number of men on the ground. However, 
leaving these powers unchecked could be the cause of serious embarrassment and 
maladministration. The Government of Bengal had to rely on senior officers to ensure 
processes and procedures were followed. Until the widespread use of the telegraph, the Board 
of Revenue, High Court and provincial administration could only intervene after an incident 
had occurred.
113
 The successful nurturing of a junior official by a wise benevolent Collector 
or Judge bolstered the commitment to the idealised district officer. However, any failures 
exposed the fragility of the enterprise and necessitated regulations, inspection, and close 
monitoring emphasised in the conduct manuals.  
The efficiency of the district was contingent on the Collector. Therefore, the 
mismanagement of junior and Indian staff was a source of considerable anxiety. Failing to 
sufficiently train junior covenanted civilians was as problematic as over reliance on 
subordinate officers. Young presented a damning image of a Collector stationary at his court 
and office, avoiding the necessary personal contact of district work, and ‘employing himself 
exclusively in the easiest and most mechanical parts of Collectorate duty, whilst all original 
work of any difficulty, or requiring any trouble and revenue knowledge to do it, is made over 
by him to his native Deputy Collectors.’114 This dependency on junior Indian staff jarred with 
the image of a paternalistic and benevolent Collector. The exercising of appropriate authority 
and racial distance was crucial to the administrative work of Empire. Young advised 
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‘excessive suspicion of the Native subordinates is as fatal as excessive confidence.’115 The 
conduct of the office and the management of the district bureaucracy reflected on the 
capabilities of the district officer. The subordinate uncovenanted officials had access to local 
information and networks beyond the scope of the district officer. The potential possessed by 
these officers to undermine or even override the Collector or Judge was one of the chief 
anxieties in governing literature.  
Racial and cultural suspicions of certain groups, primarily high caste Hindu Bengalis, 
resulted in laws restricting access to subordinate official positions: ‘the several Courts are 
required to introduce all Classes into public employ so as to leave no special one 
predominantly’.116 In order to further prevent the dominance of any particular Indian group, 
the various subordinate clerks and village officials who had worked with a Deputy Collector 
were dismissed, and prevented from travelling with him to his new role.
117
 The regulations 
surrounding the employment of Indian subordinates revealed the extent to which they were 
considered suspicious and liable to dishonesty. 
The increasing scale and scope of district work, and the introduction of a multiplicity of 
departmental functions, resulted in routine work being handed over to Indian subordinate 
officials. The 1888 Revenue Manual warned: ‘Collectors are to be careful that no Native 
officer, especially no serishtadar, is permitted to evade his obligations, particularly in the way 
of authenticating books, documents, accounts and etc., by his signature’.118 The size and 
complexity of the administration, even at the district level, could allow subordinates to evade 
detection or observation in the conduct of their routine duties.  
In Backergunge in 1877, it was discovered that the late mohurir, Kisto Kumar Dass, had 
embezzled upwards of 4,619 RS. The investigating officer, Mr H.C. Sutherland, reported that 
between 28 June 1870 and 16 of June 1874, Dass had successfully forged 14 cheques 
amounting to 2,733-8 RS signed by Mr G.G. Morris, 4 cheques amounting to 1,671-11 RS 
signed by Mr A.T. Maclean and 1 cheque amounting to 175-5 RS signed by Mr Tottenham.
119
 
R.L. Mangles, the Officiating Secretary to the Bengal Government explained that Dass ‘wrote 
out cheques for the payment of money in deposit to fictitious decree-holders, and, after 
obtaining the signature of the presiding judge on these cheques he drew the money from the 
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treasury and appropriated it’.120 Dass died in prison, and the money could not be recovered. 
He had been able to abuse the routine procedure of officers affixing their signatures to official 
papers. It was an established practice to sign documents collated by other departments and 
junior officials. Furthermore, it was a necessary timesaving activity, due to the volume of 
paperwork involved in the daily running of a district. However, the Bengal Government was 
not prepared to overlook the mistakes.  
The Lieutenant-Governor insisted that ‘officers who sign cheques for the payment of 
money without holding any inquiries, and through whose carelessness and neglect of duty 
frauds become possible, should be held personally responsible for any embezzlements which 
may be committed’.121 As far as the Bengal Government was concerned such lack of attention 
to detail was inexcusable. Dass had exploited the lapse in proper supervision for four years. 
Tottenham, Maclean and Morris all protested their innocence, and objected that they were 
being held accountable without access to the records. Morris, Maclean and Tottenham were 
excused from paying compensation due to the historic nature of the fraud, the belief Dass had 
utilised especially deceptive practices and, the previously efficient and honest character of the 
officers.
122
 For the official mind this case illustrated why vigilance over the work of the 
Indian subordinate official was so vital. The potential for personal financial accountability 
was an even greater pressure on the district officer.  
The Government of Bengal continued to struggle with the tension between the ideal of 
an experienced and paternalistic district officer who personally knew his staff and oversaw 
their duties, and the bureaucratic impulse to regulate activities and responsibilities into 
various divisions. This professional de-centralisation of the district officer split his 
responsibilities into different departments, and while his staff and the complexity of his work 
grew, he was still ultimately responsible for key decisions. Inspection manuals and 
supervisory policies tested the district officer, and expected him to uphold an increasingly 
professional managerial persona. The meaning of responsibility shifted to encompass 
accountability and the district officer was encouraged to follow the rules rather than trust his 
instinct when it came to junior officers. Although he was still a crucial decision maker the 
autonomy of those decisions was being challenged or at least redefined. This was particularly 
the case in the judicial branch of the service.  
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‘He is the upright and inflexible judge’: The Judicial Branch 
 
One of the principle criticisms made by authors of legal and juridical manuals was that 
despite codification, British Indian law remained complicated and was often unfathomable to 
Civil Servants.
123
 Governing literature revealed tensions surrounding the navigability of the 
law, the prescriptive nature of codification and the constant shifting of legal procedure. The 
mere presence and popularity of legal handbooks and guides revealed that codification had 
failed to simplify legal procedure. Furthermore, the majority of these texts also continued to 
endorse an idealised Judge, an experienced man-on-the-spot utilising his familiarity with the 
people and the country to arrive at the correct judgement. In his 1858 manual, William 
Morely argued: ‘there is a large body of living doctrine, which appears to mature itself by 
degrees in the minds of experienced judicial officers, but which is not to be met with in any 
definitive form’.124 Court made law determined that the Judge was ultimately responsible for 
the rule of law, and had greater autonomy in the exercise of his powers. This freedom of 
action was supposedly discouraged after 1861, but the idealisation of personal experience and 
the importance of practical training as an Assistant-Magistrate endured throughout the period.  
Criticisms were targeted towards ‘the overscrupulousness and timidity of some judges 
and the unscrupulousness and ignorance of others’.125 The concern was that codification was 
too restrictive upon the rational and moral mind of the district officer, and likely to 
undermine his personal and practical experience. The British Indian Government was 
compelled to regulate, codify and prescribe practice, but, when the idealised decision maker 
was threatened by automated processes, governing literature responded by praising the merits 
of experience and independence. The best antidote was, as Morely suggested, the natural 
process of private judgements developing into standard practice, and individual experience 
contributing to the entirety of the legislative machine.126 This depended on the continuing 
ability of the civil servant to exercise independent decision-making and gain the required 
experience rather than beginning his career by adhering to prescribed dictations as set out in 
legal texts. However, the emphasis on the continued freedom of the autonomous decision 
maker in court made mistakes, corruption and incompetence more likely.  
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In 1865, W.B. Buckle, Judge of Moorshedabad, was reported as unfit to arrive at 
correct and independent judgements, especially during appeals and trials by jury. The High 
Court investigated his case decision history, and received a series of unflattering anecdotes as 
to Buckle’s incompetence. The Registrar of the High Court, F.B. Peacock reported from Fort 
William: 
 
in the greater number of cases in which Mr Buckle has erred, it has been from 
inexperience and ignorance of the Laws of Evidence or the Codes of Procedure 





Buckle was a civil servant of nearly 26 years’ service during which his court rulings had been 
the product of his personal interpretations of the law. Peacock believed that the radical 
changes instigated by codification were overly complex for men like Buckle. With such a 
dramatic transition in policy, and limited training it was not a surprise that older civil 
servants made some mistakes. This problem was exacerbated in Peacock’s view by the 




 Buckle insisted the majority of the mistakes were made at Backergunge, and that at 
Berhampore he was only corrected once on a technicality. The technicality involved Buckle 
convicting a man accused of murder based on the precedents of Scottish law. He promised 
that he would confine himself to ‘illustrating the Law to the Indian Penal Code and not refer 
to the dicta of English or Scotch Law’.129 Backergunge was known as a difficult and unruly 
district, so Buckle claimed his mistakes were not the result of a lack of experience but an 
inability to implement that experience due to his workload.
130
 Buckle even attempted to 
appeal to the humanity of his superiors: ‘surely at the end of a long fatiguing day a Judge 
may be pardoned for such slight irregularity’.131  
However, the Lieutenant-Governor rejected this defence, he concluded that any officer 
‘unable to sift and weigh evidence or correctly point out its bearing to a Jury must be unfit 
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for the office of Judge’.132 The Lieutenant-Governor recommended that Buckle resigned as 
he was clearly incapable of office. While Buckle was evidently incompetent, this was 
understandably the product of his experience of the haphazard and pragmatic development of 
the British Indian legal system. Buckle had failed to keep up with the shifting dynamics of 
British justice, and considering his supposed experience this was disappointing. The fact that 
he was removed to a district without a jury system was indicative of the concern felt by the 
Bengal Government. Rule by law simultaneously demanded adherence to the codes and the 
ability to make independent decisions. Yet, codification frequently preserved or at least 
allowed space for discretion. This room for manoeuvre within the letter of the law did not 
always result in the impartial judgement desired from the ideal district officer.  
 In 1882, Mr C.J. O’Donnell was transferred from his appointment as Joint-Magistrate 
at Jessore, deprived of the power of trying summary cases, and moved to Mymensingh.
133
 
The Collector, Mr Barton, had found O’Donnell to be insubordinate and disloyal, he ‘would 
neither do the work entrusted to him, nor obey the orders that he received’.134 On returning 
from his tour of the district, Barton discovered that O’Donnell had been ignoring petitions 
from the ryots of the Chanchra Estate. The cultivators had accused the zemindar of 
oppressing them, the issue was further complicated by the fact that O’Donnell lived with the 
manager of the Chanchra estate. O’Donnell’s antagonistic and unprofessional attitude 
necessitated his removal from the district. It was in his judicial capacity that his disregard for 
process and abuse of discretion was fully realised.  
O’Donnell was known to dismiss complaints without proper enquiry. He frequently 
sent cases to the civil court in order to avoid work, and most problematic of all, he 
‘unwarrantably stretched his powers by trying summarily cases to which the summary 
procedure was inapplicable’.135 The summary procedure empowered a Judge to reduce a case 
to a brief written record. This process was intended for minor issues with limited evidence 
and testimony. It was designed to enable swift judgements for small complaints, not as a 
means to avoid the process of judgement. The Government of Bengal had to concede that 
technically O’Donnell was acting in accordance with the literal wording of the law: 
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but it was certainly not contemplated by the authors of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, nor is it in accordance with the spirit of the Code itself, that the record of 
the complaints’ examination should be so brief as in the cases instituted before Mr 
O’Donnell.136  
 
O’Donnell had manipulated the system to his advantage, and was able to elude or pass on 
work. O’Donnell had already been briefly degraded to a junior position, and relocated from 
district to district with alarming regularity due to his insubordinate behaviour. The 
Lieutenant-Governor concluded that O’Donnell had received a lenient punishment, and 
generally in the conduct of his career he had ‘shown a want of ordinary discretion’.137 Even 
in the codified legal atmosphere of the 1880s O’Donnell was still able to manipulate 
regulations and exploit his discretionary powers. This embarrassment caused the Bengal 
Government to reflect on how it managed incompetent officials. Cockerell, secretary to the 
Judicial, Political and Appointment Department, raised the issue of ‘the general reluctance of 
senior Civilians to report unfavourably of young officers in the Service’.138 When it came to 
reporting incompetence, there did appear to be an enduring commitment to espirit des corps, 
and a desire to protect the image of the service.   
The anxieties around the idealised role of the district officer were focused on the 
preservation of a benevolent and paternalistic image. This was a shared commitment, the 
maintenance of this persona depended on a united front. The idea and the rhetoric 
surrounding it had to be consistently reinforced and shared amongst the men of the ICS. The 
model of the ideal district officer had to be actively projected beyond the daily working 
practices of the office, and the personal life of the official.  
‘A garbled currency’: Private and Public Communication  
 
As with conduct management more generally, the British Indian Government extended its 
reach over the public image of the district official.
139
 Advances in technology caused 
concerns, and the district official was subjected to stricter rules about how he communicated 
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in the workplace and in public. The introduction of forms, rulebooks and specific divisional 
responsibilities was envisioned as a means of achieving greater efficiency, but there remained 
an emphasis on the personal communication between the district officer and his subordinates. 
However, there already existed a barrier to efficient and clear communication: language.  
Linguistic ability or lack thereof, was an overwhelming concern. Dependency on India 
officials was proportionate to the language skills of the district officer. Linguistic ineptitude 
exposed and compromised the depiction of the ideal Collector-Magistrate. The model district 
officer was a man who could happily and easily converse with his local population. Trainee 
officials were expected to pass a series of verbal tests as part of the Higher Standard 
examinations. Recommendations stated that the Indians selected to be conversed with should 
be ‘not only be of different degrees of intelligence, but also be distinguished by peculiarities 
of pronunciation and by differences in the character of the language spoken by them, e.g one 
might be a vernacular clerk, one a ryot and one a fisherman or cooley’.140 The civilian not only 
had to understand what was being said to him but be able to make himself understood.  
However, this led to concerns surrounding the authority of the British civilian official 
who might be forced to communicate in a manner below his station: ‘to adopt such 
phraseology must necessarily bring the party thus identifying himself with the most ignorant 
portion of the community, into contempt’.141 The district official encountered a contradiction 
within these texts. He was expected to be familiar with his subjects in order to provide the 
most effective rule, but yet he had to maintain racial authority and a degree of distance. The 
prevailing fear was that poor language skills would lead to injustice: ‘in vain the innocent 
implore the protection of his judge, who comprehends not one syllable he utters, and yet fears 
not to pronounce his sentence’.142 Therefore, the move towards written English 
communication was a guarantee against linguistic errors.  
Young insisted ‘the communication between a Collector and a native Deputy Collector 
should be close, constant and personal; not confined to sending official orders and reports 
from one to other’.143 In the mid-nineteenth century, district officers attempted to capture 
informal vernacular discussions by producing long written reports. However, this resulted in 
unworkable volumes of paperwork, information and decisions were hidden in letters and case 
histories. So in 1888, correspondence by formal letters between a Collector and his 
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subordinates in the same station was prohibited. District officers were encouraged to keep an 
order book, with a list of orders issued, and the responses received.
144
 The order book was a 
concise record of the decision-making process, it made the independent judgements of the 
district officer accessible and accountable. The Board of Revenue further declared ‘it is a 
primary rule that all useless correspondence is to be avoided.’145 There was a tension between 
the desire for personal verbal communication and efficient formulaic records. Verbal 
communication liberated the district officer from his desk, it maintained his independence but 
it left a limited record. The enduring preference for personal interaction challenged the image 
of an overly bureaucratic, impersonal and paper driven administration.  
Official emphasis on clear and concise communication was usually focused at the 
district level, but it was also necessary between the periphery and the centre. The Bengal 
Government insisted: ‘it is the duty of every officer making a report to a superior authority to 
state the case concisely in his own language, avoiding all unnecessary prolixity’.146 While the 
machine of Government was often seen as the source of decisions, it did not seem to share the 
same accountability as the district officer. 
In 1861, H. Richardson complained that he had been degraded from the role of 
Collector-Magistrate to Joint-Magistrate without fair warning. Richardson pleaded ‘this 
severe punishment has been awarded me for faults I never knew I had committed and of the 
nature of which I am not even yet aware’.147 In 1859, Mr Elliot, Richardson’s superior, 
reported that he was dissatisfied with his work. As a result, Richardson improved the 
efficiency of his office and oversaw several large settlements. This hard work was met with 
approval in his new district. Therefore, the decision two years later to dismiss Richardson was 
a shock. This decision had been produced by the centre without justification, which felt 
deeply unfair to Richardson. On receiving news of the decision, G. U Yule, Commissioner of 
Bhaugulpore, wrote in support of Richardson. He stated he was unaware of any criticisms and 
there were no reports from the Board of Revenue to substantiate the demotion. Yule argued 
that the only record of the decision he could find was in the Lieutenant-Governor’s official 
reply to the 1860 Annual Report. Yule added:  
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no caution was ever given to Mr Richardson. He never noticed the Lieutenant-
Governor’s letter, and one may easily understand how he overlooked it, for it 
comes at the end of the book after the Board’s conglomeration of figures which no 




The Bengal Annual Report, and the accompanying reply from the Lieutenant-Governor, was 
made public and issued to district officers for the first time in 1860. Yule’s confident 
supposition that it was a document usually ignored by district officers revealed the attitude 
towards superfluous paperwork.  
Yule asked the Lieutenant-Governor to reconsider his decision. Mr Richardson pleaded 
with the Government, as due to the unexpected pay cut he was unable to take furlough. 
Richardson concluded that he had been ‘disgraced before the whole Service’.149 Mr 
Richardson’s predicament revealed how inconsistent and haphazard the channels of 
communication could be between the district and the provincial Government. His own 
personal intercourse with his superiors was perceived as fair. However, some 
miscommunication or private discussion at the central offices of the Board and the Bengal 
secretariat resulted in severe consequences. These incidents aided in the perception of an 
oppositional construct between the men-on-the-spot and the machine of Government. The 
reporting and interpretation of decision-making from the district level to the centre became 
increasingly formulaic. While district officers were encouraged to make autonomous 
decisions the subsequent accountability was rigorous. The juxtaposition of personal 
judgement and official opinion was most evident in cases of inter-colleague criticism.  
In 1865, Mr Shawe, Judge at Sylhet, accused the Collector, Mr Drummond, of being 
listless, apathetic and chronically dilatory.
150
 C. T. Buckland, Commissioner of the Division, 
was appalled at these charges, and claimed Mr Drummond was the most hardworking officer 
under his supervision. Buckland further argued ‘it is my belief that the sole interest and 
pleasure of his life lies in the performance of his public duty’.151 Buckland had to concede that 
Drummond was a slow worker, and his decision-making was a laborious process, resulting in 
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reports which described every detail.
152
 Furthermore, he was a man overly ‘anxious to do 
every thing himself; who is not disposed (nor without reason) to trust any of his Omlah’.153 
Drummond was the epitome of James Young’s overanxious and suspicious district officer. 
Regrettably, Sylhet was a complicated district with a considerable workload, and 
Drummond’s habits were unsuited to the demands of the office. Buckland was forced to 
conclude that Drummond was not the right man for Sylhet, and his zealous approach would 
be better suited to a quieter district. 
Yet it was Mr Shawe who received the most severe condemnation for his actions. The 
Lieutenant-Governor asserted Shawe had been motived ‘rather by prejudice against Mr 
Drummond than by a desire to promote the interests of the public service’.154 Subsequently, 
Shawe was encouraged to retire from the public service as he had already been suffering from 
ill health. The main critique of the competition system was that it would destroy the esprit des 
corps of the ICS. Openly criticising colleagues was evidently discouraged, private remedies 
were preferable to public exposure. This emphasis on cohesion and the effort to preserve the 
impression of camaraderie was most evident in the conduct rules surrounding discretion and 
information.  
The maintenance of the public image of the service featured prominently in conduct 
manuals throughout the period. In 1843, the Foreign Department published the following 
orders: ‘the practice of making use of official information in carrying on personal 
controversies is a course highly prejudicial to the public interests’.155 Throughout the 
nineteenth century the Government tried to establish the boundaries of discretion and public 
discussion. There were particular concerns relating to official documents appearing in 
newspapers and injuring the British Government in India.  
Initially, it appears that the Government trusted in the discretion of its civil servants. 
District officers were advised that ‘a Government servant may contribute anonymously to the 
Press, but must confine himself within the limits of temperate and reasonable discussion’.156 
Officials were only permitted to become proprietors of newspapers or publications if they 
were devoted to non-political matters. Subject to the approval of Government they could edit 
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and manage an arts, science or literature publication.
157
 Civilian officials were permitted to 
‘undertake occasional work of a literary or artistic character, provided that his public duties do 
not suffer thereby; but the Government may, in its discretion, at any time forbid him to 
undertake or require him to abandon any employment which in its opinion is undesirable’.158 
Governing literature clearly fell under the acceptable categories dictated by this regulation. 
In 1878, the Governor-General confidently asserted that no particular orders were 
necessary regarding the disclosure of official information, and that these matters were 
‘necessarily be left to the discretion and intelligence of officers holding places of trust, and in 
charge of duties more or less important.’159 Cotton commented that he and civil servants often 
supplemented their incomes by writing for the press, and that the Government of the 1870s 
was unconcerned by their activities.
160
 The trust in the district official to manage his 
reputation, as well as that of the service and Government more generally was acceptable until 
later in the nineteenth century.  
Professionalism, especially in Government employ, was a new rhetoric which turned the 
innate gentlemanly attributes of honour, trust and responsibility into managed skills. Instead 
of being inherent abilities, trust and discretion had to be educated into a new middle class 
cohort of civil servants. This transition reflected anxieties around class and communication 
technologies, and betrayed the ebbing confidence of the British Government. In 1885, the 
Governor-General circulated new orders regarding the publicity of Government business. He 
stated that:  
 
in former days when India was comparatively isolated, when there were no 
telegraphs, and when newspapers were neither numerous nor widely circulated, 





The Governor-General explained that in the new technologically advanced age the potential 
for embarrassment was serious. It was increasingly difficult to keep information restricted to 
the Indian governmental sphere. This shift marked a new tone in the conduct guidance for 
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district officers. The 1885 circular described the role of professional reticence, and explained 




Officers of Government are bound to be as reserved in respect to all matters that 
may come within their cognisance during the discharge of their public duties as 





This new language of professionalism placed the district officer in the same category as a 
professional career, and not a duty of service. The ideals of trust, character and integrity were 
being subverted under the new ethos of professionalism. The district officer was no longer 
trusted to exercise his discretion. By the end of the century, the conduct rules surrounding 
public image and information disclosure were strict and unyielding: ‘a Government servant 
may not convey to the public in his own name whether in writing or in a speech or otherwise, 
any opinion upon any principle approved or action taken by the Government’.164 This strict 
and unyielding rule, and the implied consequences, acted in conflict with the enduring image 
of the autonomous ideal district official. The increasing codification of the district officer 
necessitated an expansion of the procedures regarding dismissal. These policies were equally 
focused on individual responsibility within the greater machine of Government.  
‘The duty of exact obedience’: Dismissal 
 
During the nineteenth century, dismissal and reappointment procedures transitioned from an 
opportunity to defend character, to a means of ensuring accountability. Disciplinary processes 
were often viewed as arbitrary or clumsy, and the inconsistent application of policy reflected 
the reluctance of the Government to condemn civil servants. In the majority of cases, the 
British Government in India was determined to prevent a district official from resorting to 
formal proceedings.
165
 In order to preserve the reputation of the ICS, the process of removal 
and appeal was designed to enable the Government to selectively support those cases which 
were most likely to have a positive outcome.  
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Although rarely resorted to, official channels and appeals to Government did provide an 
avenue for vindication. These procedures recognised the right of the civil servant to exercise 
his authority, defend his character, and seek redress. Maintaining the integrity and 
accountability of autonomous decisions was fundamental for the persona of the idealised 
district officer. For a formal public inquiry to take place, accusations had to be drawn up into 
distinct articles of charge.
166
 Officers who were subject to criminal charges were immediately 
suspended, and were not reinstated until fully acquitted.
167
  The support of the local 
Government was contingent on the perceived innocence of the official, ‘if the conduct was 
clearly wrong from the first he will be left to defend the action at his own charge’.168 As with 




The anxious and clandestine attitude towards the incompetent district official was 
reflected in the regulations. In 1851, the Board of Revenue stated: ‘when officers removed for 
inaptitude or other causes not involving disgrace, the word “dismissal” should not be used’.170 
Allegedly, this phrasing was used to distinguish the ICS from Indian subordinates, who if 
dismissed were prevented from reemployment in other districts or provinces. For British 
civilian officials the word removal was preferable to dismissal, it sounded less severe and 
could be interpreted as a decision unconnected with incompetence.
171
 The general blunderers 
were hushed up and discreetly sent home. Removals from service were often rephrased as 
early retirements or for reasons of health. The British Indian Government was aware that it 
had to be seen to punish serious misdemeanours, but the middling failures could be tidied 
away in private.  
Concerns around public opinion, at home and abroad, defined the more vigilant attitude 
of the later nineteenth century. In 1890, the Government of India decided that without the 
approval of local Government, civilian officials could not have ‘recourse to any Court or to 
the press for the vindication of his public acts or character from defamatory attacks’.172 This 
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policy could strategically silence disgruntled employees and keep embarrassments in the 
governmental sphere. Yet, the Government claimed that this rule did not affect the right of 
any official to ‘vindicate his private acts or character’.173 As a result of this policy, the options 
open to a civil servant through which he could defend his actions were increasingly limited. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Government of British India was explicit about 
the management of the official persona: ‘his official reputation is in the charge of the 
Government he serves, it is for that Government to decide in each case whether the institution 
of proceedings to vindicate his public acts or character is necessary or expedient’.174 The 
persona of the model district officer had transitioned from being cultivated and exercised by 
the individual to being managed by the Government. While this shift involved greater 
codification and more bureaucratic processes, it was still a clear commitment to a method of 
governance through a symbolically powerful district official. The desire to regulate and 
manage the persona and official conduct was in response to anxieties surrounding the 
accountability of the district officer. These changes were in fact efforts to maintain and secure 




This chapter has challenged the coherent and stable narrative which has been previously 
ascribed to the ICS. The absence of incompetence, corruption, and debt from histories of the 
British Indian Government neglects the considerable impact that these activities, and the 
anxieties they produced, had on the official mind. During the nineteenth century the culture of 
character, gentlemanly honour and trust gave way to a professional persona. Conduct and 
character transitioned from the personal responsibility of the district officer to the 
management and preserve of Government. This shift occurred alongside the development of 
the governance of conduct. The increased presence of civil service regulations and codes of 
conduct in the late nineteenth century reflected the desire to remedy a problem that was 
perceived as significant in official life. Governing literature revealed the conflicted attempt 
within the British Indian Government to prevent abuse through an irreconcilable combination 
of moral autonomy and increasing professionalisation. 
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The management of conduct was a problem borne from the idealised persona of the 
district official. In essence, the idealised district officer was a universalised model of the 
personal style of rule, but as a practised role it conflicted with the expanding bureaucratic 
government of British India. The continued investment in this problematic role meant that the 
ICS had to find ways of resolving the problems of human error and incompetence. In order to 
maintain the idealised district officer the Government of India had to respond pragmatically to 
issues of debt, violence, fraud, incompetence, personal misconduct, public embarrassment and 
official mistakes. 
The persona of the district officer was constructed through moments of contestation. 
This role was fashioned through the rejection or modification of incompatible ideas and 
behaviours. A combination of the scrutiny of the British Government and the Indian public 
shaped the policies surrounding the management of conduct. This idealised role was created 
reciprocally, and the boundaries of activity were defined by undesirable conduct as much as 






On 2 August 1922 during a debate about impending changes to the pension rules of the ICS, 
Lloyd George argued: 
 
As I said once in this House, there are men governing huge territories there whose 
name is hardly known. Even when they retire, and you meet them, they are 
introduced to you as members of the Indian Civil Service, and you have never 
heard of them, although they have been governing, perhaps, tens of millions of 
people for a very long period, their every word a command, every sentence a 
decree, accepted by these people, accepted willingly, with trust in their judgment 





Lloyd George’s choice to invoke the idealised district officer in his passionate plea on behalf 
of ICS pensioners reveals the enduring legacy of this imagined and practised persona.
2
 The 
retired men of the 1920s were the competitioners of the 1880s. They had been the civil 
servants of the Raj in the high noon of Empire. In British India the district officer was 
imagined and also practised as an autonomous decision maker at the centre of projects of 
governance. Yet, on his return home, he was rendered anonymous.  
The closing discussion of this thesis argues that the process of retirement threw into 
sharp relief the significance and status of the idealised district officer’s persona. For the men 
of the ICS the retirement experience was characterised by disillusionment and alienation.
3
 A 
loss of racial prestige combined with a shift in quality of life made the return to Britain a 
disappointment for many. The alienation and disappointment felt by the pensioners of the ICS 
reflected the power and influence they had experienced in their working lives.
4
 Buettner has 
explored the role of ‘home’ in the transient lives of British Indians.5 For the men of the ICS 
and their families the idea of Britain and home ‘united what were often highly idealized 
understandings of the nation, family intimacy and domesticity’.6 As Buettner explains, after 
careers of frequent relocation within India and infrequent visits home, retiring and returning 
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was the conclusion to an existence defined by permanent impermanence. However, returned 
British Indians could not shake the feeling of transience, and sought companionship in 
communities of shared experience. Buettner explores Bayswater, Cheltenham and Bedford as 
places favoured by retirees, wives and children. These communities offered suitable schools, 
the ability to maintain middle class identity, and existing familiar networks of other British 
Indians. The next generation, on seeing their parents’ reduced circumstances often longed for 
India encouraged by the nostalgia and experiences of childhood. Buettner has demonstrated 
conclusively that Empire was a family business, and young men were incentivised to apply 
for the ICS based on their family background and social circle. This often meant that families 




Retirement and pensions were as rigorously codified as all other aspects of Indian 
Government. In 1804, the Bengal Civil Fund was created with the intention of maintaining 
widows and orphans, as well as providing a small subsistence for medical leave. The EIC 
Directors agreed that its employees were ‘often reduced to the necessity of a temporary return 
to Europe by ill health, originating in, or increased by, a zealous discharge of their official 
duties an ungenial climate’.8 Rules surrounding medical leave became increasingly complex, 
and by 1889, explicit certification was required before it could be granted. The certificate was 
required to clearly state the illness, its symptoms, causes and likely duration, as well as 
estimate the amount of medical leave required and the recommended location for recovery.
9
 
In 1808, it was agreed that the Bengal Civil Fund would also act as a pension.
10
 Despite this 
existing provision in 1824, a Bengal Annuity Fund was also organised ‘for the grant of 
annuities to the civil servants of the said Company, on their retiring from the service’.11 
Subscribing to the Civil and Annuity funds was initially encouraged, but eventually it formed 
a compulsory part of the Civil Service Covenant. These subscriptions were collected through 
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a four percent salary deduction.
12
 In 1862, the Secretary of State for India assumed control 
over the funds, but the business of subscription, application and distribution remained in the 
hands of a committee of managers, as had always been the arrangement.
13
 However, just ten 
years later the Pension Code was enacted ‘which rendered the continuance of the machinery 
of the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Civil Annuity Funds unnecessary’, and the various funds 
were absorbed into the Government.
14
  
The period between the 1860s and 1880s was characterised by frenzied and anxious 
encoding emanating from the Finance Department.
15
 This culminated in the Pension Act 
(1871) and its realisation as the Pension Code (1872). By exploring the debates, controversies 
and revisions of the Pension Code Poorva Rajaram reveals a fascinating paranoia around 
fraud, efficiency and aging.
16
 Although mainly focusing on Indian uncovenanted claimants, 
Rajaram demonstrates that ‘constant changes within the code were an indication that some of 
the ideas and procedures that came embedded in the code did not get instant epistemological 
or operational traction in the functioning of the workplace’.17 Like other legislative 
frameworks in British India, the Pension Code also facilitated space for interpretation. 
Retiring civilians received a pension based on the rules in force at the time of 
resignation, and not those on commencement of service.
18
 Pensions could be withheld or 
withdrawn by the Government if the recipient committed a crime or was found guilty of 
grave misconduct.
19
 The specific regulations affecting the Covenanted Civil Service were 
contained in a supplementary appendix of the 1872 Code. The salient principle of the 
Covenanted Civil Service pension was as follows:   
 
An officer who has been twenty-five years in the service counting from the date of 
his covenant, or from the date of the despatch of the Secretary of State announcing 
his appointment (whichever may have been earlier), and who has rendered 
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twenty-two years active service, is entitled, on his resignation of the service being 




The promise of an annuity of £1,000 became one of the chief incentives for pursuing an 
Indian career. However, in 1862 complaints were raised that neither the four percent 
subscription nor the government contribution provided the full £1,000.
21
 The petitioners 
claimed that the state donation to the fund was only £361 per annum, and that in order to save 
up the full pension realistically a district official would have to retire at 28 years’ service 
rather than 25.
22
 One of the reasons cited for the shortfall in contributions was the expense of 
living in India.  
By analysing the rise in the cost of food, rent, conveyances, clothes, medicine and 
education over a period of 20 years the Salaries Commission Report demonstrated that in 
1886 the cost of living had significantly increased.
23
 The transient behaviours of Indian Civil 
Servants were expensive: ‘he will have been obliged on one or more occasions to send home 
his wife and children, and to keep up two establishments with all the heavy charges 
consequent upon the maintenance of a family at a distance’.24 Hill stations acted as an 
alternative or additional expense especially for district officers stationed in regions with 
challenging climates.
25
 Despite these unusual circumstances and the expense involved the 
ICS did enjoy a more comfortable life than their salary would have provided in Britain, 
servants were cheaper and houses were more affordable. If accommodation was not provided 
as part of the district establishment a housing allowance was granted.
26
 General subsistence 
and travel were often at the expense of the Government and even horses were subsidised. 
This was a quality of life unachievable in Cheltenham or Bayswater. 
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The cost of living issue was aggravated by the following rule: ‘a pension is fixed in 
rupees, and not in sterling money, even though it is to be paid in England’.27 The regulations 
of 1889 fixed the exchange rate at the following amount, ‘if the annuitant was a member of 
the Bengal Civil Service – 10 2/3 Government rupees for each pound sterling’.28 The 
depreciating value of silver, on which the rupee was based, rendered the pensions 
increasingly insufficient, (see table 1). If an officer became medically incapacitated and could 
be declared as such by a certificate, he was entitled to an annuity of £500 if he had been less 
than five years in the service. Medical pensioners of more than five years’ service were 
granted £150 per annum, plus £20 for every completed year. The maximum possible 
incapacity pension for anyone who had been more than five years in the service was £450. At 
less than half the standard pension this sum would leave a retired man of the ICS 
uncomfortably close to the lower end of the middle classes.
29
  
Members of the ICS argued that a substantial and fair pension was a just reward for a 
career which entailed serious health risks. The assumption of control by the Government in 
the 1860s, and the subsequent pension Code were considered a betrayal of trust by many 
pensioners. They argued that they had not agreed to the Code, they had signed a Covenant on 
the basis that a pension would be managed and delivered according to certain terms. The 
pension was viewed as a guarantee and a right of the service. In 1862, H. Stainforth and 285 
other Bengal Civilians submitted a memorial insisting the pension was ‘one of the principal 
inducements to enter the Service, and greatly contributes to the maintenance of that zeal and 
devotedness in the public service, irrespective of consideration of insalubrity of climate or of 
personal risk, which your petitioners believe to be one of the recognized characters of their 
service’.30 This argument that the zeal and devotion to the ICS was contingent on receiving a 
pension somewhat undermined the ideal of a benevolent district official.  
ICS pensioners were aware of contradicting their image and did not want to undermine 
the idealised persona of the district officer or appear too similar to the greedy Nabobs of the 
eighteenth century.
31
 Petitions and memorials often challenged perceived misconceptions 
about the financial prospects of the ICS. Even in the 1860s there was still an emphasis on 
dispelling the legacy of the corpulent lavish Company men. When contesting revisions to the 
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pension rules civil servants always insisted that the public had ‘an exaggerated notion of the 
riches which have been accumulated by Indian officials.’32 There was a conscious distancing 
from accusations of greed or ill-gotten gains, and the pension was actively portrayed as a 
reward for hard work. Therefore, the pension was represented as a positive way to induce 
good men into the Service.  
Memorialists claimed ‘any reduction in their salaries will render the Indian Civil 
Service, as a career, unattractive to the more highly educated and respectable classes in 
England.’33 These arguments were obviously motivated by self-interest, but they also 
betrayed the shared commitment to the persona of the idealised district officer. There were 
concerns that generous pensions accessed early in life would attract more money orientated 
individuals to the service. Bartle Frere argued that too liberal a pension granted at an early 
age ‘will tend to induce men to look to service in India, not as the duty of their lives, but as a 
mere prelude to a middle age to be passed in England, in English professions, aided by an 
Indian pension’.34 While memorialists tended to emphasise their duty to the service, 
realistically members of the ICS retired in middle age and could face living out the rest of 
their days on a meagre income if they could not find alternative employment.  
A minimum of 25 years active service, with 22 resident in India, qualified a civil 
servant for his pension. This minimum service was frequently criticised in comparison to the 
Company days when men either worked until death or retired in India: ‘the majority of civil 
servants are in a position to take the annuity as soon as they can get it, and the proportion 
who are either obliged or tempted to remain longer than 25 years in the service, becomes less 
and less everyday’.35 There was a law of limitation which insisted that ‘no civil servant shall 
hold any office for more than five years, if at the end of that time he shall have completed a 
service of 35 years or upwards, including any furlough he may have taken to the extent of 
four years’.36 The rule of limitation was devised to ensure the promotion hierarchy could 
continue to progress. By limiting longevity in particular roles, junior members of the service 
could climb the seniority ladder. Uncovenanted civilians frequently remained in post for up to 
forty years.
37
  It was argued there was a clear and logical distinction ‘between the two classes 
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of officers; for the former class [covenanted] is required, as a rule, to retire; while the latter 
[uncovenanted] is required, as a rule, to be retained, the result, in both cases alike, being 
decided by what  is most expedient in the public interests’.38 With the average ICS candidate 
entering the service at an age between 19 and 23 during the period under consideration, the 
maximum age of a retiring district officer, including furlough or any special leave, would 
rarely exceed 65. Based on an anecdotal study conducted by Mr A. Tupp in 1897, there were 
51 ICS pensioners over the age of 75, and 20 of these were over 85 years of age. This 
insistence on limiting service and returning home was not entirely based on health and 
ensuring consistent career development for junior officials. There was a sense that it was not 
appropriate to age in front of the colonised.
39
  
It was not only aging which was obscured from view by the process of retirement. The 
discussions surrounding the process of retiring revealed the significant anxieties about the 
public character and conduct of the retiring official. In May 1885, the Home Department 
circulated the following rule: 
 
all servants of Government covenanted or uncovenanted, are forbidden to receive 
compliments or valedictory address in any form; or accept testimonials of any 
kind; or to attend public meetings or complimentary entertainments of a formal or 




This rule was explicitly targeted towards retiring civilians who were informed that any 
addresses or celebrations of retirement would be viewed with disapproval and disfavour by 
the Government. This policy reflected the development of conduct management. Retirement 
rules increasingly appeared in the governing literature of the late nineteenth century. The 
Secretary of State claimed, it was ‘clearly objectionable that retired officers should receive 
presents. If such a practice were to be approved, it might obviously lead to the violation of 
the spirit of the law and rules, and to aspersion on the character of public officers’.41 Gifts 
were not permissible, but portraits, busts, and statues requested by a public body as 
recognition of service were allowed as long as they were not presented to the officer. A 
public fund for education or charitable projects in honour of the retiring civilian official was 
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permitted if the subscriptions were unsolicited and entirely voluntary.
42
 By preventing public 
thanks, either ceremonial or pecuniary, the district officer avoided, by association, showing 
favour to a particular group.  
The limits placed on formal farewells, tributes and gifts were supposedly intended to 
prevent any favouritism towards the departing district officer or his staff. By preventing 
public commemoration or recognition of service, the new district officer could easily 
transition into the role without the memories and achievements of his predecessor dominating 
public opinion. This legislation also ensured that the district officer remained a disinterested 
official persona and not a personal role. In 1887, the circular was reissued in order to 
emphasise the rules surrounding retirement. Retiring officers were only allowed to ‘take part 
in a private farewell entertainment, attended only by personal friends, as a mark of regard to 
himself when retiring from the service or quitting a district’.43 For a role so absolutely 
defined by the capacity for individual action, by the late 1880s these men were refused the 
reward of personal acknowledgement for their work.  
This process of being forgotten was further confirmed on the return to Britain. Memoirs 
and governing literature narratives often paint a rather gloomy picture of the life of a retired 
Indian officer. Prichard’s satire The Chronicles of Budgepore claimed the ‘man who has just 
returned wears the fact in his face, in his coat, in his boots’.44 The Indian pensioner was 
frequently portrayed as sallow or red faced, languid and suffering from liver problems. On his 
return he was usually dressed unfashionably. Hull gave an example of a friend having to 
spend £40 before he could be considered respectably attired again.
45
 Andrew Crawford, a 
retired Indian army officer, presented a bleak existence for the ICS pensioner: 
 
he will be unable to mix in society and to reciprocate hospitalities as has been his 
wont, to travel, or in short to do anything but vegetate: he will not even be able to 
employ himself beyond digging or weeding in a garden (if that may be considered 
employment): he will certainly be unable to earn anything, or by his exertions eke 
out his scanty means.
46
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Crawford did have a particular agenda in portraying the life of the retired civil servant as 
miserable. He was the originator of a retiree scheme in Tasmania. In October 1867, the 
Tasmanian parliament had granted the district of Castra for the use of European settlers from 
India. Crawford offered an active life in congenial society. The settlement presented a 
comparable existence to the life of a district officer instead of idleness at home: ‘my idea of 
what is desirable is a small home-farm where all the necessaries of life can be raised under 
the immediate personal supervision of the owner, whilst he has several acres sub-let over 
which he can, on horseback, also exercise a general control.’47 Crawford had some moderate 
success, by 1870 he had fifty gentleman settled in the district. This alternative existence was 
more reminiscent of the outdoors idealised life of the district official than the misery of an 
English village. However, as expressed by H.G. Keene, the majority of the men of the ICS 
looked ‘forward to a retirement in the British islands, where they hope to find compensation 
for the need, sorrow, sickness and other adversity that they may meet in their transitory life of 
Indian probation’.48 
The image of a retirement characterised by lonely genteel poverty was consistently 
deployed during pension reform campaigns. A petition from Bombay civil servants claimed 
that the pensioner lived ‘more or less isolation in society in England; while it may be added 
that the long severance from early friends and relations is found greatly to increase the 
difficulty of providing for a family’.49 If pensioners had never married or could not settle in 
one of the British Indian retired communities it was probable that they would have few 
connections on their return home. As one satirical novel quipped ‘the civil service is, on the 
whole, perhaps the greatest institution of the country; but when a civilian goes home for good 
he is at once a nobody, much less an institution’.50 
In 1862, Montgomery Martin believed ‘Anglo-Indian’s of every degree at home are, as 
a rule, anxious to work if they can only find employments; and if a “bad liver” is occasionally 
to be found among them, it is generally coupled with a good heart’.51 Retired district officers 
were the most prolific writers of manuals, handbooks, guides and literature. Contributing to 
scholarship, providing opinions and perspective and or compiling advice was considered an 
appropriate occupation. In prefaces, introductions and concluding remarks authors frequently 
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revealed a long held intention of writing governing literature or indeed represented the text as 
the duty of their office. William Edwards opened his memoir thus ‘from my first entrance on 
the active duties of an Indian civilian’s life I cherished the desire should I ever retire from the 
service, to compile a narrative of my own time’.52 Kerr suggested keeping one daily diary and 
a condensed weekly diary: ‘I would weekly transcribe such parts of the former as I thought 
worthy, or which, I fancied, might be interesting to friends at home, or useful at some future 
time’. 53 
It is perhaps unsurprising that a group of men who dedicated their lives to a career in 
which they had to record every decision and justify every action through a bureaucratic paper 
trail chose to produce a considerable number of memoirs, guides and manuals.
54
 However, 
this thesis maintains that this outpouring speaks to a deeper anxiety felt by the district officers 
of the ICS. In his memoir, Keene emotionally describes a public address he received in 1879: 
‘before leaving Agra, I had the gratification of receiving a spontaneous and unanimous 
address from the local Bar, expressed in terms far more complimentary than I thought my just 
due’.55 He described it as one of his most treasured possessions and cited it at length. A sense 
of having had a beneficial impact was a frequent theme in the memoirs of retired district 
officers, and in many subsequent historical accounts of the British in India. Mr Gordon 
recalled how he ‘was complimented on the result of the influence I had exercised; and now I 
was to leave the place where I had employed nearly two years in creating that influence, and 
go among a people who knew me not’.56 This desire to have had some enduring impression 
was keenly felt, especially as the possibility of positive or even personal influence was often 
frustrated in the conduct of their work, either by bureaucracy, the frequency of moving from 
district to district, or the limited resources at their disposal. Governing literature provided the 
opportunity to leave a legacy. Mason claims that ‘many a man kept till his death the 
settlement report that he wrote in his thirties … his heart would be in the introduction, 
describing in loving terms the country and people where he had been so happy’.57 The 
juxtaposition of the symbolic prominence of the district officer in governing literature, law 
and discourse, and the reality of being forgotten or not being allowed to be remembered was 
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presumably the impetus to write memoirs, manuals, guidebooks and novels. For George 
Orwell, the tragedy was realising he was wearing the mask of the coloniser, but for the 
majority it was the process of leaving the mask behind that was most traumatic.  
 
I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own 
freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of hollow, posing dummy, the 
conventionalized figure of a sahib. For it is the condition of his rule that he shall 
spend his life in trying to impress the ‘natives’ and so in every crisis he has got to 





In Orwell’s own dilatory process of embracing this persona, he barely glimpsed how 
influential this imagined and practised role was. The district officer was more than just an 
instrument for violence and control, and while, like a mask, the persona was assumed, 
imitated and passed on, it was not, like a hollow dummy, fixed and empty. The role was 
embraced and integrated, and furthermore, it reciprocally shaped the governors and their 
governance. In 1894, during a debate about the decision-making powers of district officers, 
Mr Hare, Collector at Midnapore, who was described as a man of much experience and 
ability, concluded:  
 
The old system of giving Collectors discretion has on the whole worked very well. 
Many officers have grown grey under what is termed the “embarrassing 
responsibility” without being much the worse for it ... It is the great fault of the 
Modern Indian Government that it is so cast iron in its system in a matter such as 




Too often, it has been the cast iron system, the steel frame of the Raj which has been the 
focus of our attention, rather than the men functioning under and around the bureaucracy of 
British India. The discretionary capacity of district officials in nineteenth-century Bengal has 
been obscured by the focus on the modern bureaucratic British Indian Government. One Mr 
Stevens, supported Mr Hare, and explained the importance of these discretionary powers: ‘A 
Collector is constantly expected to “use his influence” in matters which are not covered by 
any law. His influence in his district is primarily derived from the general powers which he 
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has for good or for evil’.60 As Stevens argued, the autonomy of decision-making could exist 
outside the realm of the law as well as within its limits. According to the district officers there 
were pragmatic daily acts of governance which could not be covered by procedure. Indeed, as 
this thesis has argued, policy could be a product of issues identified by district officers, and 
thus governing practice was often contingent on the experience and ability of the district 
official. At the end of the nineteenth century, these Bengal Collectors defended their 
independent powers by reminding the British Government in India that its reach was limited, 
and frequently it was the man-on-the-spot who was best placed to decide. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the idealised district officer – both imagined and 
practised – influenced ideas of governance in Bengal. It was a persona actively crafted, 
constantly contested, imagined, practised and re-negotiated. By examining the discursive 
construction of the district official in instructional texts as well as legislation this thesis has 
argued that a model idea of a civil servant dominated the official mind. It was a role 
constructed by the Indian experience and it contributed reciprocally to policies and practices 
of recruitment, survey and settlement, and corporal punishment. This thesis has shown that 
not only did the idea of an autonomous, paternalistic and benevolent district officer exist 
outside of the Punjab, but that this model persona endured throughout the nineteenth century.  
The idealised district official was considered best equipped to deal with resistance as a 
result of his personal contact with the subject race and his intimate knowledge of the locality. 
The continued commitment to the district officer revealed that the British Government not 
only acknowledged the potential for instability, but frequently saw the solution in an idealised 
persona. The district officer’s capacity to be an ‘everyman’ rather than betraying a weak 
malleability, instead revealed his universal and fundamental appeal to the process of 
colonialism. However, this idealised role was increasingly irreconcilable with the expanding 
bureaucratisation of Indian Government.  
Robb argued that the British Indian system became over concentrated and ‘as a strategy 
for maintaining order, generalised control headed by a European district officer became less 
and less practical’.61 However, this thesis asserts that, despite the impractical nature of the 
man-on-the-spot as a strategy of Government, the idea of a benevolent autonomous paternal 
district official continued to influence Bengal policy. Furthermore, these anxieties and 
tensions between the independence of the district officer’s decisions and the bureaucratic 
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system of rules and regulations reciprocally shaped this model persona. He was re-imagined 
as the head of a bureaucratic machine, a decision maker further empowered by the control of 
information. As a rebranded expert the district officer could continue to act as the 
coordinating authority of local Government. The renewed focus on the expertise of the 
district official was part of the ongoing reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of Indian 
administrative labour. As the tasks previously attributed to the British man-on-the-spot were 
increasingly carried out by Indian junior officers and subordinates, the imagined district 
officer was reinvigorated and prominently represented as the persona who knew India best. 
This recourse to the idealised district official during moments of crisis or reform further 
confirmed the preference for the model district officer as a strategy of British rule.  
The significance of the idealised officer emerged out of the consolidation of British rule 
in the 1850s and early 1860s. It was during this time that governing literature began to be 
produced and used by aspiring and serving civilian officials. This thesis has explored this 
previously underutilised source group to demonstrate the prevalence and significance of such 
texts. The market for these books was diverse and popular. The success and importance of 
governing literature was evidenced by the decision of the British Indian Government to 
produce its own official manuals in the later nineteenth century. Ranging from travel guides 
to legal compendiums, governing literature curated and communicated the imagined model 
district officer. These texts often provided the first interaction with ideas of British rule in 
India for potential civil servants, and reinforced the imagined role for existing officials. By 
documenting the characteristics of the idealised officer, manuals, guides and handbooks 
produced a practical role. Furthermore, they collated policy and law into more accessible 
forms. Governing literature incorporated the idealised district officer alongside legislation 
and procedures, thereby encouraging a relationship between colonial governance, law and the 
man-on-the-spot. Acting as mundane technologies, governing literature influenced the 
procedures of Government and shaped the governors.  
The idealised district officer also became a medium for discussions of governance 
during the advent of the competitive examination system. From the initial instigation of the 
exams, the model district official was the envisaged end product of the system. The process 
of application, examination and probation were all orientated around selecting, testing and 
improving candidates who would best fit the autonomous, benevolent and paternalistic civil 
servant. The extent to which the imagined district officer shaped the practice of recruitment 
and examination has been underestimated by historiography. Often interpreted as part of the 
reforming mentality of the mid-Victorian period, the history of the competitive system has 
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been dominated by metropolitan and high political discussions. By focusing on British Indian 
debates about governance, Chapter Two reveals that the idealised district officer was at the 
centre of the examinations and was consistently presented as the desirable outcome to 
aspiring applicants. By exploring the examinations themselves, which have been 
underutilised, this thesis offers further analysis of the official mind of British India. The 
concerns about age, nationality and class background further revealed the centrality of an 
idealised persona for the ICS. Combined with governing literature, the examinations shaped 
the expectations of newly qualified civil servants as they began their British Indian careers.  
Chapter Three explored the impact of this idealised persona in the practises of 
settlement and survey. Initially dismissed as unskilled and unprofessional in favour of the 
scientific surveyor, the revenue official was relegated to a background function. However, as 
revenue reform was reoriented around the rights of the peasant cultivator the district officer 
once again became the key decision maker. Influenced by the idealised imagined man-on-the-
spot, the practice of surveying and settlement became contingent on the experience and 
knowledge of the revenue official. Specifically, the process of boundary demarcation was 
entrusted to local officials and the work of the Settlement Officer as arbitrator and executor 
of policy was recognised. The post-1885 Tenancy Act survey and settlement of Chittagong 
recognised the necessity of local Government and district officers. While the revenue official 
still had to operate within agreed discretionary limits, his decision-making capacity was 
empowered by the belief in his local knowledge and experience.  
Chapter Four examined the role and influence of the idealised persona in the practice of 
law and the work of the Judge and Magistrate. The rule of law in British India was always 
underpinned by an ideological commitment to a civilising and benevolent Government. As a 
result, violence, especially violence inflicted by the law was an awkward and contradictory 
paradox. By recasting the Magistrate and Judge as instructional parents who knew their 
children best, the British Raj could continue to exercise its rule and avoid claims of 
inconsistency. In the debate surrounding the Whipping Act the opinions of the district 
officers were consistently privileged. Furthermore, the judiciary utilised the Whipping Act 
debate to assert their independence and establish the autonomy of legal power in the districts. 
District officers had a direct influence on policy during the reform of the Whipping Act and it 
was the imagined idealised Judge and Magistrate who shaped the retention, utilisation and 
expansion of corporal punishment in British India.  
The imagined idealised district officer was often destabilised by the contradictions 
created by the role in practise. Chapter Five explored those who failed to live up to the 
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idealised role and caused anxieties and tensions through their incompetence, debt and 
corruption. Concerns about the impact of a compromised ideal district official produced new 
bureaucratic measures, conduct manuals and legislative frameworks. While autonomy was 
recognised and preserved it increasingly operated above a safety net of rules and regulations. 
Similar to the competitive examinations, the efforts to negotiate the human error of the 
practised district officer revealed the commitment of the British Government to the ideal 
persona. By the end of the nineteenth century, the model district officer was increasingly 
defined and shaped by an anxious process of finding limits and boundaries.  
This commitment to conduct and image management continued through the process of 
retirement. By defining and restricting the exit from Empire, the British Government in India 
attempted to retain control over the impression left by the idealised and practised district 
officer. During debates over pension reform, the pensioners of the ICS frequently invoked 
their role as ideal district officers and the lynchpins of Government as a basis on which to 
demand financial satisfaction, and thereby public recognition. The disillusionment with 
retired life and dissatisfaction with pensions revealed how much the men of the ICS had 
embraced the role of knowledgeable, influential and benevolent patriarch. These frustrations 
were negated and expressed by contributing to governing literature, and adding their own 
experiences to the portrayal of the idealised district officer in India, ready to be consumed by 
the next generation.  
This thesis has argued that the district officer was more than a representation, that 
instead it was a tool of government, defined by, reflecting and producing the core anxieties 
and concerns about Empire. District officers were simultaneously compelled to obey the rules 
within a centrally-run bureaucratic machine, and yet were also concurrently expected to be 
examples of moral, manly autonomy. These fluctuating tensions resulted in a unique and 
powerful governing subject. The influence on policy and practice charted in this thesis has 
demonstrated the impact the imagined and practised role of the district officer had on the 
Government of British India in Bengal. Despite the growth of bureaucracy, the Government 
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